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Abstract
This thesis presents an assessment of farmers’ behaviour in response to current changes
in climate and policy in the UK. At present, many catchments in England are considered
as over licensed or over abstracted and although water licence trading is regarded as a
potential solution to the problem, and is currently possible, high transaction costs and
institutional barriers deter farmers from trading. In response, two new water allocation
systems have been proposed to provide farmers with the ability to adapt to climate and
demand change pressures (i.e. basic and enhanced systems). A review of the current
literature suggested farmers’ behaviour very much influences the success of policy in-
terventions. Therefore, this study sought to understand the behavioural intentions of
farmers in England, and the underlying factors which drive their decision-making, un-
der different climate and policy scenarios. Furthermore, this study examined whether
farmers with different behavioural intentions lead to different patterns of abstraction
behaviour at the system level, thus providing a means of assessing the current and
proposed water allocation systems.
An empirical survey was conducted within the Great Ouse catchment in eastern
England, UK, where freshwater availability for crop irrigation is considered highly vul-
nerable to climate change. The questionnaire, and subsequent interpretation of be-
haviours, was developed under the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned
Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991). Farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions were iden-
tified under different strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term) water shortage
and surplus scenarios. Furthermore, the TPB explained between 29-65 % of the vari-
ance in intention, based on Nagelkerke’s R2, and was similar to the range found by
meta-analytical reviews (i.e. 40-49 % based on R2). In addition, attitude and sub-
jective norm were found to be significant predictors of intention in three of the four
scenarios. Overall, farmers believed they have greater volitional control with regards
to decision-making in the long-term but less in the short-term. Furthermore, a be-
havioural farm typology based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions was used in
the development of an Agent-Based Model (ABM) to simulate system level patterns of
abstraction behaviour which emerge from individual farm level decision-making. The
scenario simulation results indicated the proposed enhanced water allocation system
was likely to provide the greatest utility to balance the needs of licence users, at least
farmers, whilst protecting the environment.
v
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Introduction2
This thesis presents an empirical investigation into farmer water abstraction behaviour3
in response to policy and climate change in an area of eastern England, where supple-4
mental irrigation is currently used to safeguard crop quality and to maintain expected5
yields. The current water allocation system in England is considered by the regulatory6
authorities as inadequate to provide users with the ability to adapt to climate change7
whilst providing adequate protection for the environment. In response, the Department8
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), who determine policy in England9
and Wales, have proposed two new water allocation systems, basic and enhanced, which10
aim to address the inadequacies of the current system. Despite important differences11
between the proposed systems, the encouragement of water licence trading underpins12
both. However, despite groups of stakeholders having been consulted, very little is13
known whether either of these allocation systems will achieve their intended aims.14
This thesis aims to address this issue and in doing so aid policy decision-makers in the15
design and implementation of the proposed systems.16
17
This chapter provides a general introduction to this thesis by discussing the im-18
portance of this research within the wider context of water resource management and19
climate change, with a particular focus on agricultural irrigation. Furthermore, it is20
argued that the success of the proposed water allocation systems largely depend on21
the response of users’ on the ground. It is this unknown factor which underpins the22
rationale for this research. Finally, this chapter highlights the main aim and subsequent23
research questions, including an overview of the methodological approaches used, which24
together form the main structure of this thesis.25
1
2 Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Rationale of the study26
1.1.1 A transition in freshwater resource management27
Water is clearly an essential natural resource for life on this planet, yet it is also clear28
that human activities are directly threatening freshwater systems (Vo¨ro¨smarty et al.,29
2010). In one of the first global syntheses investigating human and environmental per-30
spectives on water security, Vo¨ro¨smarty et al. (2010) reported on the level of impact31
that large-scale activities such as land cover change, urbanisation, industrialisation, as32
well as engineering projects such as reservoirs, irrigation and catchment transfers are33
having on the sustainability of these freshwater systems.34
35
Although these human activities bring considerable benefits to society, they also36
bring unanticipated social, economical, and ecological costs (Gleick, 2003). For ex-37
ample: the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China displaced more than one38
million people (World Commission on Dams, 2000); in 1999 27 % of all North Ameri-39
can freshwater fauna populations were considered threatened with extinction (Ricciardi40
and Rasmussen, 1999); and many rivers around the world such as the Nile; Huang He41
(Yellow); and the Colorado, no longer maintain adequate environmental flows to their42
deltas during average years (Gleick, 2003).43
44
Evidence gathered in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel45
on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that there is high agreement and robust evidence46
that freshwater related risks of climate change increase considerably with increasing47
greenhouse gas concentrations (Cisneros et al., 2014). In particular, for every degree48
Celsius of global warming approximately 7 % of the global population is projected to be49
exposed to a 20 % decrease in renewable freshwater resources. Furthermore, by the end50
of this century, under the Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 scenario, climate51
change is likely to increase the frequency of droughts within the agricultural sector, due52
to less precipitation and increased evapotranspiration, in current dry regions such as53
southern and central Europe and the Mediterranean. Overall, climate change, coupled54
with increased demand and non-climatic human activities previously mentioned, are55
likely to exacerbate local variability within the hydrological system and increase the56
vulnerability of those areas to floods and droughts (Cisneros et al., 2014).57
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However, in the last few decades a transition in freshwater resource management58
has occurred which attempts to tackle these unanticipated issues and potential risks59
of climate change. This transition complements the large-scale, high-cost, centralised60
infrastructure projects with low-cost, community-scale, decentralised systems. Largely61
instigated by major water reform policies prescribed by the International Food Policy62
Research Institute and the World Bank during the 1990s (Rosegrant and Binswanger,63
1994) these transitional approaches include: technological investment at the farm and64
catchment scale; encouragement of farmer abstraction groups to manage and improve65
current allocation systems; and to apply economic tools such as water markets and66
pricing. These water reforms aim to encourage: efficiency; productivity; and equitable67
distribution with the long-term aim of providing a sustainable allocation system to68
meet the demands of users without detriment to the environment (Gleick, 2003).69
70
1.1.2 Experiences of water markets71
The transition from large-scale, centralised, infrastructure projects to achieve continu-72
ous supplies of water to meet demand for small-scale, community based, water market73
mechanisms has struggled to achieve its intended aim (Garrick et al., 2013). Australia,74
Chile, South Africa, and the United States have encouraged and permitted water rights75
trading to improve allocation efficiency (Erfani et al., 2015). However, these mature76
water markets have experienced major problems ensuring sustainable environmental77
flows, with governments in Australia and the United States having to buy back water78
entitlements to protect the environment. In Australia, the government is in the middle79
of a $3.1 billion programme to buy back water for the environment (Wheeler et al.,80
2013). As a result of these unanticipated costs, Australia, South Africa and the United81
States, as well as emerging water markets in countries such as China (Zhang et al.,82
2014) and parts of the UK (DEFRA, 2016c), are in the process of reforming water83
allocations to improve efficiency and protect the environment (Young, 2014).84
85
In China, where water is readily available in the south but increasingly scarce in the86
north, a pilot project in the city of Zhangye found that the main reasons farmers were87
discouraged from saving water and trading surplus were due to high transaction costs in88
some areas and where transaction costs were low reasons included: management; legal;89
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administrative; and fiscal barriers (Zhang, 2007; Zhang et al., 2009, 2014). In parts of90
the UK similar institutional barriers which have discouraged water trading have been91
recognised, which restrict the ability to increase water allocation efficiency and also92
to meet water quality standards set by the European Union (EU) Water Framework93
Directive (EA, 2008). The same barriers to successful water markets are apparent in94
many developing countries (Thobani, 1998).95
96
Garrick et al. (2013) supported these findings and summarised water markets as97
systems which involve two factors: first, a system which balances demand for human98
requirements and demand for sustainable flows to protect the environment; and second,99
a system which establishes tradeable water rights to allocate water within and across100
productive sectors. The experiences of mature water markets in Australia, Chile, South101
Africa, and the United States indicate that the current policies in these countries do not102
fully protect the environment and further institutional reforms are required (Bjornlund103
and McKay, 2002). Therefore, a potential framework for the successful implementation104
of a water market should include: a multiphase sequencing of reform; strategic invest-105
ment in institutional tutorial transition costs; and institutional choices that preserve106
future flexibility to adjust water rights and diversion limits to manage social and envi-107
ronmental externalities (Garrick et al., 2013).108
109
However, institutional barriers are not the only obstacle in successfully implement-110
ing a water market or associated allocation mechanisms. The success of any new al-111
location mechanism is also largely dependent on the actual users whom the allocation112
reforms will directly affect. Several studies have shown that farmers’ behaviour very113
much influences how and to what success policy proposals are realised on the ground114
(Moon and Cocklin, 2011; Home et al., 2014; Feola et al., 2015). Furthermore, Feola115
et al. (2015) suggested that understanding farmers’ behaviour is essential to identifying116
where policy intervention may be required, or should be avoided, as well as where it117
can be used to inform the design and implementation of reforms.118
119
Bjornlund (2003) examined farmer participation in water markets in southeastern120
Australia during the first ten years of operation starting in 1989. The main findings121
of the study indicated that an increasing number of crop irrigation abstractors partic-122
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ipated in temporary licence trades (i.e. weekly, monthly, or seasonal) as more farmers123
increasingly understood the operations and the advantages of a secure, reliable, fast,124
and cheap water transfer. However, very few farmers participated in permanent wa-125
ter licence trading due to: differential tax treatment; policy uncertainty; institutional126
barriers such as administrative complexity and cost associated with permanent trades;127
and crop irrigation abstractors’ perception that water rights are an inherent part of128
their property. The results of this study, and those previously mentioned suggest that129
institutional barriers and high transaction costs deter farmers from trading; and im-130
portantly the success of any new allocation method is largely dependent on the level of131
participation by the users on the ground.132
133
1.1.3 Agricultural irrigation and climate change134
The use of freshwater for crop production by irrigation from rivers, reservoirs, lakes,135
groundwater aquifers and inter-catchment transfers are all considered sources of blue136
water; precipitation in regards to crop production is considered a green water source137
(Rost et al., 2008). Agriculture in general is responsible for approximately 85 % of total138
global water consumption of both blue and green freshwater resources (Shiklomanov139
et al., 2003). Crop irrigation accounts for the largest human withdrawal and consump-140
tion (i.e. withdrawal minus return flow to the river) of blue water globally, accounting141
for almost 70 % of this resource (Shiklomanov et al., 2003). However, to put this in142
perspective, 80 % of global croplands are rainfed, from which 60-70 % of the world’s143
food is produced (Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m, 2004). In many places, such as parts of144
the UK, blue water is used to supplement green water to improve crop quality and not145
solely to maintain expected yields.146
147
Crop irrigation ultimately relies on freshwater resources being available for abstrac-148
tion. Whether a farmer abstracts the water and to what extent they use that water for149
crop irrigation is a human behavioural factor regarding crop management. Nonetheless,150
crop water requirement is governed by a balance between atmospheric moisture deficit151
and soil water supply. Therefore, any change in climate (i.e. precipitation, tempera-152
ture, or radiation) will affect crop water requirements and also the amount of water153
available for abstraction at the catchment scale (Cisneros et al., 2014).154
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Although the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 2008 indicated that global trends in155
precipitation from several datasets during the last century were statistically insignif-156
icant (Bates et al., 2008), regional observations indicate that the most severe floods157
and droughts since the 1950s have been experienced between 1990 and 2010 (Arndt158
et al., 2010). The majority of regional changes in precipitation are considered to be159
attributable to either internal variability regarding atmospheric circulation or to global160
warming (Lambert et al., 2004; Stott et al., 2010). Despite the uncertainty regarding161
the climatic drivers Zhang et al. (2007) estimated that twentieth century anthropogenic162
forcing contributed considerably to observed changes in global and regional precipita-163
tion. In addition, there has been a continual decrease in global and regional evapo-164
transpiration since the middle of the last century which has been attributed to changes165
in precipitation; diurnal temperature range; aerosol concentration; net solar radiation;166
vapour pressure deficit; and wind speed (Fu et al., 2009; McVicar et al., 2010; Miralles167
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011). All of these factors greatly influence crop water re-168
quirements (Allen et al., 1998) particularly as precipitation and evaporation are the169
main climatic drivers controlling freshwater resources (Cisneros et al., 2014).170
171
A series of different projections regarding changes in irrigation demand and wa-172
ter availability, based on different global climate models and greenhouse gas emission173
scenarios, report a high confidence that irrigation demand will increase by more than174
40 % across Europe, United States, and parts of Asia by 2080 (Cisneros et al., 2014).175
However, some of these projections also indicate that irrigation demand could decrease176
in parts of India, Pakistan, and other parts of Asia due to an increase in precipitation.177
In addition, where poor soil is not a limiting factor, the physiological and structural re-178
sponse of crops to elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration (i.e. CO2179
fertilisation) might alleviate some of the adverse effects of climate change by reducing180
irrigation demand (Konzmann et al., 2013). Overall, it is projected that irrigation de-181
mand will exceed local freshwater availability in many areas (Wada et al., 2013).182
183
1.1.4 The UK transition184
In regards to the UK, DEFRA determine policy in England and Wales. These policies185
are regulated by the Environment Agency (EA) and Natural Resource Wales (NRW) in186
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Table 1.1: Abstractions licences in England and Wales (2014)
Sector Licences Licensed volume Licensed volume used
(%) (%) (%)
Public water supply 8 18 60
Agriculture 48 1 26
(spray irrigation only)
Agriculture 14 <1 27
(excluding spray irrigation)
Electricity supply industry 3 69 27
Other industry 18 9 40
Fish farming, cress growing, 3 3 54
and amenity ponds
Private water supply 5 <1 24
Other 1 <1 13
Total 100 100 35
Source (DEFRA, 2016a)
England and Wales respectively. Anyone wishing to abstract more than 20 m3 day−1 of187
water requires an abstraction licence. Table 1.1 highlights the percentage of: licences188
allocated; total volume allocated; and licensed volume abstracted per sector in Eng-189
land and Wales in 2014 (DEFRA, 2016a). Overall, only 35 % of the volume licensed190
to be abstracted was actually used, but this was dependent on water availability in191
addition to changes in demand. Furthermore, although the electricity supply industry192
accounted for the majority of licensed volume, this sector is generally considered as a193
non-consumptive user as nearly all of the water it abstracts is returned to the catch-194
ment. Other non-consumptive sectors include fish farming, cress growing, amenity195
ponds, and some other industry. Therefore, in regards to consumptive users, the public196
water supply sector was by far the largest abstractor (i.e. 18 % of licensed volume)197
with spray irrigation licence users only accounting for 1 % of total licensed volume.198
199
The largest proportion of irrigated agriculture is concentrated in eastern England200
(i.e. the Anglian region) employing over 50,000 people and contributing £3 billion an-201
nually to the region’s economy (Leathes et al., 2008). Furthermore, in 1995 50 % of202
the total irrigated land in England and Wales was located in the Anglian region (Knox203
et al., 2000) and in 2014 the area accounted for 36 % of all spray irrigation licences and204
62 % of estimated spray irrigation abstractions (DEFRA, 2016a). In addition, Knox205
et al. (2010) reported that since 1990 there has been a marked increase in irrigation of206
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high value crops such as potatoes and field vegetables, largely driven by supermarkets207
demand for quality; consistency; and continuity of supply, which can only be guaran-208
teed by irrigation. However, this region is one of the driest and most water stressed209
regions in the UK, with nearly three quarters of the water licensed for irrigation in 2006210
located in catchments under severe levels of water stress according to the UK Irrigation211
Association (UKIA) (i.e. with 47 % over-licensed; 23 % over-abstracted; and 21 % with212
no water available for further licensing) (UKIA, 2007). Furthermore, several studies213
have shown that freshwater available for irrigation in this region will be vulnerable to214
projected changes in climate (Gowing and Ejieji, 2001; Gibbons and Ramsden, 2008;215
Henriques et al., 2008; Knox et al., 2009).216
217
Therefore, the need to improve efficiency at the farm and catchment scale has be-218
come increasingly important as water availability has become increasingly competitive219
between users and the environment. Several initiatives have previously been imple-220
mented towards alleviating some of this pressure such as: restoring sustainable abstrac-221
tions (EA, 2010); and requiring spray irrigation licence users to demonstrate efficiency222
as part of their licence application process (Knox et al., 2012). However, DEFRA and223
the EA consider the current water allocation system in England as inadequate to pro-224
vide users with the adaptive strategies they require to meet their needs whilst providing225
sufficient protection to the environment (EA, 2008; DEFRA, 2011).226
227
Consequently, DEFRA have proposed two new water allocation systems, basic and228
enhanced, which aim to address the inadequacies of the current system, and which are229
to be implemented by the early 2020s (see Table 1.2). Although both of the proposed230
systems encourage water licence trading by removing seasonal restrictions (i.e. licences231
which can only be used during certain months) and time limited licences (i.e. licences232
which expire after a certain number of years), the enhanced system offers greater incen-233
tives for trading. These include access to ‘bonus water’ (i.e. water which is available for234
abstraction during high flow periods in addition to licensed volumes); gradual imple-235
mentation of Hands off Flow (HOF) conditions rather than simply on or off as with the236
current and basic systems (i.e. when the EA stop users from abstracting water during237
certain low flows in order to protect the environment or other users); and pre-approved238
trading rules to increase the speed and ease of trading.239
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Table 1.2: Current and proposed water allocation systems for England
Measure Current allocation Proposed allocation systems
system Basic Enhanced
Abstraction >20 m3 day−1 Licence required Permit required Permit required
Daily, annual, and return Yes Yes Yes
licence limits (fixed) (fixed) (share)
Seasonal restrictions Yes No No
Time limited licences Yes No No
Hands off Flow (HOF) Yes Yes Yes
conditions for some licences
Low flow conditions for those No Yes Yes
without HOF conditions
‘Bonus water’ during high No No Yes
flows in addition to licence
Water licence trading Yes Yes Yes
Pre-approved trades No No Yes
Source (DEFRA, 2016c)
These additional incentives for water licence trading, under the enhanced system,240
are made possible as annual licence limits would not be fixed, as they are with the241
current and basic systems, but accounted for as shares of available water within a242
catchment or sub-catchment. The type of proposed system to be implemented depends243
on whether DEFRA consider a catchment as basic or enhanced. Classification of catch-244
ments is still ongoing but the main determining factor is likely to concern the potential245
for water licence trading related to the cost of implementing an enhanced catchment, as246
users are required to have smart meters installed in order for the regulatory authorities247
to calculate water use and availability accurately (DEFRA, 2016c).248
249
Furthermore, licences will become permits under the proposed systems and consist250
of three parts: water account conditions; site specific conditions; and standard catch-251
ment rules. The water account conditions consist of daily, annual, and return licence252
limits and are stored online to facilitate trading. Site specific conditions relate to any253
conditions which are unique to a particular licence and for most users will be trans-254
ferred from their existing licence. Standard catchment rules will apply to everyone and255
relate to: common HOF conditions; trading rules; and low flow conditions. The latter256
are restrictions which can be imposed by the regulatory authority for those without257
HOF conditions, in order to protect the environment and other users.258
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1.2 The need for further research259
England is currently in the process of a major transition in water resource manage-260
ment. The proposed water allocation systems are designed to address the inadequacies261
of the current system, largely by encouraging water licence trading in order to increase262
efficiency, whilst providing adequate protection to the environment. These issues are263
particularly apparent in regards to irrigation within the Anglian region, in eastern264
England. The success of the proposed water allocation systems, at least in regards265
to increasing efficiency within the irrigation sector, is very much dependent on how266
likely users are to engage with the new systems, in particular to trading. Although267
experiences of water markets elsewhere, and consultations with some users in the UK268
(DEFRA, 2014b, 2016b), may provide some understanding of potential engagement,269
no formal scientific approach has been made to attempt to measure, or understand270
farmers’ behaviours with regards to the proposed water allocation systems.271
272
Therefore, further research is required to understand farmers’ behaviours, under273
different scenarios of water shortage and surplus, with regards to the proposed water274
allocation systems. In addition, an investigation which aims to understand whether275
a farm typology based on farmers’ behaviours, rather than traditional economic or276
physical descriptors, could provide a valuable tool for policy decision-makers involved277
with the design and implementation of the proposals. Finally, an understanding of the278
potential system level patterns of abstraction behaviour which could emerge from in-279
dividual farm scale decisions under the proposed water allocation systems is essential.280
This research intends to inform policy decision-makers involved with the proposals and,281
more generally, assess the potential effectiveness of the transition in freshwater resource282
management in England by addressing these issues.283
284
1.3 Aim, research questions and methodological overview285
The main aim of this thesis was to understand farmers’ behavioural intentions under286
different climate and proposed water allocation system scenarios, in order to assess287
whether the proposals will achieve their intended aim. Three research questions were288
formulated to address this main aim.289
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Research question 1: What are farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under290
different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water291
allocation systems in England? And which underlying predictors of intention most in-292
fluence their decision-making?293
294
As previously mentioned, and discussed in more depth in the following chapter,295
there is a clear need to understand farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions as this296
heavily influences the success of the proposals at the ground level. Therefore, an em-297
pirical investigation was conducted, in a selected study area in the Anglian region, with298
the main aim of understanding farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under different299
scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water allocation300
systems. The investigation also collected data concerning farm attributes and social301
demographics. The questionnaire, and subsequent interpretation of behaviours, was302
developed under the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)303
(Ajzen, 1985).304
305
Research question 2: If farmers share similar behavioural intentions under dif-306
ferent scenarios how can traditional farm typologies incorporate these preferred be-307
haviours?308
309
Traditional farm typologies tend to concentrate on particular farm attributes such310
as farm income, size, or output rather than on preferred behavioural intentions. This311
study presents a farm typology based on the preferred behavioural intentions of farmers312
identified. Furthermore, statistical analyses were conducted to examine similarities and313
differences between farm types in regards to: farm attributes; social demographics; li-314
cence characteristics; and past abstractions from 2008 to 2012. This study offers one of315
the first typologies designed for policy decision-makers to understand which farm types316
are more likely to engage with the proposed water allocation systems and therefore aid317
in deciding which catchments could be considered basic or enhanced.318
319
Research question 3: What potential system level patterns of abstraction be-320
haviour emerge from individual farm scale decisions under different policy and climate321
scenarios?322
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This final research question addresses the challenge of developing a model to assess323
potential patterns of catchment level water abstraction behaviour which emerge from324
individual farm scale decisions under different water allocation systems (i.e. current325
and proposed) and climate scenarios. While sophisticated hydrological models (Gosling326
et al., 2011) and crop models exist (Allen et al., 1998), few successfully integrate farmer327
decision making (Feola et al., 2015) and none do so in the context of the proposed water328
allocation systems in England. Therefore, this study presents the development of an329
Agent-Based Model (ABM) that utilises the farm typology that has been developed.330
The model is capable of modelling the preferred behaviours of individual farmers and331
exploring what system level patterns of abstraction behaviour emerge under the differ-332
ent policy and climate scenarios. Furthermore, particular farm indicators are used to333
present the outputs from the model and measure the system level patterns of abstrac-334
tion behaviour.335
336
1.4 Thesis structure337
This chapter has provided a general introduction outlining the main rationale and ar-338
eas for further research which this thesis aims to address. Chapter 2 presents a critical339
review of the main bodies of literature regarding measuring individual behaviour; incor-340
porating preferred behaviours into farm typologies; and modelling individual behaviour341
at the farm and catchment scales. As a result, Chapter 2 highlights the main research342
gaps this thesis aims to address. Chapter 3 introduces the study area which was the343
focus of this investigation. Chapter 4, 5, and 6, are associated with each of the research344
questions previously discussed and therefore present the methodologies and results of345
these individual studies. Finally, Chapter 7 presents a discussion of the main results346
of this research placing the findings within the broader context of agricultural water347
resource management and climate change in the UK. Furthermore, this final chapter348
presents the main conclusions and policy applications of this research along with some349
of the limitations of the methods and potential areas for further research.350
351
Chapter 2352
Literature review353
The previous chapter discussed the proposed water allocation systems which are to be354
introduced in England. In particular, Chapter 1 discussed the importance, from a pol-355
icy decision-making perspective, of understanding how users on the ground (i.e. those356
who the proposals are going to directly effect) are likely to respond and engage with357
the proposed water allocation systems. That is, at least with the parts that they will358
have control over such as deciding whether or not to trade, rather than catchment rules359
which are enforced to protect the environment from over abstraction. Furthermore, this360
thesis is particularly interested in how the proposed water allocation systems will effect361
irrigation farmers, and therefore the term term farmers refers to spray irrigation licence362
users only, not farmers who abstract for other purposes (see Table 1.1). This chapter363
critically reviews the main bodies of literature related to each of the three research364
questions presented previously (see Section 1.3). In particular, this chapter examines:365
farmers’ behaviours with regards to behavioural approaches, limitations, and exten-366
sions; farm typologies including limitations and incorporating behaviours; and lastly367
approaches used to model farmers’ behaviours, and how these models can be used to368
inform policy decision-making. Finally, this chapter highlights the main research gaps369
this thesis aims to address.370
371
2.1 Farmer behaviour372
The behavioural approach within the fields of agricultural and policy decision-making373
is not a recent concept and is thought to have originally begun with the ‘satisficing’374
concept during the 1950s (Simon, 1957). This concept acknowledged that people do not375
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necessarily indulge in economically optimal decision-making but instead may optimise376
social, intrinsic, or expressive goals. Despite the growing necessity and increasing ap-377
plication of the behavioural approach over the following decades, particularly in policy378
driven studies (Wolpert, 1964; Gasson, 1973), it has often been regarded as an addi-379
tional component of rational, or neo-classical economic models (Beedell and Rehman,380
2000), rather than a separate entity partly because the main criticism of it is that it381
overemphasises the role that attitude has on determining behaviour and partly due to382
the lack of any real theoretical foundation (Burton, 2004). However, with advancements383
in the field of social psychology, such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen,384
1985), the number of studies incorporating farmer decision-making rapidly increased385
(Burton, 2004; Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013) providing a practical and theoretical386
basis for the growing amount of research on farmers’ attitudes and intentions (Beedell387
and Rehman, 2000).388
389
Morris and Potter (1995) provided a valuable definition of behavioural approaches390
in agricultural studies as those that: a) seek to understand the behaviour of individ-391
ual decision-makers, usually the farmers or land managers, directly responsible for the392
land; b) focus on psychological constructs such as attitudes, values, and goals but also393
commonly gather additional relevant data such as farm structure, economic situation,394
successional status; and c) employ largely quantitative methodologies, in particular395
psychometric scales such as Likert-type scaling procedures (Likert, 1932), for investi-396
gating psychological constructs such as those of the TPB.397
398
2.1.1 The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)399
The TPB is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein and400
Ajzen, 1975) and was required due to the original model’s limitations in dealing with401
behaviours where individuals fail to have complete volitional control in regards to per-402
forming, or not performing, a particular behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Furthermore, it is403
one of the most frequently cited and influential models for the prediction of human so-404
cial behaviour (Ajzen, 2011) and has regularly been supported with empirical evidence405
(Armitage and Conner, 2001). A central factor in the theory is an individuals’ inten-406
tion to perform a given behaviour. Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational407
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Attitude
Subjective
norm
Intention Behaviour
Perceived
behavioural
control
Figure 2.1: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (adapted from Ajzen (1991))
factors that influence a behaviour and therefore the stronger the intention the more408
likely the behaviour will be performed.409
410
Figure 2.1 illustrates the main constructs of the TPB with the direct antecedents411
of intention including attitude (i.e. an individuals’ overall positive or negative evalu-412
ation of performing, or not performing, a particular behaviour); subjective norm (i.e.413
the social pressure an individual might feel towards performing, or not performing, a414
particular behaviour); and perceived behavioural control (i.e. the degree of volitional415
control an individual feels they have over performing, or not performing, a particular416
behaviour). Consequently, the strength of an individuals’ intention to perform, or not417
perform, a particular behaviour depends on the level, or strength, of that individuals’418
attitude; subjective norm; and perceived behavioural control (Armitage and Conner,419
2001). Furthermore, the constructs of attitude; subjective norm; and perceived be-420
havioural control are based on associated salient behavioural; normative; and control421
beliefs about the particular behaviour, respectively (Ajzen, 1991).422
423
The relative importance of these three constructs in regards to predicting intention424
varies depending on the type of behaviours and nature of the situation (Ajzen, 1991).425
Furthermore, perceived behavioural control is also considered a direct antecedent of426
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behaviour based on the rationale that however strong an individuals’ intention is to427
perform, or not perform, a particular behaviour, the actual performance of said be-428
haviour can depend on personal and environmental barriers. Therefore, this direct re-429
lationship between perceived behavioural control and actual behaviour becomes more430
important as volitional control decreases (Ajzen, 1991), to the extent that perceived431
behavioural control should be able to directly predict actual behaviour (Armitage and432
Conner, 2001). Conversely, where an individual has complete volitional control per-433
ceived behavioural control should have very little or no influence on their intention to434
perform, or not perform, a particular behaviour.435
436
Poppenborg and Koellner (2013) investigated whether attitudes toward ecosys-437
tem services determine agricultural land use practices. The study examined farmer’s438
decision-making processes, based on the TPB, with respect to land use in a South Ko-439
rean watershed. Decisions between a variety of cropping patterns and practices were440
compared among farmers as a function of their attitude towards particular ecosys-441
tem services including: biomass production; prevention of soil erosion; improvement442
of water quality; and conservation of plants and animals. The study found that deci-443
sions to plant perennial crops are most often accompanied by positive attitudes toward444
ecosystem services whereas no differences were found between organic and conventional445
farming. Furthermore, positive attitudes toward ecosystem services were most likely446
held by farmers with high income indicating that a farmer’s financial means were a key447
determinant of farmers’ environmental attitudes.448
449
Similarly, Wauters et al. (2010) investigated the adoption of soil conservation prac-450
tices of farmers in Belgium based on the TPB. The results of the study showed that451
the most important explanatory factor was attitude towards soil conservation prac-452
tices. They concluded that future interventions directed at promoting erosion control453
measures should be directed towards changing farmers attitudes, although further in-454
vestigation was required to understand the negative attitudes of farmers.455
456
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2.1.2 Limitations of the TPB457
Despite the popularity of the TPB, particularly within the health sciences (Sniehotta458
et al., 2014), it has also had considerable criticism most notably concerning efficacy (i.e.459
the predictive ability of the model) and sufficiency (i.e. the assumption that the effect460
of all other biological, social, environmental, economic, cultural, and unconscious in-461
fluences are hypothesised to be accounted for by the TPB constructs) (McCarty, 1981;462
Hardeman et al., 2002; Chatzisarantis et al., 2005; Sniehotta et al., 2014).463
464
In regards to efficacy, several meta-analytical reviews reported that although the465
TPB explained between 40-49 % of the variance in intention, it only explained be-466
tween 26-36 % of the variance in actual behaviour (Sheeran et al., 1999; Armitage467
and Conner, 2001; Hagger et al., 2002; Trafimow et al., 2002; Schulze and Wittmann,468
2003; McEachan et al., 2011). This common occurrence has been described as the469
intention-behaviour gap (Sniehotta et al., 2005), or the issue of inclined abstainers (i.e.470
despite an individual’s intention they fail to act out the behaviour) (Orbell and Sheeran,471
1998). The intention-behaviour gap indicates low correlations between the TPB con-472
structs and therefore a failure to account for the majority of variability in behaviour473
(Sniehotta et al., 2014).474
475
Ajzen (2011) argued that even with carefully considered measures (i.e. well de-476
signed salient beliefs), the most one can reasonably expect in regards to correlations477
between constructs are coefficients of approximately .60 (i.e. the weaker the correlation478
the less the constructs can explain the variance in intention and therefore behaviour).479
This statement corresponds with several meta-analytical reviews, for example, multi-480
ple mean correlations between attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural481
control with intention ranged from .59 to .66 (Cheung and Chan, 2000; Armitage and482
Conner, 2001; Schulze and Wittmann, 2003); and .53 between intention and behaviour483
(Sheeran, 2002). Furthermore, several studies have shown that the predictive ability484
of the TPB model is often reduced depending on: the length of the study (i.e. the485
predictive ability of the model decreased as the length of the study increased due to ex-486
ternal events intervening and changing individuals’ salient beliefs) (Sheeran et al., 1999;487
Conner et al., 2000); and whether measures were taken objectively or self reported (i.e.488
the predictive ability of the model decreased where outcome measures were measured489
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objectively) (Ajzen, 2011; McEachan et al., 2011). Finally, Ajzen (2011) suggested490
that where studies which occurred over a short time period reported a large intention-491
behaviour gap (Kor and Mullan, 2011), the cause was often due to actual control not492
being accurately represented by perceived behavioural control. In addition, intention-493
behaviour gap has also been attributed to behaviours which require different social or494
psychological drivers, such as efficiency and curtailment behaviours (i.e. behaviours495
which are one-off or occur regularly respectively) (Gardner and Stern, 1996; Russell496
and Fielding, 2010). However, beyond methodological failures and different types of497
behaviours being assessed, a low intention-behaviour relation could simply indicate the498
limits of this particular behavioural approach (Ajzen, 2011).499
500
In regards to sufficiency, several studies have criticised the TPB model for its ex-501
clusive focus on rational reasoning (Sniehotta et al., 2013) and ignoring unconscious502
influences such as habits (Conner and Armitage, 1998; Abraham and Sheeran, 2003;503
Gardner et al., 2011); affects; emotions; and irrationality (Sutton, 1994; Conner and504
Armitage, 1998; Richard et al., 1998; Rapaport and Orbell, 2000; McEachan et al.,505
2011; Wolff et al., 2011; Carraro and Gaudreau, 2013; Conner et al., 2013; Sheeran506
et al., 2013). However, Ajzen (2011) argued that there is no assumption in the TPB507
that the salient beliefs are formed in a rational or unbiased fashion, and in fact are508
more likely to be irrational or inaccurate as the individual beliefs about a behaviour509
are often incomplete or self serving. Therefore, regardless of being rational or irrational,510
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control follow on from beliefs511
and it is only in this sense that behaviour is said to be planned (Geraerts and McNally,512
2008).513
514
2.1.3 Adding past behaviour as a predictor variable515
Nonetheless, several studies, predominantly within the health sciences, provided evi-516
dence to suggest that additional predictor constructs, such as habit which was used517
within Triandis’ Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB) (Triandis, 1979), can and518
have been used to address both of the main limitations (Conner and Armitage, 1998).519
Additional predictor variables have included: past behaviour (Kor and Mullan, 2011;520
Norman and Cooper, 2011); similarity (Rivis et al., 2011); uncertainty avoidance (Wolff521
§2.2 Farm typologies 19
et al., 2011); and self-concept (Hassandra et al., 2011). The possibility of adding addi-522
tional predictors, or constructs, was in fact originally suggested (Fishbein and Ajzen,523
1975; Ajzen, 1991) which led to the updated TPB from the TRA by adding perceived524
behavioural control. However, Ajzen (2011) argued that the addition of further predic-525
tors, or constructs, should be made with caution and after empirical exploration.526
527
Adding past behaviour as a means of improving the predictive measure of intention,528
has been supported by considerable empirical evidence (Conner and Armitage, 1998;529
Abraham and Sheeran, 2003; Ajzen, 2011; Kor and Mullan, 2011; Norman and Cooper,530
2011). For example, in the study by Abraham and Sheeran (2003), the amount of531
variance in physical activity explained by the TPB increased from 36 % to 53 % with532
the addition of past physical activity. However, Ajzen (2011) argued that past be-533
haviour should not be included as an additional construct since it constitutes a causal534
antecedent of intention, and therefore fails to meet the original criteria for the TPB.535
In particular, it is difficult to argue that the performance of a behaviour in the past536
directly causes an individual’s current intention; rather it is usually considered a proxy537
for habit when performed routinely in a stable environment (Ajzen, 2011; Norman and538
Cooper, 2011).539
540
Nevertheless, in three meta-analytic syntheses the addition of past behaviour raised541
the proportion of explained variance in intention by between 10 % and 13 % (Albar-542
racin et al., 2001; Sandberg and Conner, 2008; Rise et al., 2010). Ajzen (2011) explained543
that one possible conclusion to this is that intentions may not only be determined by544
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control but by one or more545
additional variables, and these additional variables are captured, at least partly, by546
measures of past behaviour.547
548
2.2 Farm typologies549
The use of farm typologies, particularly with regards to policy decision-making, is not550
a new concept and has been used for several decades (Kostrowicki, 1977; Whatmore551
et al., 1987; Landais, 1998; Andreoli and Tellarini, 2000; Daskalopoulou and Petrou,552
2002; Ko¨brich et al., 2003; Tavernier and Tolomeo, 2004). Most commonly they are553
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used to assist policy decision-makers with the design, implementation, or assessment554
of the performance of agricultural or environmental schemes at the farm and regional555
scales (Andersen et al., 2007).556
557
Farm typologies are often designed based on some type or combination of farm char-558
acteristic, such as: farm size; income; capital; labour; production pattern; soil quality;559
managerial ability; or output. A farm is the key level at which decisions are made in560
relation to the management of farmland and natural resources, and a typology offers561
policy decision-makers a tool to assess farms by these particular criteria or indicators,562
as well as providing a means to better understand the underlying drivers behind farm563
management decisions (Andersen et al., 2007).564
565
The EU farm typology, for example, is used to inform policy decision-makers about566
multiple agricultural issues such as the performance of particular schemes linked with567
the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Andersen et al., 2007). However, the ra-568
tional behind the EU farm typology is exclusively economic, with the main distribution569
of farms categorised by farm income. Although farm income can be argued to be one570
of the main drivers behind farm management decisions and policies, CAP reforms are571
no longer simply about production and economy; rather they have shifted towards the572
environment and landscape. Andersen et al. (2007) therefore suggested that the EU573
farm typology should be updated to include an environmentally based extension, which574
would classify farms into farm types that are more homogeneous in their environmental575
performance rather than simply by their income.576
577
2.2.1 Limitations of farm typologies578
Although farm typologies clearly offer policy decision-makers a useful tool for categoris-579
ing farms, and making more informed policy decisions, their main criticism is that they580
fail to fully capture true farmer behaviour and are therefore of limited value in support-581
ing policy formulation (Guillem et al., 2012). In regards to the EU farm typology, the582
suggestion proposed by Andersen et al. (2007) to include environmental performance583
indicators, relied on further statistical measures of environmental pressures caused by584
farm management practices, rather than any assessment of true farmer behaviour.585
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Therefore, to address this main criticism, and partly due to the lack of success586
or changes to such environmental policy schemes (Brotherton, 1991; Morris and Pot-587
ter, 1995; Wilson, 1996; Winter, 2000; Burton, 2004), policy decision-makers realised588
they required more sophisticated methods of anticipating farmers motivation to comply589
with new policy approaches, thus, providing a catalyst for research in this field (Austin590
et al., 1998; Burton, 2004; Emtage et al., 2006; Guillem et al., 2012). In addition,591
Emtage et al. (2006) reviewed a number of studies which used landholder typologies592
in the development of natural resource management programmes in Australia. They593
concluded that policy decision-makers needed to: better understand the variation in594
socio-economic circumstances and values of individuals; understand how this variation595
affects their attitudes and behaviour; and how the differences lead to variation in the596
impacts of policy reforms across the community or target area.597
598
2.2.2 Incorporating decision-making into farm typologies599
As previously discussed, over the last few decades considerable research has focussed600
on understanding farmer’s intentions and behaviours (Austin et al., 1998; Garforth and601
Rehman, 2006; Gorton et al., 2008; Barnes et al., 2009; Sutherland et al., 2011) by602
linking behavioural theories from the field of social psychology with the field of agri-603
cultural decision-making (Burton, 2004). Guillem et al. (2012) indicated that studies604
which have incorporated farmer decisions have improved the relevance of policy formu-605
lation and have been a major factor in increasing the successful development and use of606
farmer typologies (Schmitzberger et al., 2005; Emtage et al., 2006, 2007; Gorton et al.,607
2008; Pike, 2008; Barnes et al., 2011; Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013).608
609
There are two main approaches used to develop farm typologies based on a range610
of farm characteristics: the data-driven approach; and the conceptual approach. The611
data-driven approach often utilises multi-variate techniques, such as cluster analysis,612
to search for patterns in the data which can be identified as farm types (Ko¨brich et al.,613
2003; Acosta et al., 2014). The conceptual approach usually pre-defines the types based614
on a particular research aim and subsequently conducts statistical tests to search for615
any similarities or differences in farm characteristics (Phillip et al., 2010).616
617
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2.3 Modelling farmer behaviour618
Traditional neo-classical economic models have for many years been used to model619
farmer decision-making at different spatial scales (Willock et al., 1999; Edwards-Jones,620
2006). Whilst these types of models provided a useful tool for policy decision-making,621
they have also received criticism for assuming individuals only make rational economic622
decisions, whilst in reality, individual decisions are often based on a combination of623
psychological constructs such as attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural624
control (Ajzen, 1991; Edwards-Jones, 2006). Therefore, the traditional models of farmer625
decision-making have been increasingly supplemented since the 1990s by simulation626
models, which integrate theoretical frameworks from psychology in order to fully un-627
derstand farmer behaviour at the farm or individual scale. Such models include: system628
dynamic modelling (Guerrin, 2001; Keating et al., 2003; Darnhofer et al., 2011); dis-629
crete event modelling (Sokhansanj et al., 2006); and, most commonly, Agent-Based630
Modelling (ABM) (Railsback, 2001; Janssen, 2002; Strand et al., 2002; Edwards-Jones,631
2006; Grimm et al., 2006; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Grimm et al., 2010).632
633
2.3.1 Agent-Based Models (ABM)634
Janssen and Ostrom (2006) defined ABM as the computational study of social agents,635
such as farmers, as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. The develop-636
ment of ABM can be traced back to early research by Neumann and Burks (1966), who637
provided a technical methodology for modelling multiple interacting agents during their638
work on cellular automata. This modelling approach was popularised during the 1970s639
after a study by Gardner (1970), who illustrated how following simple rules of local640
interaction could lead to the emergence of complex global patterns. However, cellular641
automaton models were limited in their ability to model the heterogeneity of agents642
beyond their specific location and history (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). Therefore, early643
studies focussing on ABM, although theoretical, such as work on segregation (Schelling,644
1971) and prisoner’s dilemma strategies (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), showed how645
simple rules of interaction could explain more complex spatial patterns and levels of646
cooperation at the larger system scale (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006).647
648
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ABM are now widely used within the fields of ecology (DeAngelis et al., 1992;649
Shugart et al., 1992; Van Winkle et al., 1993; Grimm, 1999; Gimblett, 2002; Huse650
et al., 2002; DeAngelis and Mooij, 2005; Grimm and Railsback, 2013); social sciences651
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Epstein, 2006; Gilbert, 2007;652
Billari and Prskawetz, 2012); economics (Tesfatsion, 2002; Fagiolo et al., 2007); and ge-653
ography, particularly land use change, (dAquino et al., 2002; Parker et al., 2003; Evans654
and Kelley, 2004; Brown et al., 2005; Matthews et al., 2007). The increase in popular-655
ity of these models has partly been due to the advancements in computer science over656
the last two decades, but also in their ability to consider aspects often ignored in an-657
alytical, or neo-classical economic models, such as variability among individuals; local658
interactions; complete life cycles; and individual behaviour adapting to the individual’s659
changing internal and external environment (Grimm et al., 2006).660
661
2.3.2 Limitations of ABM662
The main limitation of ABM lies within their development, largely criticised for being663
far more complex in structure than typical analytical models (Grimm et al., 2006).664
Furthermore, ABM are also often more difficult to analyse, understand and communi-665
cate than traditional analytical models (Grimm, 1999). In regards to communication,666
Grimm et al. (2006) argues that analytical models are easier to communicate as they667
are formulated in the general language of mathematics; the description is often com-668
plete, unambiguous and accessible to the reader, unlike ABM descriptions which are669
often difficult to understand, incomplete, ambiguous, and therefore less accessible. As670
a consequence of this, the results are often very difficult to reproduce, which largely un-671
dermines ABM as a suitable modelling approach since science is based on reproducible672
observations (Hales et al., 2003). As a potential solution to this limitation, Grimm and673
Railsback (2005) suggested a standardised protocol for describing ABMs which was674
successfully applied by several leading researchers in this field (Grimm et al., 2006) and675
later revised after considerable use (Grimm et al., 2010).676
677
The Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol was suggested as a678
means of standardising the way researchers communicate their ABM to one another to679
overcome one of the main criticisms of this modelling approach (Grimm et al., 2010).680
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The ODD protocol is subdivided into seven elements: purpose; entities, state vari-681
ables, and scale; process overview and scheduling; design concepts (further divided into682
several elements); initialisation; input data; and sub-models. Although the number of683
studies using the ODD protocol has increased rapidly since it was first published, it has684
also received criticism since some elements may be redundant for particular or simple685
models. However, Grimm et al. (2010) argued that although this can be the case, it is686
the price of having a hierarchical structure and the majority of times redundancy can687
be avoided by keeping detail short and precise and any detail provided in the design688
concept element can be left out of the sub-model element. Overall, ODD provides a689
method of reviewing and categorising different types of ABM in a systematic approach690
and has increasingly been used by researchers within the field of ABM (Grimm et al.,691
2010).692
693
2.3.3 Use of ABM within the field of farmer decision-making694
In addition, although ABM has often been considered a promising quantitative method-695
ology for social science research (Parker et al., 2003), it is only in the last few years696
that researchers are combining ABM with empirical methods (Janssen and Ostrom,697
2006). For example, Acosta et al. (2014) developed an ABM to understand the influ-698
ence of global environmental change drivers and land manager decisions on the future699
of the Montado, a multifunctional semi-wooded area used for grazing and cereal cul-700
tivation in Portugal. The model description followed the standardised ODD protocol701
suggested by Grimm et al. (2010). A farm typology, based on cluster analysis of em-702
pirically derived farm attributes represented the different agents, along with particular703
behavioural strategies which were driven by global economic and climatic parameters.704
Overall, the ABM developed indicated that farmers would continue to abandon their705
land if the future global economic environment, characterised by rapid industrialisa-706
tion and urbanisation, should persist. However, agriculture remained the dominant707
land use, indicating some resilience to change from local farmers.708
709
Similarly, other studies have applied ABM to deal with complex human-environmental710
systems such as Gala´n et al. (2009). In this study an ABM was used to integrate differ-711
ent social sub-models: models of urban dynamics; water consumption; and technological712
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and opinion diffusion, which together were linked with a geographical information sys-713
tem. The completed ABM represented a computational environment which was able to714
simulate and compare different water demand scenarios for different agent types. In an-715
other study, Schlu¨ter and Pahl-Wostl (2007) developed an ABM which was designed to716
compare the resilience of different institutional settings of water management to changes717
in the variability and uncertainty of water availability for irrigation and environmental718
water requirements. The results of this study indicated that under fluctuating inflows719
and compliance with restrictions, a centralised management approach provided more720
sustained levels of water availability when irrigation was the only user. However, as721
demands from other sectors were introduced a decentralised management approach to722
water allocation provided a more sustained level of water availability. Therefore, this723
study highlights the ability of ABM to explore system level patterns of water use and724
behaviour based on individual decision making at the farm scale.725
726
2.4 Further remarks and research gaps727
This chapter has presented a critical review of the main bodies of literature highlighting728
three important research gaps pertaining to the methods which are to be used to ad-729
dress the three research questions presented in Section 1.3. Firstly, despite the number730
of studies addressing the issue of understanding farmers’ behaviours having increased,731
it appears no studies have attempted to understand farmers’ preferred behavioural in-732
tentions under different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the733
proposed new water allocation systems in England. The TPB demonstrated its abil-734
ity to provide a reliable method of successfully measuring intention and its predictors,735
particularly with the addition of past behaviour. Therefore, Chapter 4 presents an736
empirical investigation in a case study catchment in England, under the theoretical737
framework of the TPB, aimed at addressing this research gap.738
739
Secondly, traditional farm typologies fail to incorporate true farmer behaviour and740
are therefore of limited value in supporting policy formulations (Guillem et al., 2012).741
Furthermore, where studies have measured farmers’ behaviours, relatively few have used742
this data to develop farm typologies (Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Wauters et al., 2010;743
Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013). In addition, it appears no studies have developed744
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a farm typology based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions’ under different745
scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water allocation746
systems in England. Therefore, Chapter 5 presents a farm typology aimed at address-747
ing this research gap.748
749
Finally, although several studies have used ABM to simulate farmer decision-making750
in regards to irrigation and land use (Bousquet et al., 1999; Barreteau et al., 2001;751
Berger, 2001; Becu et al., 2003; Hare and Deadman, 2004; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006;752
Matthews et al., 2007; Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011), no studies have explicitly753
used ABM as a method of simulating farmers’ behavioural intentions under different754
scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water allocation755
systems in England. Furthermore, an ABM which incorporated a farm typology based756
on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions could be used to: a) see what patterns757
of abstraction behaviour emerge at the system level based on decisions made at the758
farm level; b) see how different climate and proposed water allocation system scenarios759
affect decisions made at the farm level; and c) see how the results of an ABM can760
be used to inform policy-decision makers involved in the process of implementing the761
proposed water allocation systems. Therefore, Chapter 6 presents the development and762
simulation scenario results of an ABM aimed at addressing these issues.763
764
Chapter 3765
The Great Ouse catchment,766
Anglian region, UK767
The Great Ouse catchment represents approximately a third of the Anglian region in768
eastern England, UK, and was selected as the study area due to two important fac-769
tors including: the importance of available freshwater resources for agricultural spray770
irrigation (see Section 1.1.4); and the fact that the Anglian region, although represent-771
ing more than 50 % of total irrigated land (Knox et al., 2000), and 62 % of estimated772
spray irrigation abstractions in England and Wales (DEFRA, 2016a), is one of the most773
water-stressed regions in the UK (Knox et al., 2009) (see Figure 3.1).774
775
3.1 Biophysical environment776
The Great Ouse catchment is approximately 8,596 km2 with elevation in the range of777
-2 and 241 metres above mean sea level (m.a.s.l.). On average, the area received 655778
mm of precipitation annually, and 51 mm monthly, between 1973 and 2012 (MetOffice,779
2016). This was 499 mm less annually, and 42 mm less monthly, than the UK in general.780
In addition, 2011 was the driest year and 2012 was the wettest with annual rainfalls781
of 454 mm and 810 mm respectively. Furthermore, on average, the area has been 1782
oC warmer than the UK in general with 1986 being the coldest year whilst 2011 was783
the hottest year with mean temperatures of 9 oC and 11 oC respectively (see Figure 3.2).784
785
The Great Ouse meanders from the uplands in the south west to the tidal reaches786
near Earith where it continues to the mouth of the river (i.e. the Wash) at King’s787
27
28 Chapter 3: The Great Ouse catchment, Anglian region, UK
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
##
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
##
#
#
#
#
##
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
# #
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
0 25 5012.5 km
" England and Wales
" Anglian region
Low: -2 m.a.s.l.
High: 241 m.a.s.l.
Assessment Point
(AP) boundary
Catchment Abstraction Management
Strategy (CAMS) boundary
Ely Ouse to Essex transfer scheme
Main rivers
Denver Complex
Towns
Groundwater abstractors
! Surface water abstractors
King’s
Lynn
Earith
/
Upper and Bedford
Ouse CAMS (C4)
C4AP12
C4AP14
C4AP06
C4AP05
C4AP03
C4AP01
Old Bedford
CAMS (C2)
C2AP00
North West Norfolk
CAMS (C1)
C1AP00
C1AP10
C1AP09
C1AP08
C1AP07
C1AP06
C1AP04
C1AP02
C1AP01
Cam and Ely
Ouse CAMS (C3)
C3AP17
C3AP13
C3AP12
C3AP11
C3AP09
C3AP08
C3AP07
C3AP04 C3AP03 C3AP02
Figure 3.1: The Great Ouse catchment, Anglian region, UK
Lynn. Several major tributaries join the tidal river between Earith and King’s Lynn,788
most notably the Ely Ouse in the south east. Much of the catchment in the north789
west is below sea level and consists of irrigation drainage channels (i.e. the Fens). The790
main aquifers in the study area include: the Great Oolite aquifer in the south west;791
the Woburn Sands aquifer in the south; the Chalk aquifer in the south and east of the792
catchment; and the Sandringham Sands aquifer in the north east (EA, 2013b,c,a,d).793
794
The catchment is predominantly used for crop production, with 39 % classified as795
grade one or two agricultural land and a further 40 % classified as grade three (EA,796
2011). There are currently 836 spray irrigation farmers operating in the study area797
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Figure 3.2: Difference in average monthly precipitation and mean temperature
between the study area and the UK (1973 to 2012). (Top) Line graph indicating the
difference in average monthly precipitation between the study area and the UK. (Bottom) Line
graph indicating the difference in average monthly mean temperature between the study area
and the UK
who, along with the remaining spray irrigation farmers in the larger Anglian region,798
rely on available freshwater for supplemental irrigation in order to supply high quality799
produce, including over 30 % of potatoes and 25 % of all fruit and vegetables, to UK800
supermarkets (UKIA, 2007). However, water available for spray irrigation in the study801
area is increasingly under pressure from climate change (see Section 1.1.4), demand802
from other sectors, most notably public water supply, and growing protection for the803
environment (Knox et al., 2009). Despite this increasing pressure, Weatherhead and804
Rivas Casado (2007) found that the total water applied each year for spray irrigation805
in England is increasing by 2.1 % per annum, as is the total area being irrigated (i.e.806
0.9 %).807
808
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3.2 Water management809
Water availability in England is managed by the Environment Agency (EA) who,810
through their Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies (CAMS), determine wa-811
ter availability for further licensed abstractions. The study area is divided into four812
CAMS areas: North West Norfolk (EA, 2013b); Old Bedford (EA, 2013c); Cam and813
Ely Ouse (EA, 2013a); and Upper and Bedford Ouse (EA, 2013d), which are further814
divided into 50 Assessment Point (AP) areas. However, for reasons discussed in Section815
3.3 only 26 AP areas were used in this study.816
817
Three factors are used to determine water availability within an AP area: an Envi-818
ronmental Flow Indicator (EFI) which refers to a proportion of natural flow allocated819
to the environment; a Fully Licensed (FL) scenario which refers to the quantity of water820
which could be abstracted (i.e. a hypothetical scenario); and a Recent Actual (RA)821
scenario which refers to the quantity of water abstracted over the previous six years.822
A flow deficit occurs when water available after a RA scenario is below the EFI and823
therefore no water is available and the AP area is considered over abstracted. A risk824
of a flow deficit occurs when water available after a FL scenario is below the EFI and825
therefore restricted water is available and the AP area is considered over licensed. If826
there is no risk of a flow deficit then the AP area is considered as having water avail-827
able (EA, 2010). However, the EA also use four flow levels, derived from flow duration828
curves which show the percentage of time that a particular flow level is equalled or829
exceeded, to account for natural annual flow variation including: Q30 (i.e. high flow);830
Q50; Q70; and Q95 (i.e. low flow). Therefore, despite the risk of a flow deficit water831
may still be available for further licensing but only during high flows.832
833
In regards to the Great Ouse catchment, AP areas within the low lying fens are834
assessed differently by the EA with water available for further licensing in the Winter835
and not in the Summer, as river flows are largely controlled by a system of pumps836
and drains, most notably at the Denver Complex, managed by the Internal Drainage837
Board and the Middle Level Commissioners (EA, 2010). The Denver Complex controls838
inundation by the sea for much of the low lying fens in the Winter and provides water839
for spray irrigation in the Summer by using a large combination of sluices. In addition,840
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the Ely Ouse to Essex transfer scheme augments river flows and reservoir levels in south841
Essex by transferring excess water from the Ely Ouse during high flow conditions (i.e.842
inter-catchment transfer).843
844
3.3 River flows845
River flow data for each AP area was derived from the National River Flow Archive846
gauge station network (CEH, 2016). However, only 16 of the 50 AP areas used by847
the EA corresponded with available gauge station data. Furthermore, river flow data848
for these 16 AP areas consisted of missing data and were only available from 1973 to849
2012. Therefore, where gauge station records were incomplete average values for the850
AP area were used. For this study, any upstream AP area which did not correspond851
with available river flow data was amalgamated with the downstream AP area which852
did have river flow data available. Furthermore, due to the tidal nature of the river,853
10 AP areas were essentially all downstream catchments and none had river flow data854
available. Therefore, for these 10 AP areas the watershed area ratio method was used855
to derive river flows (Gianfagna et al., 2015) using either an upstream AP area or a856
similar sized neighbouring AP area:857
Qungauged = Qgauged(
Aungauged
Agauged
) (3.1)858
where Q equals river flow (i.e. discharge) and A equals AP area (i.e. km2). Although859
this method provides a reasonable estimation for river flows in ungauged AP areas860
for this study, it does assume that river flow is proportional to area which may not861
always be accurate. In addition, for the purposes of this study, the two AP areas which862
represent the low lying fens (i.e. C1AP00 and C2AP00) derived their river flows using863
the watershed area ration method, from C3AP17 in the Cam and Ely Ouse CAMS864
area. River flow in this AP area largely influences the availability of freshwater at the865
Denver Complex, and therefore also for the low lying fens. Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5866
illustrate, respectively, a schematic of the 26 AP area network used in this study, flow867
duration curves for each AP area, and average monthly river flows for each AP area.868
Furthermore, Table 3.1 summarises average river flows for each AP area at the flow869
exceedence levels used by the EA to determine water availability.870
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Table 3.1: Average river flows for each Assessment Point (AP) area (1973 to 2012)
Assessment Gauge Upstream Q30 flow Q50 flow Q70 flow Q95 flow
Point (AP) station area (km2) (m3/s) (m3/s) (m3/s) (m3/s)
North West Norfolk CAMS (C1)
- C1AP01 - 103 0.89 0.66 0.49 0.24
- C1AP02 - 37 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.09
- C1AP04 - 109 0.94 0.70 0.52 0.25
- C1AP06 - 62 0.54 0.40 0.29 0.14
- C1AP07 - 61 0.53 0.39 0.29 0.14
- C1AP08 33007 153 1.33 0.99 0.72 0.35
- C1AP09 - 91 2.11 1.57 1.15 0.56
- C1AP10 - 114 0.99 0.74 0.54 0.26
- C1AP00 - 229 1.27 0.83 0.52 0.16
Old Bedford CAMS (C2)
- C2AP00 - 977 5.43 3.56 2.21 0.68
Cam and Ely Ouse CAMS (C3)
- C3AP02 33053 114 0.32 0.16 0.08 0.01
- C3AP03 33024 198 1.05 0.69 0.48 0.25
- C3AP04 33021 303 1.31 0.70 0.47 0.26
- C3AP07 33050 61 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.11
- C3AP08 33023 102 0.33 0.15 0.06 0.02
- C3AP09 33014 272 1.47 1.04 0.78 0.44
- C3AP11 33013 206 0.82 0.48 0.30 0.10
- C3AP12 33011 129 0.54 0.32 0.20 0.09
- C3AP13 33019 316 2.31 1.50 0.95 0.50
- C3AP17 33035 3,430 19.06 12.48 7.76 2.38
Upper and Bedford Ouse CAMS (C4)
- C4AP01 - 3,038 20.54 9.30 5.43 2.90
- C4AP03 33026 2,570 17.37 7.87 4.59 2.45
- C4AP05 33039 1,660 14.59 7.36 4.47 2.37
- C4AP06 33022 541 3.33 2.27 1.69 1.09
- C4AP12 33037 800 5.53 2.27 1.28 0.46
- C4AP14 33015 277 2.59 1.42 0.90 0.55
If gauge station is not present then river flow was calculated using equation 3.1
Source (CEH, 2016)
Generally, the flow duration curves are relatively flat between high and low flow871
conditions for all AP areas indicating the presence of surface storage (i.e. reservoirs) or872
groundwater storage (i.e. aquifers) which tend to equalize flows (Searcy, 1959). How-873
ever, in some AP areas, duration curves are steep below low flow conditions, indicating874
almost zero flows. Furthermore, average monthly flows indicate that lower flows gen-875
erally occur during the Summer, when spray irrigation demand is highest, and higher876
flows during the Winter, when spray irrigation demand is lowest.877
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3.4 Summary878
Overall, Figure 3.5 illustrates the current water availability status of the 24 AP areas879
defined in this study, excluding the two AP areas which are assessed differently due880
to their location within the low lying fens (i.e. C1AP00 and C2AP00). At high flows881
(i.e. Q30) 83 % of the catchment has water available for further licensing with the882
remainder having restricted water available. However, at moderate flows (i.e. Q50)883
only 13 % of the catchment has water available for further licensing with 54 % having884
restricted water available, and 33 % having no water available. At below moderate885
flows (i.e. Q70) only 4 % of the catchment has water available for further licensing886
with 13 % having restricted water available, and 83 % having no water available. Fi-887
nally, at low flows (i.e. Q95) only 4 % of the catchment has water available for further888
licensing with the remainder having no water available. Therefore, under the current889
water allocation system there is little opportunity for issuing new abstraction licences890
within the Great Ouse catchment except at high flows. Furthermore, climate change891
and demand increases from other sectors is expected to exacerbate the vulnerability of892
freshwater availability for spray irrigation in this catchment.893
894
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Chapter 4895
Farmers’ behaviours896
This chapter presents empirical data which identifies farmers’ preferred behavioural897
intentions under different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the898
proposed water allocation systems in England. In this study, the term farmers’ refer899
to spray irrigation licence users’ only. After an initial pilot study, a questionnaire was900
sent to 826 farmers’ in the study area, of which 11% responded. The questionnaire, and901
subsequent analysis, was based on the theoretical framework of the Theory of Planned902
Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985). The results of this study are intended to inform policy903
decision-makers involved in the design and implementation of the proposed water allo-904
cation systems by: 1) understanding how the proposed water allocation systems might905
be received by farmers’ on the ground; and 2) identifying which underlying predictors906
of intention most influence farmers’ decision-making. Therefore, this chapter addresses907
the first of the three research questions presented in the introductory chapter to this908
thesis:909
910
Research question 1: What are farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under911
different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water912
allocation systems in England? And which underlying predictors of intention most in-913
fluence their decision-making?914
915
4.1 Introduction916
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, major water allocation reforms are currently917
being proposed in England to address the climate and demand change pressures, which918
39
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the current system is failing to address (DEFRA, 2011). Furthermore, evidence has919
been presented which highlights how farmer behaviour very much influences how and920
to what success policy proposals are realised on the ground (Moon and Cocklin, 2011;921
Home et al., 2014; Feola et al., 2015) (see Chapter 2). Policy decision-makers therefore922
increasingly require more sophisticated methods of anticipating farmers’ motivation to923
comply with new policy approaches (Austin et al., 1998; Burton, 2004; Emtage et al.,924
2006; Guillem et al., 2012). The TPB (Ajzen, 1985) was critically reviewed and has925
been identified as a relatively reliable method of successfully measuring intention and926
its predictors (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, evidence has been provided which has927
shown that the addition of past behaviour as a predictor variable can increase the pre-928
dictive power of the TPB model (Albarracin et al., 2001; Sandberg and Conner, 2008;929
Rise et al., 2010). In addition, the TPB also provides a means by which the relative930
importance (weights) of each of the underlying constructs (predictors) of intention can931
be estimated. Therefore, this chapter presents empirical data, from the selected study932
area (see Chapter 3), which identifies farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under933
different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water934
allocation systems in England.935
936
4.2 Materials and Methods937
The methodological procedure used in this study can be categorised into four stages:938
1) scenario and behaviour selection; 2) questionnaire design; 3) survey procedure; and939
4) statistical analysis.940
941
4.2.1 Scenario and behaviour selection942
In total there were four scenarios and 18 behaviours selected (see Table 4.1). These943
included seven strategic (long-term)/water shortage behaviours, four strategic (long-944
term)/water surplus behaviours, four in-season (short-term)/water shortage behaviours,945
and three in-season (short-term)/water surplus behaviours. The strategic and in-season946
scenarios related to farm level water management decisions made once every several947
growing seasons, and regularly during each season, respectively. The water shortage948
and surplus scenarios related to decisions when a farmer is unable to meet crop wa-949
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Table 4.1: Scenarios and behaviours (options) selected
Low Water Usage Options (LWUO) High Water Usage Options (HWUO)
Strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario
- Grow the same crops but over a - Increase storage capacity
smaller area
- Grow less water intensive crops - Buy more water for the duration
of the growing season
- Increase application efficiency - Apply for a larger abstraction licence
- Change nothing
Strategic (long-term)/water surplus scenario
- Sell surplus water for the duration - Grow the same crops but over a
of the growing season larger area
- Change nothing - Grow more water intensive crops
In-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario
- Only use your maximum abstraction - Buy more water to meet crop water
licence to spread water evenly requirements
between all crops
- Only use your maximum abstraction
licence to irrigate your most
valuable crops
- Restrict application
(i.e. deficit irrigation)
In-season (short-term)/water surplus scenario
- Sell surplus water to maximise - Abstract surplus water for storage
profits
- Just use your abstraction licence
to meet crop water requirements
and leave the remainder of your
licence unused
ter requirements, or has a surplus of water after they meet crop water requirements,950
respectively. The scenarios and behaviours were selected after consultation with sev-951
eral farmers during multiple UKIA meetings held in and around the selected study952
area between October 2012 and December 2013. Furthermore, an irrigation specialist953
with experience in the selected study area reviewed the scenarios and behaviours (K.954
Weatherhead, personal communication, November 2013) as did the head of water ab-955
straction reform at DEFRA (H. Leveson-Gower, personal communication, December956
2013). This selection approach was favoured over holding focus groups as many farmers957
commented on their time restraints, and the UKIA meetings provided an opportunity958
to meet several farmers simultaneously.959
960
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Under a strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario farmers require additional961
water to meet crop water requirements and have the following options available: grow962
the same crops but over a smaller area; grow less water intensive crops; increase storage963
capacity; increase application efficiency; buy more water for the duration of the growing964
season; apply for a larger abstraction licence; or change nothing. Growing the same965
crops but over a smaller area; growing less water intensive crops; increasing applica-966
tion efficiency; or changing nothing were considered, for the purposes of this study, as967
Low Water Usage Options (LWUO), as any one of these behaviours ultimately means968
abstracting the same or less volume of water. Furthermore, farmers who favour these969
options are expected to experience a reduction in crop quality or yield. In contrast,970
increasing storage capacity; buying more water for the duration of the growing sea-971
son; or applying for a larger abstraction licence were considered as High Water Usage972
Options (HWUO) as any one of these behaviours ultimately means abstracting more973
water. Farmers who favour these options are expected to reduce the risk of a reduction974
in crop quality or yield.975
976
Under a strategic (long-term)/water surplus scenario farmers have a surplus of wa-977
ter after meeting crop water requirements and have the following options available:978
grow the same crops but over a larger area; grow more water intensive crops; sell sur-979
plus water for the duration of the growing season; or change nothing. The latter two980
behaviours were considered as LWUO whilst the first two were considered as HWUO981
due to the decrease and increase in water used, compared to an average year, respec-982
tively. Farmers who favour selling surplus water, a LWUO, are expected to increase983
their income similar to those farmers who favour the HWUO.984
985
Under an in-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario farmers have fewer options986
available to meet crop water requirements including: only using their maximum ab-987
straction licence to spread water evenly between all crops; only using their maximum988
abstraction licence to irrigate their most valuable crops; restricting application (i.e.989
deficit irrigation); or buying more water to meet crop water requirements. The first990
three behaviours were considered as LWUO whilst the latter was considered a HWUO991
for the same reasons presented under a strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario.992
993
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Lastly, under an in-season (short-term)/water surplus scenario farmers also have994
fewer options available including: selling surplus water to maximise profits; just using995
their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leaving the remainder of996
their licence unused; or abstracting surplus water for storage. The first two behaviours997
were considered as LWUO whilst the latter was considered a HWUO for the same rea-998
sons presented under a strategic (long-term)/water surplus scenario.999
1000
4.2.2 Questionnaire design1001
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was designed into four sections: farm attributes1002
(section A); farmers’ behavioural intentions under strategic (long-term) and in-season1003
(short-term) scenarios (sections B and C respectively); and social demographics (sec-1004
tion D). In total, there were 108 questions: five associated with section A; 98 associated1005
with sections B and C; and five associated with section D. The design of the question-1006
naire, as with the scenarios and behaviours selected, was developed after consultation1007
with several farmers during multiple UKIA meetings held in and around the selected1008
study area between October 2012 and December 2013. Furthermore, feedback for the1009
final phrasing of the questions was provided by an irrigation specialist familiar with the1010
study area (K. Weatherhead, personal communication, November 2013) and the head1011
of water abstraction reform at DEFRA (H. Leveson-Gower, personal communication,1012
December 2013).1013
1014
Section A of the questionnaire attempted to identify farmers’ three main irrigated1015
crops (as several farmers reported irrigating more than one crop over equal areas); the1016
irrigated area of each of these crops; the predominant soil type each crop was grown1017
on (as this influenced irrigation water demand); the irrigation technique used for each1018
crop (to assess the efficiency of each farm); and the overall water storage capacity of1019
the farm (to assess farm storage reserves when licensed abstractions were unavailable).1020
Example categories of crops included in the first question, and subsequently used in1021
later analysis, were based on those used by Weatherhead and Rivas Casado (2007) and1022
included: early potatoes; main crop potatoes; sugar beet; orchard fruit; small fruit;1023
vegetables; grass; cereals; and other.1024
1025
44 Chapter 4: Farmers’ behaviours
Attitude
Subjective
norm
Intention Behaviour
Perceived
behavioural
control
Past
behaviour
Figure 4.1: The Theory of Planned Behaviour including past behaviour (adapted from Ajzen
(1991))
Sections B and C, which were both divided into further water shortage and surplus1026
scenarios, related to the scenarios and behaviours previously discussed. In addition,1027
as the questionnaire was structured based on the theoretical framework of the TPB1028
(Ajzen, 1985) (see Chapter 2), each behaviour consisted of five questions related to1029
overall intention as well as the underlying constructs (or predictors) of intention in-1030
cluding: attitude; subjective norm; perceived behavioural control; and past behaviour1031
(see Figure 4.1). A Likert psychometric scale of one to seven (one being negative and1032
seven being positive) was used to record farmers’ responses. In regards to subjective1033
norms, farmers were also asked to rank which social group most influenced their de-1034
cisions. These included: a group interested in water saving and efficiency; a group1035
interested in crop type and quality; and a group consisting of family, friends, and1036
neighbours. Lastly, in regards to past behaviour, an additional question was included1037
asking farmers whether they had actually experienced the scenario.1038
1039
Section D of the questionnaire attempted to identify farmers’ gender; age; level of1040
education (measured by National Qualification Framework level for England, Wales1041
and Northern Ireland); total gross annual farm business income; and whether they had1042
used their abstraction licence within the last ten years.1043
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4.2.3 Survey procedure1044
The farmers selected for the survey were chosen due to their location within the se-1045
lected study area (see Chapter 3). The EA provided data regarding the addresses and1046
abstraction point locations for the total population of farmers in the study area (a total1047
of 836) from the National Abstraction Licence Database. A pilot survey was conducted1048
by post, on the 14th January 2014, with a sample of 10 randomly selected farmers. The1049
pilot survey included: the questionnaire; a cover letter; and a consent form. However,1050
this randomly selected sample had to be selected from the total population within the1051
study area, as the EA did not permit additional access to farmers’ addresses outside1052
the study area, thus only a small sample were chosen as these farmers were then ex-1053
cluded from the final survey. Farmers selected for the pilot survey had two weeks to1054
complete and return the questionnaire before a reminder was sent. The questionnaire1055
and reminder were posted with first class return envelopes to avoid costs to farmers;1056
however no incentives were offered for completing a questionnaire.1057
1058
In the initial pilot survey a second perceived behavioural control question, asking1059
farmers to report on the difficulty in performing a behaviour, was included in order to1060
examine the internal control aspect of self-efficacy, such as ability or motivation, rather1061
than simply external control, such as resources (Manstead and Eekelen, 1998):1062
1063
How difficult or easy would it be to... (e.g. increase application efficiency?)1064
1065
was used in addition to:1066
1067
How much do you disagree or agree with the following statements? (e.g. Increasing1068
application efficiency or not is entirely up to you)1069
1070
The pilot survey response rate was 30 % which was towards the higher end compared1071
to that reported in the survey literature (i.e. 20 % to 30 %) (Yammarino et al., 1991;1072
Pennings et al., 2002). The pilot survey provided valuable feedback, most noticeably1073
highlighting the redundancy of the additional perceived behavioural control question1074
as none of the respondents noted any difference between these two questions with many1075
commenting negatively on the length and repetitiveness of the questionnaire, and in1076
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particular those two questions. Therefore, in response to the pilot survey, and to reduce1077
the risk of a low response rate in the final survey, the additional question was removed1078
based on the knowledge that this would not cause problems to the way perceived be-1079
havioural control was used as a measure of intention. The final questionnaire was then1080
distributed by post on the 12th February 2014 to the remaining population of farmers1081
in the study area, a total of 826, offering them one month to respond. No incentives1082
were offered or reminders sent due to available resources.1083
1084
4.2.4 Statistical analysis1085
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS v22. In addition, the EA provided1086
additional licence characteristic data and past abstraction data for those who responded1087
to the questionnaire, rather than the total population, due to EA data restrictions. Li-1088
cence characteristic data included: licence type (i.e. direct; storage; or direct and1089
storage); licence source (i.e. surface or groundwater); whether licences were time lim-1090
ited or not; and annual and daily licensed volumes. Past abstraction data consisted1091
of monthly abstractions from the start of 2008 to the end of 2012. Furthermore, the1092
statistical analysis for this study was conducted and is presented in two parts. The first1093
part focussed on farm characteristics including: farm attributes; social demographics;1094
licence characteristics; and past abstractions (see Appendix B). The second part fo-1095
cussed on farmers’ behavioural intentions (see Appendix C).1096
1097
Farm characteristics1098
In regards to farm characteristics, relative frequency tables and histograms were used1099
to highlight the results of the respondents. Furthermore, where comparative data were1100
available, the results were compared to the characteristics of the total surveyed pop-1101
ulation and farmers in England and Wales in general. In addition, two-tailed tests1102
of association were conducted to explore whether associations existed between: stor-1103
age capacities and irrigated areas; annual and daily licence limits; annual abstractions1104
and precipitation; and monthly abstractions and precipitation. Although for the first1105
two tests it could be expected that positive associations were more likely, a negative1106
association could not be ruled out, particularly with regards to the role of seasonal1107
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restrictions on licences resulting in large daily licence limits for a relatively small an-1108
nual licence. Conversely for the latter two tests it could be expected that negative1109
associations were more likely, as one would expect abstractions to increase as precip-1110
itation decreases. However, additional water available may have meant that farmer’s1111
abstract more for storage, whilst less water available may coincide with HoF restric-1112
tions. Therefore, the null hypotheses for these tests were that there was no significant1113
association between variables. The appropriate parametric (Pearson’s correlation), or1114
non-parametric (Spearman’s rank correlation), test of association was used depending1115
on whether the data were normally distributed or not.1116
1117
The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test whether quantitative data was normally1118
distributed (Shapiro and Wilk, 1972). The null hypothesis for the Shapiro-Wilk test1119
was that the data are normally distributed. Therefore, if the p-value was less than the1120
chosen alpha level, which for this test was .05, then the null hypothesis was rejected1121
suggesting that the data were not from a normal distribution. However, as this test1122
is biased by sample size, normal probability plots were presented for additional veri-1123
fication. Normal probability plots are graphical techniques used to assess whether or1124
not a data set is approximately normally distributed. The data are plotted against a1125
theoretical normal distribution in a way that the data points should form a straight1126
line. Departure from the line indicates the data are not normally distributed (Cham-1127
bers et al., 1983).1128
1129
Therefore, with regards to the tests of association, if the p-value was less than the1130
chosen alpha level, which for these tests were .05, then the null hypothesis was rejected1131
suggesting that the variables were associated. Furthermore, a Pearson’s correlation1132
coefficient (r), or a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs), of plus or minus 0.7 or1133
greater was considered a strong correlation, plus or minus 0.5 a moderate correlation,1134
and plus or minus 0.3 a weak correlation.1135
1136
Behavioural intentions1137
In regards to farmers’ behavioural intentions, relative frequency tables were used to1138
summarise the results of the respondents, whilst median and IQR values highlighted1139
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the variability of responses for each Likert item. As discussed, each behaviour com-1140
prised of five Likert items, relating to each of the TPB constructs, and each Likert item1141
comprised of a seven point Likert item scale ranging from negative to positive. In order1142
to identify respondents preferred behavioural intentions for each scenario, the scores1143
on each Likert item scale were rescaled from minus three to three and multiplied by1144
the number of responses. The total sum of these rescaled Likert items were summed1145
for each behaviour. This provided an overall single value which could be used to rank1146
behaviours from most preferred to least preferred, where a positive or negative value1147
corresponded to a positive or negative overall intention to perform a behaviour.1148
1149
In addition, sign tests were conducted to test whether behaviours were statistically1150
preferred to the behaviour ranked immediately below. The null hypothesis for the sign1151
test was that the median of the differences between the two behaviours was zero. In1152
addition, the sign test does not make any assumptions about distribution, and was1153
therefore considered appropriate for use with ordinal data. If the p-value was less than1154
the chosen alpha level, which for this test was .05, then the null hypothesis was re-1155
jected suggesting that there was a difference in medians between the two behaviours.1156
The frequency of positive and negative responses, between the two behaviours, was1157
used to determine whether the difference in medians increased or decreased (Dixon1158
and Mood, 1946). However, rather than perform the sign test on each construct, for1159
each behaviour, only intention was used for simplicity and ease of interpretation and1160
therefore despite the ranking, which takes into consideration all of the constructs, an1161
increase in intention might occur for a lower ranked behaviour.1162
1163
Studies employing the TPB framework typically use multiple linear regression to1164
examine the relationships between the response and predictor variables (i.e. intention1165
and underlying constructs). Despite this method requiring data measured on a con-1166
tinuous scale (Hankins et al., 2000), these studies usually measure underlying salient1167
beliefs for each construct using multiple Likert items. The Likert items for each con-1168
struct are then assessed for internal consistency and averaged to form an overall Likert1169
scale for each construct. These Likert scales are often treated as continuous to meet1170
the assumptions required for multiple linear regression (Armitage and Conner, 2001).1171
However, as this study forewent measuring underlying salient beliefs, in order to iden-1172
§4.2 Materials and Methods 49
tify respondents’ preferred behaviours from a wider range of behaviours, binary logistic1173
regression was used. This regression technique uses the maximum likelihood method,1174
rather than ordinary least squares, to estimate the probability of a binary response1175
based on one or more categorical predictors (Peng et al., 2002).1176
1177
This method is to be favoured over ordinal logistic regression, despite the loss of in-1178
formation incurred by dichotomising ordinal scales based on median values (Roozenbeek1179
et al., 2011), due to ease of interpretation and data limitations caused by small sample1180
sizes (i.e. with the data collected in this study complete or quasi-complete separation1181
occurred for each preferred behavioural intention when using ordinal logistic regression1182
thus leading to erroneous results) (Webb et al., 2004). Furthermore, as this study was1183
interested in the respondents’ preferred behaviours under each of the four scenarios,1184
binary logistic regressions were only conducted for the highest ranked behaviours. Peng1185
et al. (2002) suggested that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a binary logistic1186
regression model, it is important to examine: the overall model; statistical tests of in-1187
dividual predictors; goodness-of-fit statistics; and validations of predicted probabilities.1188
1189
However, prior to conducting the binary logistic regression, tests for multi-collinearity1190
of the dichotomous predictor variables were conducted based on inspection of the cor-1191
relation matrix and variance inflation factors (VIF). Although no formal cutoff values1192
exist, correlation coefficients greater than 0.8 and VIF values greater than 2.5, when1193
analysing logistic regression models, were considered signs of multi-collinearity follow-1194
ing Midi et al. (2010). Moreover, plots of standardised Pearson residuals are presented1195
to highlight any possible outliers exceeding the absolute value of 2.58 which was the1196
cutoff value proposed by Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom (1989). If these occurred, then binary1197
logistic regression was conducted with and without the outliers in order to compare1198
results. Few other assumptions are required for this regression technique other than1199
the response variable (i.e. intention) has to be a dichotomous variable, the categories1200
must be mutually exclusive, and as maximum likelihood coefficients are large sample1201
estimates, a minimum of 50 cases per predictor variable was recommended (Peng et al.,1202
2002). Thus, despite dichotomising the response and predictor variables based on their1203
median values, the inclusion of past behaviour as a predictor variable still resulted in1204
complete or quasi-complete separation of each of the preferred behavioural intentions1205
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due to the low response rates obtained for this particular construct, and was therefore1206
not included in the following analyses.1207
1208
The null hypothesis for the binary logistic regressions was that the regression coeffi-1209
cients (β), or predictor variables, equalled zero. That is, the predictor variables did not1210
improve the predictive ability of the null model (i.e. the constant only model). Overall1211
model evaluation was assessed using the likelihood ratio test. This test uses chi-square1212
(X2) to compare the difference between the likelihood ratio of the full model (i.e the1213
model including predictors) and the null model based on the -2log likelihood. If the1214
p-value was less than the chosen alpha level, which for this test was .05, then the null1215
hypothesis was rejected suggesting that the alternative model (i.e. the model including1216
predictors) was a better model for predicting respondents’ behavioural intention.1217
1218
If the null model was rejected, then the Wald chi-square statistic was used to test1219
the significance of the individual regression coefficients (β) (i.e. the individual predictor1220
variables which are expressed in log odds). If the p-value for an individual predictor1221
variable was less than the chosen alpha level, which for this test was .05, then the null1222
hypothesis was rejected suggesting that the predictor variable provides a significant1223
contribution to the model. For ease of interpretation, the exponent of the regression1224
coefficients (Exp(β)), which is the odds ratio, was used to interpret the results. For1225
example, a one unit increase in the predictor variable increases the odds of a farmers’1226
preferred behavioural intention by the value of Exp(β).1227
1228
In addition, the Hosmer-Lemeshow inferential goodness-of-fit statistic was used to1229
assess the null hypothesis that there was no difference between observed and predicted1230
values. If the p-value was greater than the chosen alpha level, which for this test was1231
.05, then the null hypothesis could not be rejected suggesting that the model estimates1232
fit the data at an acceptable level (Hosmer and Lemesbow, 1980). Furthermore, the1233
two descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit which were reported included R2 indices1234
based on Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke (1991). However, it is important to note1235
that although these approximate, or pseudo R2 values, are variations of the R2 concept1236
used in linear regression, which explains the proportion of variation in the dependent1237
variable explained by the predictor variables, they are not directly comparable (Peng1238
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et al., 2002). Lastly, classification tables are presented to validate the predicted prob-1239
abilities.1240
1241
4.3 Results and discussion1242
The section is presented in two parts in relation to the statistical analysis conducted.1243
The first part discusses the respondents farm characteristics which includes: farm at-1244
tributes; social demographics; licence characteristics; and past abstractions between1245
2008 to 2012. Farm attributes and social demographics were obtained from the survey1246
(section A and D respectively) whilst licence characteristics and past abstractions, for1247
those who responded to the survey, were obtained from the EA. The second part dis-1248
cusses the respondents’ behavioural intentions, for strategic (long-term) and in-season1249
(short-term) scenarios, which were obtained from the survey (sections B and C re-1250
spectively). Summary statistics with regards to farm characteristics and behavioural1251
intentions are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C respectively. Overall, not1252
including the random sample of farmers who participated in the pilot survey, 11 % of1253
the remaining population of farmers in the study area responded, providing a sample1254
size of 90 farmers.1255
1256
4.3.1 Farm characteristics1257
Farm attributes1258
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the respondents’ farm attributes including: the per-1259
centage of crops which were irrigated; the percentage of predominant soil types which1260
were irrigated; and the percentage of irrigation application mechanisms used. Main1261
crop potatoes (41 % of respondents) and vegetables (33 %) were the most widely ir-1262
rigated crops. Sand and loam were the most widely irrigated predominant soil types,1263
36 % and 35 % respectively. Whilst rainguns were the most widely used irrigation1264
application mechanism used (60 %). In addition, the respondents total irrigated area,1265
based on their three main irrigated crops, was 12,659 ha, with main crop potatoes and1266
vegetables accounting for 46 % and 35 % respectively. Lastly, 49 % of the respondents1267
had a combined storage capacity of 10,134 Ml.1268
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Table 4.2: Respondents’ farm attributes (n = 90)
Measure Respondents
(%)
Irrigated crop
- Early potatoes 5
- Main crop potatoes 41
- Sugar beet 11
- Orchard fruit 1
- Small fruit 1
- Vegetables 33
- Grass 1
- Cereals 7
- Other 2
Predominant soil type
- Sand 36
- Loam 35
- Peat 16
- Mixed 14
Irrigation application used
- Raingun 60
- Booms 18
- Sprinkle 2
- Trickle 1
- Mixed 19
Summing errors due to rounding
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the distribution of irrigated areas (top) and storage ca-1269
pacities (bottom) of the respondents were positively skewed. Irrigated areas ranged1270
from 3 ha to 1,558 ha, with a median of 47 ha and an interquartile range (IQR) of1271
116 ha. Storage capacities ranged from 5 Ml to 2,273 Ml, with a median of 107 Ml1272
and an IQR of 217 Ml. Furthermore, 25 % of respondents irrigated less than 25 ha1273
and 75 % of respondents irrigated less than 141 ha. With regards to those respondents1274
with storage, 25 % had storage capacities of less than 49 Ml whilst 75 % had storage1275
capacities of less than 266 Ml. In addition, for the 49 % of respondents who had stor-1276
age capacity, there was a strong positive correlation between ranked irrigated area and1277
ranked storage capacity (rs= .76), which was also statistically significant (p = <.001),1278
thus the null hypothesis could be rejected (see Appendix B).1279
1280
These results correspond with findings presented by Knox et al. (2010) for the An-1281
glian region who reported an increase in high value crops, between 1990 and 2010, such1282
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Figure 4.2: Relative frequency histograms of respondents’ irrigated areas and stor-
age capacities. (Top) A relative frequency histogram of respondents’ irrigated areas. (Bot-
tom) A relative frequency histogram of respondents’ storage capacities for those who had storage
as main crop potatoes and vegetables. Furthermore, sand and loam were found to be1283
common soil types present in this region (Hodge et al., 1984). Moreover, approximately1284
67 % of farmers in England use rainguns as their preferred irrigation application mech-1285
anism and 42 % have some level of storage capacity (Weatherhead and Rivas Casado,1286
2007).1287
1288
Social demographics1289
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the respondents’ social demographics including: gen-1290
der; age; level of eduction acquired (measured by National Qualification Framework1291
level for England, Wales and Northern Ireland); and total gross annual farm business1292
income. The majority of respondents were male (98 %) and aged between 40 and 59 (501293
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Table 4.3: Respondents’ social demographics (n = 90)
Measure Respondents
(%)
Gender
- Male 98
- Female 2
Age
- 18-39 15
- 40-59 50
- ≥ 60 35
aEducation
- ≤ 2 37
- 3-5 25
- ≥ 6 38
bIncome
- £0-49,999 5
- £50-99,999 18
- ≥ £100,000 77
aNational Qualification Framework
(NQF) levels for England, Wales
and Northern Ireland
bTotal gross annual farm
business income
%). In regards to the level of education acquired the respondents were largely divided1294
between those who achieved level two or less and those who achieved level six or more1295
(37 % and 38 % respectively). Furthermore, 77 % of respondents reported a total gross1296
annual farm business income of more than £100,000.1297
1298
These results correspond with findings from the farm structure survey in 2013 which1299
found that 83 % of farm managers in England were male and 58 % were aged between1300
45 and 64 (DEFRA, 2013). Furthermore, although reported farm incomes were greater1301
than the average farm income in England (£78,190 in 2010), these are typical within1302
the Anglian region where farms are inherently more profitable (DEFRA, 2014a).1303
1304
Licence characteristics1305
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the respondents’ licence characteristics including:1306
the percentage of farmers who actively used their licence within the last 10 years;1307
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Table 4.4: Respondents’ licence characteristics (n = 90)
Measure Respondents
(%)
Licence use (last 10 years)
- Yes 98
- No 2
Licence type
- Direct 51
- Storage 9
- Direct and storage 40
Licence source
- Surface water 78
- Groundwater 22
Time limited
- Yes 76
- No 24
Summing errors due to rounding
licence type; licence source; and whether licences were time limited or not. The ma-1308
jority of farmers actively used their licence within the last 10 years (98 %). However,1309
with regards to the percentage of respondents who had storage capacity, a discrepancy1310
occurred between the additional data provided by the EA (31 %) and those who re-1311
sponded to the survey (49 %). It was assumed that the questionnaire data provided1312
a more reliable source of information. Therefore, the additional respondents who had1313
storage were assumed to have updated their licences from direct only to direct and1314
storage, as both data sources reported the same respondents with storage only licences.1315
Whereas the majority of respondents (51 %) owned direct licences, which are gener-1316
ally used during the growing season, only 9 % owned storage only licences, which are1317
generally used during the winter to refill farm storage reservoirs, whilst the remainder1318
(40 %) were able to abstract during the whole year as they owned direct and storage1319
licences. Furthermore, 78 % of respondents owned surface water licences, with the1320
remainder owning groundwater licences, and 76 % owned time limited licences with1321
the remainder owning licences which were not time limited. Jointly the respondents1322
total annual licence limit was 6,645 Ml, whilst their total daily licence limit was 171 Ml.1323
1324
Figure 4.3 illustrates that the distribution of annual (top) and daily (bottom) li-1325
cence limits of the respondents were positively skewed, similar to irrigated areas and1326
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Figure 4.3: Relative frequency histograms of respondents’ annual and daily licence
limits. (Top) A relative frequency histogram of respondents’ annual licence limits. (Bottom)
A relative frequency histogram of respondents’ daily licence limits
storage capacities. Annual licence limits ranged from 1 Ml to 727 Ml, with a median of1327
45 Ml and an IQR of 67 Ml. Daily licence limits ranged from <1 Ml to 25 Ml, with a1328
median of 1 Ml and an IQR of 2 Ml. Furthermore, 25 % of respondents annual licence1329
limits were less than 17 Ml and 75 % of respondents annual licence limits were less than1330
84 Ml. Similarly, 25 % of respondents daily licence limits were less than 1 Ml and 75 %1331
of respondents daily licence limits were less than 2 Ml. In addition, there was a strong1332
positive correlation between ranked annual licence limit and ranked daily licence limit1333
(rs= .70), which was also statistically significant (p = <.001), thus the null hypothesis1334
could be rejected (see Appendix B).1335
1336
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Past abstractions (2008 to 2012)1337
On average, the respondents abstracted 36 % of their annual licensed volume between1338
2008 and 2012 (i.e. 2,395 Ml) (see Appendix B). However, Figure 4.4 (top and middle)1339
illustrate that annual licensed abstractions varied during this period with 51 % being1340
abstracted in 2011 and 24 % in 2012, corresponding with the driest and wettest years1341
since 1973 respectively (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, Figure 4.4 (bottom) illustrates1342
that the respondents’ average monthly abstractions, during the same period, varied1343
with the largest volume abstracted in June (435 Ml) and the smallest in October (391344
Ml). However, Figure 4.4 (bottom) also indicates two general periods of abstractions1345
in the year. The first corresponds with the growing season (i.e. April to October)1346
when the majority of direct licence users can abstract, accounting for 70 % of average1347
monthly abstractions. The second corresponds with the period outside of the growing1348
season (i.e. November to March) when the majority of storage only licence users can1349
abstract.1350
1351
In particular, there was a strong, negative, linear correlation between annual ab-1352
stractions and precipitation (r= -.91), which was also statistically significant (p= <.05),1353
thus this null hypothesis could be rejected (see Appendix B). However, there was a weak1354
correlation, with no direction or form, between average monthly abstractions and pre-1355
cipitation (r= .36), which was not statistically significant (p= >.05), thus this null1356
hypothesis could not be rejected (see Appendix B). Furthermore, as there were two1357
general periods of abstractions in the year, during the growing season and outside, two1358
further tests of association were conducted respectively. During the growing season,1359
there was a weak correlation, with no direction or form, between average monthly ab-1360
stractions and precipitation (r= .36), which was not statistically significant (p= >.05),1361
thus this null hypothesis could not be rejected (see Appendix B). However, outside1362
of the growing season, there was a strong, positive, linear correlation between aver-1363
age monthly abstractions and precipitation (r= .87), although it was not statistically1364
significant (p= >.05), thus this null hypothesis could not be rejected (see Appendix B).1365
1366
These results indicate that although annual abstractions increased when precipi-1367
tation decreased, other factors had a strong influence on monthly abstractions other1368
than precipitation. During the growing season, a major contributing factor would likely1369
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Figure 4.4: Bar charts illustrating respondents’ annual, licensed, and average
monthly abstractions (2008 to 2012). (Top) A bar chart illustrating respondents’ an-
nual abstractions (2008 to 2012). (Middle) A bar chart illustrating the percentage of licence
volume abstracted by respondents (2008 to 2012). (Bottom) A bar chart illustrating respon-
dents’ average monthly abstractions (2008 to 2012)
include water availability, as less precipitation also means farmers are unable to always1370
abstract water due to HoF restrictions. Outside of the growing season, water avail-1371
ability is less of an issue due to increased precipitation. Thus, a stronger association1372
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existed between average monthly abstractions and precipitation, although not signif-1373
icant. Overall, these results indicate that the farm characteristics of the respondents1374
are largely representative of farmers in the Anglian region, and also in England more1375
generally.1376
1377
4.3.2 Behavioural intentions1378
The respondents’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions for each of the four scenarios1379
are presented in Figure 4.5. LWUO were preferred under all four scenarios: increasing1380
application efficiency under a strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario; selling sur-1381
plus water for the duration of the growing season under a strategic (long-term)/water1382
surplus scenario; only using their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most1383
valuable crops under an in-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario; and just using1384
their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leaving the remainder of1385
their licence unused under an in-season (short-term)/water surplus scenario. In addi-1386
tion, groups interested in crop type and quality were most influential in respondents1387
decision-making under all scenarios (see Appendix C).1388
1389
Preferred strategic (long-term)/water shortage behavioural intention1390
In regards to this scenario, 88 % to 97 % of the respondents answered each Likert item,1391
except for past behaviour, where only 6 % to 8 % answered, due to the fact that only1392
9 % actually experienced this scenario. Figure 4.5 (top left) indicates that under this1393
scenario the respondents’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions, from most preferred1394
to least preferred, were as follows: increase application efficiency (LWUO); increase1395
storage capacity (HWUO); apply for a larger abstraction licence (HWUO); buy more1396
water for the duration of the growing season (HWUO); grow less water intensive crops1397
(LWUO); grow the same crops but over a smaller area (LWUO); and lastly change1398
nothing (LWUO).1399
1400
Furthermore, a significant median decrease existed between intention to increase1401
application efficiency and intention to increase storage capacity; intention to increase1402
storage capacity and intention to apply for a larger abstraction licence; intention to1403
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Table 4.5: A binary logistic regression model with regards to respondents’ preferred strategic
(long-term)/water shortage behavioural intention (n = 79)
aVariables β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 95 % C.I. for Exp(β)
(X2) Lower Upper
Constant -1.765 .476 13.748 1 .000 .171
- Attitude 1.146 .545 4.419 1 .036 3.146 1.081 9.159
- SN 1.641 .547 9.009 1 .003 5.160 1.767 15.068
- PBC .431 .567 .577 1 .448 1.538 .506 4.676
Coefficient (β); Standard error of estimate (SE ); Wald chi-square value (Wald
(X2)); Degree of freedom (df ); Significance (Sig.); Exponentiated coefficient
(Exp(β)); Confidence interval (C.I.)
a Subjective norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)
Model chi-square (X2) = 22.866 (3 df ), p = .000, (-2 log likelihood = 85.623).
Hosmer & Lemeshow (X2) = 1.970 (5 df ), p = .853. Cox and Snell R2 = .251.
Nagelkerke R2 = .337
buy more water for the duration of the growing season and intention to grow less wa-1404
ter intensive crops; and intention to grow the same crops but over a smaller area and1405
intention to change nothing. As p= <.05 in each case, the null hypotheses could be1406
rejected for each pair of these behaviours. In addition, a significant median increase1407
existed between intention to grow less water intensive crops and intention to grow the1408
same crops but over a smaller area, p= <.05, thus the null hypothesis between this1409
pair of behaviours could also be rejected (see Appendix C).1410
1411
A binary logistic regression was performed to examine the effects of attitude, sub-1412
jective norm, and perceived behavioural control on the likelihood of increasing respon-1413
dents’ intention to increase application efficiency. The logistic regression model was1414
statistically significant, X2(3) = 22.866, p = <.001, thus the null hypothesis could be1415
rejected (see Table 4.5). Attitude and subjective norm were both significant predictors1416
of intention, p = <.05 and p = <.01 respectively, thus the null hypotheses for these1417
predictor variables could be rejected. However, perceived behavioural control was not1418
a significant predictor of intention, p = >.05, thus the null hypothesis for this predictor1419
could not be rejected. Moreover, a one unit increase in attitude increased the odds of a1420
farmers’ intention to increase application efficiency by 3.146 times. A one unit increase1421
in subjective norm increased the odds of a farmers’ intention to increase application1422
efficiency by 5.160 times.1423
1424
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Table 4.6: Classification table with regards to respondents’ preferred strategic (long-
term)/water shortage behavioural intention (n = 79)
Predicted
Intention % correct
Observed 0 1
Intention 0 37 7 84.1
1 12 23 65.7
Overall % 75.9
The cutoff value is .5
Furthermore, no multi-collinearity existed between predictor variables, the number1425
of cases per predictor variables were greater than the recommended value, and no out-1426
liers were present, based on the thresholds used in this study (see Appendix C). The1427
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was insignificant indicating that the model1428
fit the observed data well, X2(5) = 1.970, p = .853, thus the null hypothesis could not1429
be rejected. Furthermore, the model explained 34 % (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance1430
in intention to increase application efficiency and correctly classified 76 % of cases,1431
an improvement over the null model which only classified 56 % of cases correctly (see1432
Table 4.6).1433
1434
Preferred strategic (long-term)/water surplus behavioural intention1435
In regards to this scenario, 86 % to 96 % of the respondents answered each Likert item,1436
except for past behaviour, where only 42 % to 50 % answered, due to the fact that only1437
51 % actually experienced this scenario (noticeably more than the previous strategic1438
(long-term)/water shortage scenario). Figure 4.5 (top right) indicates that under this1439
scenario the respondents’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions, from most preferred1440
to least preferred, were as follows: sell surplus water for the duration of the growing1441
season (LWUO); change nothing (LWUO); grow the same crops but over a larger area1442
(HWUO); and lastly grow more water intensive crops (HWUO).1443
1444
Furthermore, a significant median decrease existed between intention to change1445
nothing and intention to grow the same crops but over a larger area; and intention to1446
grow the same crops but over a larger area and intention to grow more water intensive1447
crops. As p= <.05 for both of these cases, the null hypotheses could be rejected for1448
§4.3 Results and discussion 63
Table 4.7: A binary logistic regression model with regards to respondents’ preferred strategic
(long-term)/water surplus behavioural intention (n = 75)
aVariables β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 95 % C.I. for Exp(β)
(X2) Lower Upper
Constant -1.085 .387 7.850 1 .005 .338
- Attitude 2.588 1.107 5.463 1 .019 13.309 1.519 116.635
- SN 1.275 .528 5.821 1 .016 3.579 1.270 10.083
- PBC .535 .643 .693 1 .405 1.708 .484 6.022
Coefficient (β); Standard error of estimate (SE ); Wald chi-square value (Wald
(X2)); Degree of freedom (df ); Significance (Sig.); Exponentiated coefficient
(Exp(β)); Confidence interval (C.I.)
a Subjective norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)
Model chi-square (X2) = 18.340 (3 df ), p = .000, (-2 log likelihood = 85.512).
Hosmer & Lemeshow (X2) = 2.621 (3 df ), p = .454. Cox and Snell R2 = .217.
Nagelkerke R2 = .289
each pair of these behaviours (see Appendix C). However, although no significant me-1449
dian difference existed between intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the1450
growing season and intention to change nothing, the prior behaviour was ranked higher.1451
1452
A binary logistic regression was performed to examine the effects of attitude, sub-1453
jective norm, and perceived behavioural control on the likelihood of increasing respon-1454
dents’ intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season. The logistic1455
regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 18.340, p = <.001, thus the null1456
hypothesis could be rejected (see Table 4.7). Attitude and subjective norm were both1457
significant predictors of intention, p =<.05 for both predictors, thus the null hypotheses1458
for these predictor variables could be rejected. However, perceived behavioural control1459
was not a significant predictor of intention, p = >.05, thus the null hypothesis for this1460
predictor could not be rejected. Moreover, a one unit increase in attitude increased the1461
odds of a farmers’ intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season1462
by 13.309 times. A one unit increase in subjective norm increased the odds of a farm-1463
ers’ intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season by 3.579 times.1464
1465
Furthermore, no multi-collinearity existed between predictor variables, the number1466
of cases per predictor variables were greater than the recommended value, and no out-1467
liers were present, based on the thresholds used in this study (see Appendix C). The1468
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was insignificant indicating that the model1469
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Table 4.8: Classification table with regards to respondents’ preferred strategic (long-
term)/water surplus behavioural intention (n = 75)
Predicted
Intention % correct
Observed 0 1
Intention 0 26 13 66.7
1 10 26 72.2
Overall % 69.3
The cutoff value is .5
fit the observed data well, X2(3) = 2.621, p = .454, thus the null hypothesis could not1470
be rejected. Furthermore, the model explained 29 % (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance1471
in intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season and correctly1472
classified 69 % of cases, an improvement over the null model which only classified 521473
% of cases correctly (see Table 4.8).1474
1475
Preferred in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural intention1476
In regards to this scenario, 87 % to 94 % of the respondents answered each Likert item,1477
except for past behaviour, where only 12 % answered, due to the fact that only 12 %1478
actually experienced this scenario, similar to the previous strategic (long-term)/water1479
shortage scenario. Figure 4.5 (bottom left) indicates that under this scenario the re-1480
spondents’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions, from most preferred to least pre-1481
ferred, were as follows: only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate your most1482
valuable crops (LWUO); buy more water to meet crop water requirements (HWUO);1483
only use your maximum abstraction licence to spread water evenly between all crops1484
(LWUO); and lastly restrict irrigation (i.e. deficit irrigation) (LWUO).1485
1486
Furthermore, a significant median decrease existed between intention to only use1487
your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate your most valuable crops and intention1488
to buy more water to meet crop water requirements; and intention to buy more water1489
to meet crop water requirements and intention to only use your maximum abstraction1490
licence to spread water evenly between all crops. As p= <.05 for both of these cases,1491
the null hypotheses could be rejected for each pair of these behaviours (see Appendix C).1492
1493
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Table 4.9: A binary logistic regression model with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season
(short-term)/water shortage behavioural intention (n = 78)
aVariables β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 95 % C.I. for Exp(β)
(X2) Lower Upper
Constant -3.108 .680 20.862 1 .000 .045
- Attitude 1.588 .750 4.479 1 .034 4.896 1.125 21.312
- SN 2.031 .697 8.479 1 .004 7.619 1.942 29.885
- PBC 1.356 .653 4.314 1 .038 3.882 1.079 13.958
Coefficient (β); Standard error of estimate (SE ); Wald chi-square value (Wald
(X2)); Degree of freedom (df ); Significance (Sig.); Exponentiated coefficient
(Exp(β)); Confidence interval (C.I.)
a Subjective norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)
Model chi-square (X2) = 28.167 (3 df ), p = .000, (-2 log likelihood = 60.639).
Hosmer & Lemeshow (X2) = 5.055 (4 df ), p = .282. Cox and Snell R2 = .303.
Nagelkerke R2 = .446
A binary logistic regression was performed to examine the effects of attitude, sub-1494
jective norm, and perceived behavioural control on the likelihood of increasing respon-1495
dents’ intention to only use their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most1496
valuable crops. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) =1497
28.167, p = <.001, thus the null hypothesis could be rejected (see Table 4.9). Attitude,1498
subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control were all significant predictors of1499
intention, p = <.05 for all predictors, thus the null hypotheses for all of the predictor1500
variables could be rejected. Moreover, a one unit increase in attitude increased the1501
odds of a farmers’ intention to only use their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate1502
their most valuable crops by 4.896 times. A one unit increase in subjective norm in-1503
creased the odds of a farmers’ intention to only use their maximum abstraction licence1504
to irrigate their most valuable crops by 7.619 times. Lastly, a one unit increase in per-1505
ceived behavioural control increased the odds of a farmers’ intention to only use their1506
maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most valuable crops by 3.882 times.1507
1508
However, although no multi-collinearity existed between predictor variables, and1509
the number of cases per predictor variables were greater than the recommended value,1510
there was one noticeable outlier present, based on the thresholds used in this study (see1511
Appendix C). This outlier represented the only respondent who was categorised as one1512
for intention but zero for each of the predictors. Therefore, a second binary logistic1513
regression was performed, after removing the outlier, to compare changes in the model.1514
66 Chapter 4: Farmers’ behaviours
Table 4.10: A binary logistic regression model with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season
(short-term)/water shortage behavioural intention after removing an outlier (n = 77)
aVariables β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 95 % C.I. for Exp(β)
(X2) Lower Upper
Constant -3.643 .817 19.876 1 .000 .026
- Attitude 1.708 .774 4.876 1 .027 5.519 1.212 25.139
- SN 2.403 .777 9.556 1 .002 11.056 2.410 50.730
- PBC 1.638 .707 5.366 1 .021 5.146 1.287 20.577
Coefficient (β); Standard error of estimate (SE ); Wald chi-square value (Wald
(X2)); Degree of freedom (df ); Significance (Sig.); Exponentiated coefficient
(Exp(β)); Confidence interval (C.I.)
a Subjective norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)
Model chi-square (X2) = 32.129 (3 df ), p = .000, (-2 log likelihood = 53.853).
Hosmer & Lemeshow (X2) = 7.215 (4 df ), p = .125. Cox and Snell R2 = .342.
Nagelkerke R2 = .508
The second binary logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) =1515
32.129, p = <.001, thus the null hypothesis could be rejected (see Table 4.10). Atti-1516
tude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control all continued to be significant1517
predictors of intention, p = <.05 for all predictors, thus the null hypotheses for all of1518
the predictor variables could be rejected. Moreover, a one unit increase in attitude in-1519
creased the odds of a farmers’ intention to only use their maximum abstraction licence1520
to irrigate their most valuable crops by 5.519 times. A one unit increase in subjective1521
norm increased the odds of a farmers’ intention to only use their maximum abstraction1522
licence to irrigate their most valuable crops by 11.056 times. Lastly, a one unit increase1523
in perceived behavioural control increased the odds of a farmers’ intention to only use1524
their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most valuable crops by 5.146 times.1525
Therefore, removing the one noticeable outlier increased the odds ratios of each of the1526
predictor variables.1527
1528
Furthermore, no multi-collinearity existed between predictor variables, the number1529
of cases per predictor variables were greater than the recommended value, and no out-1530
liers were present, based on the thresholds used in this study (see Appendix C). The1531
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was insignificant indicating that the model1532
fit the observed data well, X2(4) = 7.215, p = .125, thus the null hypothesis could not1533
be rejected. Furthermore, the model explained 51 % (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance1534
in intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season and correctly1535
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Table 4.11: Classification table with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-
term)/water shortage behavioural intention (n = 77)
Predicted
Intention % correct
Observed 0 1
Intention 0 52 6 89.7
1 5 14 73.7
Overall % 85.7
The cutoff value is .5
classified 86 % of cases, an improvement over the null model which only classified 751536
% of cases correctly (see Table 4.11).1537
1538
Preferred in-season (short-term)/water surplus behavioural intention1539
In regards to this scenario, 79 % to 91 % of the respondents answered each Likert1540
item, except for past behaviour, where only 42 % to 50 % answered, due to the fact1541
that only 53 % actually experienced this scenario, which is noticeably more than the1542
previous in-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario and similar to the strategic1543
(long-term)/water surplus scenario. Figure 4.5 (bottom right) indicates that under1544
this scenario the respondents’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions, from most pre-1545
ferred to least preferred, were as follows: just use your abstraction licence to meet crop1546
water requirements and leave the remainder of your licence unused (LWUO); sell sur-1547
plus water to maximise profits (LWUO); and lastly abstract surplus water for storage1548
(HWUO).1549
1550
The only significant median decrease existed between intention to sell surplus wa-1551
ter to maximise profits and intention to abstract surplus water for storage, as p=1552
<.05. Therefore the null hypotheses could be rejected for this pair of behaviours (see1553
Appendix C). However, although no significant median difference existed between in-1554
tention to just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leave1555
the remainder of your licence unused and intention to sell surplus water to maximise1556
profits, the prior behaviour was ranked higher, similar to the previous strategic (long-1557
term)/water surplus scenario.1558
1559
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Table 4.12: A binary logistic regression model with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season
(short-term)/water surplus behavioural intention (n = 72)
aVariables β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 95 % C.I. for Exp(β)
(X2) Lower Upper
Constant -21.819 6027.378 .000 1 .997 .000
- Attitude +∞ 6027.378 .000 1 .997 +∞ - -
- SN -.431 .826 .272 1 .602 .650 .129 3.281
- PBC +∞ 6027.378 .000 1 .997 +∞ - -
Coefficient (β); Standard error of estimate (SE ); Wald chi-square value (Wald
(X2)); Degree of freedom (df ); Significance (Sig.); Exponentiated coefficient
(Exp(β)); Confidence interval (C.I.)
a Subjective norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)
Model chi-square (X2) = 40.960 (3 df ), p = .000, (-2 log likelihood = 37.744).
Hosmer & Lemeshow (X2) = 2.003 (5 df ), p = .849. Cox and Snell R2 = .434.
Nagelkerke R2 = .653
A binary logistic regression was performed to examine the effects of attitude, sub-1560
jective norm, and perceived behavioural control on the likelihood of increasing respon-1561
dents’ intention to just use their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements1562
and leave the remainder of their licence unused. However, the model failed to converge1563
after 20 iterations suggesting that one or more of the predictor variables were causing1564
complete or quasi-complete separation, due to the sample size being too small. On1565
inspection of the iteration history it was clear that attitude and perceived behavioural1566
control were the responsible variables (see Appendix C). Although the most common1567
approach is to remove the variable or variables causing the issue, others suggest a more1568
desirable approach is to simply do nothing and report the results of the full model,1569
largely due to interaction effects between predictor variables. Either approach should1570
be made in consideration to the original research question attempting to be addressed.1571
Therefore, as this study was interested in understanding the relative importance of each1572
of the underlying constructs, the latter approach was adopted (Allison, 2008).1573
1574
The binary logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 40.960, p1575
= <.001, thus the null hypothesis could be rejected (see Table 4.12). However, none of1576
the predictor variables were individually significant, p = >.05 for all predictors, thus the1577
null hypothesis could not be rejected for any of the predictor variables. The standard1578
errors and Wald chi-square statistics for attitude and perceived behavioural control are1579
certainly incorrect but those for subjective norm remain valid (Allison, 2008).1580
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Table 4.13: Classification table with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-
term)/water surplus behavioural intention (n = 72)
Predicted
Intention % correct
Observed 0 1
Intention 0 55 0 100.0
1 9 8 47.1
Overall % 87.5
The cutoff value is .5
Furthermore, no multi-collinearity existed between predictor variables, the number1581
of cases per predictor variables were greater than the recommended value, and no out-1582
liers were present, based on the thresholds used in this study (see Appendix C). The1583
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic was insignificant indicating that the model1584
fit the observed data well, X2(5) = 2.003, p = .849, thus the null hypothesis could not1585
be rejected. Furthermore, the model explained 65 % (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance1586
in intention to just use their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and1587
leave the remainder of their licence unused and correctly classified 88 % of cases, an1588
improvement over the null model which only classified 76 % of cases correctly (see Ta-1589
ble 4.13).1590
1591
4.4 Summary1592
Overall, this chapter has analysed empirical data which identified farmers’ preferred1593
behavioural intentions under different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with re-1594
gards to the proposed water allocation systems in England. The results of this study1595
are intended to inform policy decision-makers involved in designing the proposed water1596
allocation systems by: 1) understanding how the proposed water allocation systems1597
might be received by farmers’ on the ground; and 2) identifying which underlying pre-1598
dictors of intention most influence farmers’ decision-making. Therefore, a questionnaire1599
was sent to 826 farmers in the study area of which 11 % responded. Analyses were1600
conducted in regards to respondents’ farm characteristics and preferred behavioural1601
intentions based on the theoretical framework of the TPB.1602
1603
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Generally, respondents were representative of farmers in the Anglian region, and1604
in England, as farm characteristics were similar to those presented in other studies1605
(Hodge et al., 1984; Weatherhead and Rivas Casado, 2007; Knox et al., 2010; DE-1606
FRA, 2013, 2014a). Under a strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario farmers’1607
preferred behavioural intention was to increase application efficiency. Under a strate-1608
gic (long-term)/water surplus scenario farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions was to1609
sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season. Under an in-season (short-1610
term)/water shortage scenario farmers’ preferred behavioural intention was to only use1611
their maximum abstraction licence to irrigated their most valuable crops. Lastly, under1612
an in-season (short-term)/water surplus scenario farmers’ preferred behavioural inten-1613
tion was to just use their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leave1614
the remainder of their licence unused. Interestingly, all of the preferred behaviours were1615
LWUO as defined in this study.1616
1617
In addition, the results of the binary logistic regression analyses indicated that atti-1618
tude and subjective norm were both significant predictors of farmers’ intentions under1619
three of the four scenarios (not under an in-season (short-term)/water surplus scenario).1620
Perceived behavioural control was only a significant predictor under an in-season (short-1621
term)/water shortage scenario. Interestingly, subjective norm had a larger influence on1622
farmers’ intentions under both strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term)/water1623
shortage scenarios, whilst attitude had a larger influence on farmers’ intention under a1624
strategic (long-term)/water surplus scenario. Past behaviour was not included in the1625
regression analyses due to too few responses for this construct.1626
1627
Therefore, the results of this study indicate that the proposed water allocation1628
systems, which strongly encourage water licence trading, are not likely to be adopted1629
quickly by farmers in the Anglian region based on their current preferred behavioural in-1630
tentions, except with regards to selling surplus water during strategic (long-term)/water1631
surplus scenarios. However, if attitude and subjective norm are assumed to be the most1632
influential predictors of farmers’ intentions, based on the results of this study, then it1633
would not be surprising to see a gradual increase in the number of farmers trading as1634
more farmer’s increasingly understood the operations and the advantages, similar to1635
what occurred in Australia when they first introduced water trading (Bjornlund, 2003).1636
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Finally, this study is intended to inform policy decision-makers involved with the1637
design and implementation of the proposed water allocation systems in England. The1638
results of this study have indicated how the proposals might be received by farmers1639
on the ground under different strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term) water1640
shortage and surplus scenarios. It also identified the main underlying constructs of the1641
TPB which have the greatest effect in influencing their decision-making.1642
1643

Chapter 51644
A farm typology based on1645
preferred behavioural intentions1646
This chapter presents a farm typology based on the preferred behavioural intentions of1647
farmers identified in the previous chapter. In particular this chapter offers one of the1648
first typologies designed for policy decision-makers to understand how the proposed1649
water allocation systems in England might be received by particular groups of farmers1650
on the ground. As previously discussed, traditional farm typologies tend to concentrate1651
on particular farm attributes such as farm income, size, or output. However, in respect1652
to policy decision-making a growing number of researchers, and policy decision-makers,1653
are beginning to realise the necessity of identifying farmers’ behavioural intentions in1654
aiding the design, implementation, and overall success of policy changes. Therefore,1655
this chapter addresses the second of the three research questions presented in the in-1656
troductory chapter:1657
1658
Research question 2: If farmers share similar behavioural intentions under dif-1659
ferent scenarios how can traditional farm typologies incorporate these preferred be-1660
haviours?1661
1662
5.1 Introduction1663
The importance of understanding farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under dif-1664
ferent scenarios, and the underlying predictors of intention, for policy decision-making1665
have been discussed (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, the use and development of farm1666
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typologies to aid policy decision-makers in effectively designing and implementing pol-1667
icy changes have also been discussed (see Chapter 2). However, an important research1668
gap identified in Chapter 2 highlighted that traditional farm typologies, which focus1669
on physical or economic descriptors, fail to incorporate true farmer behaviour and are1670
therefore of limited value in supporting policy formulations (Guillem et al., 2012).1671
Therefore, this chapter extends the analyses conducted in Chapter 4 by exploring1672
whether farmers who share similar behavioural intention traits also share particular1673
farm characteristics such as: farm attributes; social demographics; licence character-1674
istics; and past abstraction behaviour. This method could provide an alternative tool1675
for policy decision-makers when developing and implementing proposed policy changes1676
by targeting specific farm types based on behavioural intentions which may naturally1677
incorporate elements of more traditional typologies.1678
1679
5.2 Materials and methods1680
A conceptual approach was used to categorise farmers into three farm types based on1681
their responses to the behavioural intention scenarios of the questionnaire (sections B1682
and C). The categories used to define the three farm types related to the Low Water1683
Usage Options (LWUO) and High Water Usage Options (HWUO) previously discussed1684
(see section 4.2.1). Individual preferences were determined by rescaling Likert psycho-1685
metric responses to the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) constructs (Ajzen, 1985),1686
including past behaviour (see Figure 4.1), from -3 to 3 and calculating a median re-1687
sponse for each of the 18 behaviours. These median values were then used to calculate1688
an overall median response for all LWUO and all HWUO for each respondent. Data1689
were treated as ordinal and therefore median values were used rather than mean val-1690
ues. Respondents were categorised depending on which median value was greatest. If1691
both median values were tied then this would suggest that the irrigation farmer had1692
no preference overall. Therefore, three farm types existed in this conceptual approach:1693
farmers who preferred HWUO; farmers who preferred LWUO; and farmers who had no1694
preference.1695
1696
Farm characteristics including: farm attributes; social demographics; licence char-1697
acteristics; and past abstractions were analysed to compare similarities and differences1698
§5.3 Results and discussion 75
between the three farm types. Pearson’s Chi-square tests (X 2) were conducted to test1699
for statistically significant differences between farm types when examining categorical1700
variables. This test required two main assumptions: independence of observations; and1701
that no cells had an expected frequency of less than one and no more than 20 % had1702
an expected frequency of less than five (Cochran, 1952). Although the first assumption1703
was satisfied by the fact that only one farmer could belong to a single farm type, the1704
second assumption occasionally required amalgamating particular categories, if suit-1705
able, to increase expected frequency. Where this occurred, the amalgamated categories1706
are stated along with the test results. The null hypothesis for the Pearson’s Chi-square1707
test was that there was no statistically significant difference between farm type and1708
the categorical variable being tested. Therefore, if the p-value was less than the chosen1709
alpha level, which for this study was .05, then the null hypothesis was rejected suggest-1710
ing that there was a significant difference between farm types.1711
1712
In regards to continuous variables, such as size of irrigated areas, Shapiro-Wilk1713
tests, in addition to normal probability plots, were used to determine whether vari-1714
ables were normally distributed (see Appendix D). Depending on the results of these1715
tests, the appropriate parametric or non-parametric test was then used to explore the1716
null hypothesis that a statistically significant difference existed between the three farm1717
types if the p-value was less than the chosen alpha level, which for these tests was1718
.05, (one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) or Kruskal-Wallis respectively). If such1719
a statistically significant difference existed, then further relevant parametric or non-1720
parametric tests were conducted to test the same null hypothesis but between two1721
farm types (independent t-test or Mann-Whitney U test respectively). However, in1722
regards to Mann-Whitney U tests the difference in median values was reported if the1723
two distributions were similar in shape; otherwise the difference in mean ranks was1724
reported if distributions were not similar.1725
1726
5.3 Results and discussion1727
Figure 5.1 illustrates the prevalence of the three farm types: those who preferred LWUO1728
accounting for 23 % of the respondents; those who had no preference accounting for1729
27 % of the respondents; and those who preferred HWUO accounting for 50 % of the1730
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Figure 5.1: A scatter plot indicating three farm types derived from median responses to low
water usage options (LWUO) and high water usage options (HWUO), including: respondents
who preferred LWUO; respondents who had no preference; and respondents who preferred
HWUO (n = 90)
respondents. The results indicate that the largest percentage of respondents preferred1731
HWUO whilst the smallest percentage of respondents preferred LWUO. Although it1732
appears farmers from different farm types are clustered close together this is simply a1733
result of the conceptual approach used.1734
1735
5.3.1 Farm attributes1736
Table 5.1 provides a comparison of the three farm types’ farm attributes. A statistically1737
significant difference existed with regards to irrigation application mechanisms used be-1738
tween those who preferred LWUO and those who had no preference (X 2= 5.033) as1739
p= <.05, and between those who preferred LWUO and those who preferred HWUO1740
(X 2= 9.260) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this farm attribute could be1741
rejected as those who preferred LWUO used significantly more rainguns for irrigating1742
(80 %) compared to those who had no preference or preferred HWUO (58 % and 531743
% respectively). In addition, a statistically significant difference existed with regards1744
to storage availability between those who preferred LWUO and those who preferred1745
HWUO (X 2= 7.508) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this farm attribute1746
could also be rejected as those who preferred LWUO consisted of significantly fewer1747
farmers with storage available (24 %) compared with those who preferred HWUO (601748
%). However, in regards to irrigated crops and predominant soil types, no statistically1749
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Table 5.1: Farm types’ farm attributes (n = 90)
Measure aLWUO No bHWUO
preferred (%) preference (%) preferred (%)
Irrigated crop
- Main crop potatoes 41 39 42
- Vegetables 24 41 32
- Other (amalgamated) 34 20 26
Pearson chi-square (X2)(2 df )
- LWUO preferred 3.427 1.290
- No preference 1.137
Predominant soil type
- Sand 32 45 33
- Loam 32 23 42
- Peat 22 17 12
- Mixed 15 15 13
Pearson chi-square (X2)(3 df )
- LWUO preferred 1.784 2.611
- No preference 4.705
Irrigation application used
- Raingun 80 58 53
- Other (amalgamated) 19 42 46
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred 5.033* 9.260*
- No preference .407
Storage available
- Yes 24 50 60
- No 76 50 40
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred 3.268 7.508*
- No preference .637
Summing errors due to rounding. (df ) = Degree of freedom. (*) = p<.05
a Low water usage options (LWUO)
b High water usage options (HWUO)
significant difference existed between the three farm types, as p= >.05, thus the null1750
hypotheses for these two farm attributes could not be rejected.1751
1752
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that statistically significant differences existed between1753
farm types with regards to irrigated areas (X 2= 6.525) as p= <.05, and storage capac-1754
ities (X 2= 9.280) as p= <.05 (see Figure 5.2). In particular, a statistically significant1755
difference existed with regards to irrigated area between those who preferred LWUO1756
and those who preferred HWUO (U = 264) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for1757
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Figure 5.2: Box plots illustrating farm types’ irrigated areas and storage capacities.
(Top) A box plot illustrating farm types’ irrigated areas. (Bottom) A box plot illustrating farm
types’ storage capacities
this farm attribute could be rejected as those who preferred LWUO irrigated signifi-1758
cantly smaller areas (median 38 ha and IQR 33 ha) compared to those who preferred1759
HWUO (median 76 ha and IQR 130 ha). Similarly, a statistically significant difference1760
existed with regards to storage capacity between those who preferred LWUO and those1761
who preferred HWUO (U = 273) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this farm1762
attribute could also be rejected as those who preferred LWUO had significantly smaller1763
storage capacities (median 100 Ml and IQR 64 Ml) compared to those who preferred1764
HWUO (median 136 Ml and IQR 245 Ml).1765
1766
5.3.2 Social demographics1767
Table 5.2 provides a comparison of the three farm types’ social demographics. A sta-1768
tistically significant difference existed with regards to age between those who preferred1769
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Table 5.2: Farm types’ social demographics
Measure aLWUO No bHWUO
preferred (%) preference (%) preferred (%)
Gender (n = 86)
- Male 100 96 98
- Female 0 4 2
Age (n = 88)
- 18-59 47 63 73
- ≥ 60 53 38 27
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred .985 3.993*
- No preference .868
cEducation (n = 79)
- ≤ 5 87 65 51
- ≥ 6 13 35 49
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred 2.154 5.785*
- No preference 1.173
dIncome (n = 77)
- £0-99,999 29 23 22
- ≥ £100,000 71 77 78
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred .156 .253
- No preference .005
Summing errors due to rounding. (df ) = Degree of freedom. (*) = p<.05
a Low water usage options (LWUO)
b High water usage options (HWUO)
cNational Qualification Framework (NQF) levels for England, Wales
and Northern Ireland
dTotal gross annual farm business income
LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (X 2= 3.993) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hy-1770
pothesis for this social demographic could be rejected as those who preferred LWUO1771
consisted of significantly older farmers (53 % were aged 60 or over) compared with those1772
who preferred HWUO (only 27 % were aged 60 or over). In addition, a statistically1773
significant difference existed with regards to education between those who preferred1774
LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (X 2= 5.785) as p= <.05. Thus, the null1775
hypothesis for this social demographic could also be rejected as those who preferred1776
LWUO consisted of significantly fewer farmers who had achieved a National Qualifi-1777
cation Level (NQF) of 6 or higher (only 13 % had a university degree or equivalent)1778
compared with those who preferred HWUO (49 %). However, in regards to gender, the1779
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assumptions for conducting Pearson’s Chi-square test could not be satisfied as very few1780
female farmers existed. Furthermore, in regards to income, no statistically significant1781
difference existed between the three farm types, as p= >.05, thus the null hypothesis1782
for this social demographic could not be rejected.1783
1784
5.3.3 Licence characteristics1785
Table 5.3 provides a comparison of the three farm types’ licence characteristics. A sta-1786
tistically significant difference existed with regards to licence type between those who1787
preferred LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (X 2= 7.508) as p= <.05. Thus, the1788
null hypothesis for this licence characteristic could be rejected as those who preferred1789
LWUO consisted of significantly fewer storage, or direct and storage, licence users (761790
% owned direct licences only) compared with those who preferred HWUO (only 40 %).1791
In addition, a statistically significant difference existed with regards to time limited1792
licences between those who preferred LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (X 2=1793
7.698) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this licence characteristic could also1794
be rejected as those who preferred LWUO consisted of significantly fewer farmers who1795
owned time limited licences (52 %) compared with those who preferred HWUO (841796
%). However, in regards to licence use during the last 10 years, the assumptions for1797
conducting Pearson’s Chi-square test could not be satisfied as very few non-active users1798
existed. Furthermore, in regards to licence source, no statistically significant difference1799
existed between the three farm types, as p= >.05, thus the null hypothesis for this1800
licence characteristic could not be rejected.1801
1802
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that statistically significant differences existed between1803
farm types with regards to annual licence limits (X 2= 11.078) as p= <.05, and daily1804
licence limits (X 2= 15.172) as p= <.05 (see Figure 5.3). In particular, a statistically1805
significant difference existed with regards to annual licence limit between those who1806
preferred LWUO and those who had no preference (U = 139) as p= <.05, and between1807
those who preferred LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (U = 240) as p= <.05.1808
Thus, the null hypothesis for this licence characteristic could be rejected as those who1809
preferred LWUO had significantly smaller annual licence limits (median 18 Ml and IQR1810
26 Ml) compared to those who had no preference (median 49 Ml and IQR 68 Ml), and1811
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Table 5.3: Farm types’ licence characteristics (n = 90)
Measure aLWUO No bHWUO
preferred (%) preference (%) preferred (%)
Licence use (last 10 years)
- Yes 100 92 100
- No 0 8 0
Licence type
- Direct 76 50 40
- Other (amalgamated) 24 50 60
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred 3.268 7.508*
- No preference .637
Licence source
- Surface water 81 75 78
- Groundwater 19 25 22
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred .230 .086
- No preference .068
Time limited
- Yes 52 79 84
- No 48 21 16
Pearson chi-square (X2)(1 df )
- LWUO preferred 3.616 7.698*
- No preference .303
Summing errors due to rounding. (df ) = Degree of freedom. (*) = p<.05
a Low water usage options (LWUO)
b High water usage options (HWUO)
compared to those who preferred HWUO (median 55 Ml and IQR 74 ml). Similarly,1812
a statistically significant difference existed with regards to daily licence limit between1813
those who preferred LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (U = 193) as p= <.05, and1814
between those who had no preference and those who preferred HWUO (U = 382) as p=1815
<.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this licence characteristic could also be rejected as1816
those who preferred LWUO, and those who had no preference, had significantly smaller1817
daily licence limits (median 1 Ml and IQR <1 ml, and median 1 Ml and IQR 2 Ml1818
respectively) compared to those who preferred HWUO (median 2 Ml and IQR 2 ml).1819
Therefore, although those who preferred LWUO had a significantly smaller annual and1820
daily licence limit than those who preferred HWUO, those who had no preference had1821
a significantly larger annual licence limit than those who preferred LWUO but had a1822
significantly smaller daily licence limit than those who preferred HWUO.1823
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Figure 5.3: Box plots illustrating farm types’ annual and daily licence limits. (Top)
A box plot illustrating farm types’ annual licence limit. (Bottom) A box plot illustrating farm
types’ daily licence limit
5.3.4 Past abstractions (2008 to 2012)1824
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that statistically significant differences existed between1825
farm types with regards to average annual volume abstracted (X 2= 10.294) as p=1826
<.05, and average in-season (i.e. April to October) volume abstracted (X 2= 7.072) as1827
p= <.05 (see Figure 5.4). In particular, a statistically significant difference existed with1828
regards to average annual volume abstracted between those who preferred LWUO and1829
those who had no preference (U = 127) as p= <.05, and between those who preferred1830
LWUO and those who preferred HWUO (U = 269) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypoth-1831
esis for this past abstraction characteristic could be rejected as those who preferred1832
LWUO abstracted significantly less on average annually (median 3 Ml and IQR 7 Ml)1833
compared to those who had no preference (median 15 Ml and IQR 31 Ml), and to those1834
who preferred HWUO (median 12 Ml and IQR 20 Ml). Similarly, a statistically signif-1835
icant difference existed with regards to average in-season volume abstracted between1836
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Figure 5.4: Bar charts illustrating farm types and total respondents annual, li-
censed, and average monthly abstractions (2008 to 2012). (Top) A bar chart illus-
trating annual abstractions by farm type. (Middle) A bar chart illustrating the percentage of
licence volume abstracted by farm type and total respondents. (Bottom) A bar chart illustrating
average monthly abstractions by farm type
those who preferred LWUO and those who had no preference (U = 141) as p= <.05.1837
Thus, the null hypothesis for this past abstraction characteristic could also be rejected1838
as those who preferred LWUO abstracted significantly less on average in-season (me-1839
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dian <1 Ml and IQR 1 Ml) compared to those who had no preference (median 2 Ml1840
and IQR 5 Ml).1841
1842
Interestingly, despite those who preferred LWUO and those who had no preference1843
abstracting only 20 % and 5 % out-of-season compared to 53 % for those who preferred1844
HWUO, no statistically significant differences existed between farm types with regards1845
to average out-of-season volume abstracted (X 2= 5.513) as p= >.05. Nonetheless, this1846
higher percentage of water abstracted out-of-season to refill farm storage reservoirs does1847
support earlier findings as those who preferred HWUO consisted of significantly more1848
farmers with storage available, and significantly more farmers who owned storage, and1849
direct and storage, licences compared to those who preferred LWUO.1850
1851
5.4 Summary1852
Overall, this study was driven by a growing number of researchers and policy decision-1853
makers realising the necessity of incorporating farmers behavioural intentions into more1854
traditional farm typologies in order to aid the design, implementation, and overall suc-1855
cess of policy changes. In particular, this chapter aimed to inform policy decision-1856
makers on how the proposed water policy reform options in England might be received1857
by particular groups, or farm types, on the ground. In doing so, this chapter addressed1858
the second of three research questions set out in the introduction to this thesis, and1859
highlighted again at the start of this chapter. That was, if farmers shared similar1860
behavioural intentions under different scenarios how could traditional farm typologies1861
incorporate these preferred behaviours. This chapter has identified three farm types1862
based on farmers’ overall preferred behaviours analysed in the previous chapter: those1863
who preferred LWUO; those who had no preference; and those who preferred HWUO.1864
Furthermore, a series of statistical tests were conducted in order to examine similari-1865
ties and differences between the three farm types in regards to: farm attributes; social1866
demographics; licence characteristics, and past abstractions.1867
1868
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the significant differences in farm characteristics1869
identified between the three farm types, in addition to each farm types’ preferred be-1870
havioural intention under each scenario. Despite farm types being determined based on1871
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Table 5.4: A conceptual farm typology based on respondents’ overall preferred behavioural
intentions across all four scenarios (n = 90)
Measure aLWUO No bHWUO
preferred preference preferred
Farm characteristics (Significant differences)
- Irrigation application Mainly rainguns Mixed Mixed
- Storage available Minority Majority
- Irrigated area Small Large
- Storage capacity Small Large
- Age (18-59) Minority Majority
- cEducation (≥ 6) Minority Majority
- Licence type Mainly direct dMainly storage
- Time limited licences Mixed Mainly time limited
- Annual licence limit Small Large Large
- Daily licence limit Small Small Large
- Annual abstractions Small Large Large
- In-season abstractions Small Large
Preferred behavioural intentions
- Strategic (long-term)/ Increase application efficiency (LWUO)
water shortage
- Strategic (long-term)/ Change nothing Sell surplus Grow the same
water surplus (LWUO) water for the crops but over a
duration of larger area
the growing (HWUO)
season (LWUO)
- In-season (short-term)/ Only use their maximum abstraction licence to
water shortage irrigate their most valuable crops (LWUO)
- In-season (short-term)/ Just use their Sell surplus Abstract surplus
water surplus abstraction licence water to water for storage
to meet crop water maximise (HWUO)
requirements and profits (LWUO)
leave the remainder
of their licence
unused (LWUO)
a Low water usage options (LWUO)
b High water usage options (HWUO)
cNational Qualification Framework (NQF) levels for England, Wales and Northern
Ireland
d Includes both storage, and direct and storage licences
See Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, and Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 for actual values
See Appendix D for farm types’ ranked preferred behavioural intentions
respondents’ overall behavioural intentions across all four scenarios, similarities and dif-1872
ferences in preferred behavioural intentions existed within each scenario (see Appendix1873
D).1874
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Those who preferred LWUO were generally representative of farmers who irrigated1875
smaller areas, had fewer resources available, and were older and had a lower level of1876
education compared to farmers who preferred HWUO. In particular, fewer resources1877
refer to less available storage and capacity (and therefore fewer storage related licences),1878
smaller annual and daily licence limits, and therefore smaller average annual abstrac-1879
tions compared to those who preferred HWUO. In addition, those who preferred LWUO1880
also relied predominantly on rainguns for irrigation rather than a more mixed approach1881
used by those who had no preference, and those who preferred HWUO.1882
1883
Conversely, those who preferred HWUO were generally representative of farmers1884
who irrigated larger areas, had greater resources available, and were younger and had1885
a higher level of education compared to farmers who preferred LWUO. In particular,1886
greater resources refer to more available storage and capacity (and therefore more stor-1887
age related licences), larger annual and daily licence limits, and therefore larger average1888
annual abstractions compared to those who preferred LWUO. In addition, those who1889
preferred HWUO also owned mainly time limited licences compared to a more mixed1890
ratio by those who preferred LWUO. The most likely explanation for this relates to1891
the EA slowly phasing out none-time limited licences, in order for greater control over1892
protecting the environment, as new licences are issued. Therefore, licences issued to1893
younger farmers are perhaps more likely to be time limited compared to older farmers1894
who have retained their none-time limited licences.1895
1896
Lastly, those who had no preference were unsurprisingly more difficult to define1897
as they shared significant differences with both other farm types, although more in1898
common with those who preferred HWUO. In particular, they relied on a more mixed1899
approach to irrigation, similar to those who preferred HWUO. In addition, they had a1900
greater resource with regards to annual licence limit and therefore had similarly large1901
annual abstractions in comparison to those who preferred HWUO. However, they had a1902
smaller daily licence limit similar to those who preferred LWUO. In addition, those who1903
had no preference abstracted more in-season compared to those who preferred LWUO.1904
1905
In regards to similarities, all farm types irrigated similar proportions of main crop1906
potatoes and vegetables, on sand and loam which were the predominant soil types.1907
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The majority of farmers were all male, and total gross annual farm business income1908
was over £100,000. Furthermore, the majority had all used their abstraction licences1909
within the last 10 years, and were predominantly all surface water licences.1910
1911
Interestingly, all farm types shared similar LWUO preferred behavioural intentions1912
under strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term) water shortage scenarios. That1913
is, under the strategic (long-term)/water shortage scenario they all preferred to increase1914
application efficiency, and under the in-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario1915
they all preferred to only use their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most1916
valuable crops. This is not particularly surprising for those who preferred LWUO, or1917
perhaps for those who had no preference. However, with regards to those who preferred1918
HWUO, one explanation could simply be the HWUO available were not regarded as1919
feasible or practical in comparison to the preferred LWUO. For example, increasing1920
storage capacity for many of those who preferred HWUO may not be possible if many1921
already have storage available. Furthermore, many of the farmers would not have ex-1922
perience with trading so buying more water for the duration of the growing season,1923
or buying more water to meet crop water requirements, may have seemed very diffi-1924
cult compared to increasing application efficiency. The same is true with applying for1925
a larger abstraction licence. However, these HWUO were ranked second, third and1926
fourth during a strategic (long-term)/ water shortage, and second during an in-season1927
(short-term)/water shortage by those who preferred HWUO, and by those who had no1928
preference (see Appendix D).1929
1930
During strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term) water surplus scenarios1931
each farm type had different preferred behavioural intentions. For example, under a1932
strategic (long-term)/water surplus scenario: those who preferred LWUO preferred to1933
change nothing; those who had no preference preferred to sell surplus water for the1934
duration of the growing season; and those who preferred HWUO preferred to grow the1935
same crops but over a larger area. Similarly, under an in-season (short-term)/water1936
surplus scenario: those who preferred LWUO preferred to just use their abstraction li-1937
cence to meet crop water requirements and leave the remainder of their licence unused;1938
those who had no preference preferred to sell surplus water to maximise profits; and1939
those who preferred HWUO preferred to abstract surplus water for storage. As perhaps1940
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would be expected, those who preferred LWUO favoured LWUO, whilst those who pre-1941
ferred HWUO favoured HWUO. More interestingly, those who had no preference also1942
favoured LWUO, although rather than doing nothing with the surplus water they pre-1943
ferred to sell. This would suggest that those who had no preference had slightly more1944
in common with those who preferred HWUO in regards to farm characteristics but1945
more in common with those who preferred LWUO in regards to preferred behavioural1946
intentions within each scenario.1947
1948
This study has shown how farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions can be incor-1949
porated into more traditional farm typologies, which are typically based on physical or1950
economic descriptors only, and offer valuable support with regards to policy formula-1951
tion. Therefore, this study has addressed the second research gap identified in Chapter1952
2, and presented again at the start of this chapter. Furthermore, the typology indi-1953
cate that the most likely farm types to engage in water licence trading are those who1954
have no preference and those who prefer HWUO. Therefore, the typology could also1955
be used to determine which catchments would likely benefit most from the proposed1956
enhanced water allocation system based on the proportion of farmers who have simi-1957
lar farm characteristics to those who had no preference and those who preferred HWUO.1958
1959
Chapter 61960
Modelling system level patterns1961
of abstraction behaviour1962
This chapter offers one of the first insights into: 1) how the proposed water allocation1963
systems, both in basic and enhanced catchments, are likely to change water availability1964
for farmers; and 2) the importance of understanding abstraction behaviour in determin-1965
ing the overall success of these systems. The proposed water allocation systems, which1966
are to be implemented by the early 2020s, aim to improve efficiency whilst balancing1967
the needs of licence users and the environment. However, climate change is expected1968
to exacerbate this challenge. Therefore, this chapter presents an empirically based1969
Agent-Based Model (ABM) to understand what system level patterns of abstraction1970
behaviour emerge from individual farmer decisions under different policy (the current1971
and proposed water allocation systems) and climate scenarios (during a selected dry1972
and wet year). Therefore, this chapter addresses the final of the three research ques-1973
tions presented in the introductory chapter:1974
1975
Research question 3: What potential system level patterns of abstraction be-1976
haviour emerge from individual farm scale decisions under different policy and climate1977
scenarios?1978
1979
6.1 Introduction1980
Major water allocation system reforms have been proposed in England to address the1981
climate and demand change pressures which the current system is failing to address1982
89
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(see Chapter 1). A critical review of the literature highlighted the importance of pol-1983
icy decision-makers, involved in the design and implementation of the proposed water1984
allocation systems, to understand farmers’ behaviour at the farm and system level yet1985
very little is understood in either of these areas (see Chapter 2). The Great Ouse1986
catchment was selected as the study area due to the importance of available freshwater1987
resources for agricultural spray irrigation despite it being one of the driest and most1988
water-stressed regions in the UK (see Chapter 3). Chapters 4 and 5 have presented em-1989
pirical data which identified farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under different1990
scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed water allocation1991
systems, and used this data to develop a farm typology based on preferred behavioural1992
intentions rather than traditional farm characteristics. This chapter presents the devel-1993
opment and scenario simulation results of an ABM, which utilises the empirical data1994
and typology discussed in the previous chapters, to understand what system level pat-1995
terns of abstraction behaviour emerge from individual farm decisions under different1996
policy and climate scenarios.1997
1998
6.2 Materials and methods1999
The methodological procedure used in this study can be categorised into three stages:2000
1) model description; 2) policy and climate scenario selection; and 3) statistical analysis.2001
2002
6.2.1 Model description2003
The model, developed using NetLogo 5.1.0 (Wilensky, 1999), is described following2004
the standardised Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol designed by2005
Grimm et al. (2006), and updated by (Grimm et al., 2010) (see section 2.3.2).2006
2007
Purpose2008
The purpose of this model was to understand the system level patterns of abstraction2009
behaviour which emerge based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions under dif-2010
ferent policy and climate scenarios (see section 6.2.2). The aims of the proposed water2011
allocation systems are to improve efficiency whilst balancing the needs of licence users2012
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and the environment. Therefore, as this study was only simulating farmers, and the2013
environment was considered to be better protected under the proposed water allocation2014
systems due to the introduction of low flow conditions, four model indicators were used.2015
The four indicators were: monthly licensed volume abstracted; surplus water available;2016
shortage water required; and the percentage of farm Irrigation Water Need (IWN) sat-2017
isfied (i.e. of main crop potatoes and vegetables) (see Appendix E). Monthly licensed2018
volume abstracted was used to understand the overall system level pattern of farmers2019
abstractions. Surplus water available, and shortage water required, were considered im-2020
portant to highlight the potential for trading, thus improve efficiency, between farmers2021
and other sectors at different times of the year. Finally, the percentage of farm IWN2022
satisfied was used to understand the effectiveness of the different policy scenarios.2023
2024
Entities, state variables, and scales2025
There are three types of entities in this model: agents (i.e. farmers); grid cells (i.e.2026
the landscape); and the observer (i.e. the global environment) all of which have their2027
own unique set of state variables (see Table 6.1). Farmers’ state variables included two2028
types: those which remain the same during each model setup (i.e. identification and2029
location within the projected landscape of the study area); and those which depend on2030
the farmers’ farm type, which is randomly assigned at the start of each model setup.2031
However, the proportion of farmers within each farm type remain the same during each2032
model run and is presented in Section 5.3: 23 % of farmers are those who preferred Low2033
Water Usage Options (LWUO); 27 % are farmers who had no preference; and 50 % are2034
farmers who preferred High Water Usage Options (HWUO). Irrigated areas, storage2035
capacities, and annual licence limits are calculated from distributions, using median,2036
25th and 75th percentile values, which are unique to each farm type. Therefore, farmers2037
within the same farm type can have different individual values for each of these state2038
variables at the start of each model setup. However, farmers’ other state variables2039
are single values depending on their farm type including: the percentage of irrigated2040
area covered by main crop potatoes and vegetables; the percentage of farmers with2041
storage available; the percentage of farmers with storage only licences; and preferred2042
behavioural strategies. In addition, the percentage of crop cover excludes any other2043
crops besides main crop potatoes and vegetables and therefore values differ between2044
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Table 6.1: Entities, state variables, and scales
Variable Unit Value (value derived from)
Farmers’ state variables
- Identification n 1-836
- Location aCoordinates Figure 3.1
- Farm type bn Section 5.3
- Irrigated area m2 Figure 5.2
- Main crop potato cover % Table 5.1
- Vegetable cover % Table 5.1
- Storage availability % Table 5.1
- Storage only licence % Table 5.3
- Storage capacity m3 Figure 5.2
- Annual licence limit m3 Figure 5.3
- Preferred behavioural strategies Table 5.4
Landscape state variables
- cAP location aCoordinates Figure 3.1
- cAP name Figure 3.1
- cAP low flow condition (Q95) m3 Table 3.1
- cAP high flow condition (Q30) m3 Table 3.1
Global environment state variables
- dIWN of main crop potatoes mm Appendix E
- dIWN of vegetables (i.e. carrots) mm Appendix E
- cAP river discharges (dry year) m3 Appendix E
- cAP river discharges (wet year) m3 Appendix E
a British National Grid
b Farm types are randomly assigned but proportional to the empirical data in
the farm typology
c Assessment Point
d Irrigation water need
the model and the farm typology. Furthermore, carrots were selected to represent veg-2045
etables due to the availability of data with regards to calculating IWN (see Appendix E).2046
2047
In regards to farmers’ preferred behavioural strategies, only in-season (short-term)2048
water shortage and surplus strategies were simulated. The added complexity and large2049
assumptions involved with incorporating the strategic (long-term) water shortage and2050
surplus strategies, particularly with regards to how farmers would increase application2051
efficiency or grow the same crops but over a larger area, were considered to over com-2052
plicate the model and not provide the most efficient and effective way of addressing2053
the research question. The strategic (long-term) water shortage and surplus strategies2054
were therefore omitted in favour of a simpler but nonetheless more reliable model.2055
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During an in-season (short-term)/water shortage, all three farm types preferred to2056
only use their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate their most valuable crops. In the2057
model, this was defined by which of the two crops represented the largest percentage2058
of irrigated area, as this was considered likely to be the crop which generated the most2059
income. Main crop potatoes represented 63 % and 57 % of irrigated areas for those who2060
preferred LWUO and HWUO respectively, whilst vegetables (i.e. carrots) represented2061
51 % of irrigated area for those who had no preference. During an in-season (short-2062
term)/water surplus, those who preferred LWUO preferred to just use their abstraction2063
licence to meet crop water requirements and leave the remainder of their licence unused.2064
Those who had no preference preferred to sell surplus water to maximise profits, whilst2065
those who preferred HWUO preferred to abstract surplus water for storage. However,2066
this final behavioural strategy was designed to automatically occur for all farm types2067
within the model who had storage available. Therefore, those who preferred HWUO2068
performed their second highest ranked behavioural strategy which was to sell surplus2069
water to maximise profits. In addition, although two of the farm types behavioural2070
strategies involved selling surplus water to maximise profits, none of the farm types2071
behavioural strategies involved buying more water to meet crop water requirements,2072
and therefore no trading occurred. Nonetheless, the quantity of surplus water available2073
and shortfall in water required were used as indicators to evaluate the potential for2074
trading, and thus a measure of potential increase in efficiency.2075
2076
Landscape state variables included: Assessment Point (AP) location, which was a2077
projected shapefile of the study area; AP name; AP low flow conditions (Q95); and AP2078
high flow conditions (Q30). However, low flow conditions were dependent on policy2079
scenario, and were therefore not included when simulating the current water allocation2080
system. Furthermore, HoF data was unavailable for individual farmers and was there-2081
fore not included in the model. State variables associated with the global environment,2082
which drive the behaviour and dynamics of the other entities, included IWN of main2083
crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots), and river discharge of each AP area during2084
both the dry and wet year climate scenarios.2085
2086
In regards to scales, spatially each grid cell represents 1 km2 with the extent of the2087
model reflecting the projected landscape of the study area (8,596 km2) (see Figure 6.1).2088
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Figure 6.1: Model setup in Netlogo 5.1.0 highlighting each AP location within the Great
Ouse catchment and the location of farmers by farm type: those who preferred low water usage
options (LWUO) (blue); those who had no preference (orange); and those who preferred high
water usage options (HWUO) (grey)
Temporally, each time step represents one month, as this corresponded with available2089
precipitation and temperature data used to derive IWN (see Appendix E). Simulations2090
ran for one year, for both dry and wet years, to indicate in-season (short-term) water2091
shortage and surplus abstraction behaviour during extreme climate scenarios.2092
2093
Process overview and scheduling2094
The main order of procedures simulated asynchronously each month in the model are2095
presented in pseudo-code in Figure 6.2. First, the observer runs the monthly param-2096
eters including IWN for main crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots) and river2097
discharge of each AP area. Farmers then calculate how much water they require to2098
satisfy IWN for both crops based on the size of their irrigated area, the percentage2099
of irrigated area each crop represents, and the IWN of both crops. Grid cells, within2100
the projected landscape, then calculate how much water they have available, based on2101
their AP name and the river discharge of that AP area, in addition to low and high2102
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to go
    run-monthly-parameters (observer procedure)
    calculate-farm-water-requirements (farmer procedure)
    calculate-ap-water-availability (grid and farmer procedure)
    calculate-farm-water-availability (farmer procedure)
    calculate-farm-water-abstractions (farmer procedure)
    perform-preferred-behavioural-strategies (farmer procedure)
end
Figure 6.2: Pseudo code highlighting the main procedures simulated each month in the model
flow conditions derived from river flow data from 1973 to 2012 (see Chapter 3). Within2103
this same procedure, farmers determine how much potential water there is within their2104
AP area as it can vary depending on the water allocation system being simulated, in2105
addition to the climate scenario.2106
2107
After the previous procedures have been performed, farmers calculate how much2108
water they have available which is determined based on licensed water availability and2109
storage water availability, both of which are dependent on the water allocation system2110
being simulated, in addition to variability of particular variables during initialisation.2111
However, as a farmer may have one or both of these sources of water available during a2112
period when there is no IWN or when there is an IWN the remaining farmer procedures2113
highlighted in the pseudo-code are more simply illustrated in Figure 6.3.2114
2115
If a farmer has no licensed water available and there is no IWN then they assess2116
whether they need to replenish their storage reservoirs. However, regardless of the2117
result, they have no water available and they are therefore unable to refill their stor-2118
age reservoirs and as they have not used any of their annual licence limit it remains2119
the same for the procedures next month. Similarly, if a farmer has no licensed water2120
available but there is an IWN then they assess whether they have enough storage water2121
available to satisfy IWN. If they do not have enough to cover IWN then they perform2122
their in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural strategy (dependent on farm2123
type) and update their storage water availability for next month accordingly. If, on the2124
other hand, they do have enough to cover IWN they simply update their storage water2125
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availability for next month. Either way, no licensed water has been used and therefore2126
their annual licence limit remains the same for next month.2127
2128
Alternatively, if a farmer has licensed water available and it is greater than total2129
IWN then they assess whether they need to replenish their storage reservoirs with2130
the surplus available. If the surplus available is more than they require to replenish2131
their storage reservoirs then they perform their in-season (short-term)/water surplus2132
behavioural strategy (dependent on farm type) and update their storage water avail-2133
ability and annual licence limit (if they used their licence limit) for next month accord-2134
ingly. If, on the other hand, the surplus available is less than required to replenish their2135
storage reservoirs then they simply update their storage water availability and annual2136
licence limit (as they used all their licence for that month) for next month accordingly.2137
However, if a farmer has licensed water available and it is less than total IWN then2138
they assess whether they have enough licensed water available plus storage water avail-2139
able to satisfy IWN. If they do not have enough to cover IWN then they perform their2140
in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural strategy (dependent on farm type)2141
and update their storage water availability and annual licence limit (as they used all2142
their storage and all their licence for that month) for next month accordingly. If, on the2143
other hand, they do have enough to cover IWN then they simply update their storage2144
water availability and annual licence limit for next month accordingly.2145
2146
Design concepts2147
Design concept elements of the ODD protocol have been grouped together to avoid2148
repetition. The general concept underlying this model is the farm typology presented2149
in Chapter 5. In particular the main concept is that individual behavioural strategies2150
and attributes at the farm scale, based on empirical data, will lead to different over-2151
all patterns of behaviour at the system level under different water allocation systems2152
(policy scenarios) during dry and wet years (climate scenarios). Furthermore, the indi-2153
cators which are used to evaluate the different water allocation systems at the system2154
level are model results which emerge from individual farmers performing behavioural2155
strategies at the farm scale. In addition, the main objective of farmers is to satisfy2156
their monthly IWN based on licensed and storage water availability.2157
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In addition, depending on the water allocation system being simulated and the type2158
of licence a farmer possesses, they implicitly assume that they will require some of that2159
licence later in the year and therefore divide their annual licence by the number of2160
months they are permitted to abstract from the environment. This highlights a design2161
in the model which could be improved by incorporating a more sophisticated method2162
for farmers to assume how much water they will require each month. Nonetheless,2163
in the model presented, under the current system those with direct licences can only2164
abstract between April and October (i.e. in-season), those with storage only licences2165
can only abstract between November and March (i.e. out-of-season), whilst those with2166
direct and storage licences can abstract all year. However, this self-imposed limit does2167
not accumulate from one month to the next if unused due to water availability.2168
2169
Furthermore, all of the global environment state variables, and the landscape state2170
variables on which the farmer is located, are sensed by the individual farmers as these2171
drive their behaviours and dynamics. In regards to the landscape state variables this2172
was considered a reasonable assumption as these simply include location and low and2173
high flow conditions which they would know as part of their licence. However, in re-2174
gards to global environment state variables, it is more likely that farmers would know2175
the approximate IWN of their crops and river discharge in their AP area, rather than2176
the exact values. Therefore, this highlights another design in the model which could2177
be improved by incorporating a more realistic method for farmers to estimate IWN.2178
Although available water resources within each AP area fluctuate from month to month2179
this only affects farmers under the enhanced water allocation system, where licences2180
increase and decrease proportionally with water availability in the AP area and there-2181
fore no direct or indirect interaction between farmers occurs. Finally, stochasticity of2182
particular variables associated with farmers occur during model initialisation including:2183
farm type; irrigated areas; storage capacities; and annual licence limits. However, all2184
of these are based on values presented in the farm typology (see Chapter 5).2185
2186
Initialisation2187
At the start of each simulation, each of the 836 farmers are located on their actual ge-2188
ographical location within the projected landscape (i.e. the study area) with a unique2189
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Table 6.2: Summary of scenarios simulated
Scenario Climate
Dry year (1983 ) Wet year (1988)
Policy Current Current
Basic Basic
Enhanced Enhanced
identification number. Furthermore, although the proportion of farmers within each2190
farm type are kept the same as the empirical data, their farm types are randomly as-2191
signed. This was due to reasons of confidentiality and the EA only providing farmers’2192
locations, except for the 90 respondents which received additional data, and therefore2193
no assumptions could be made regarding which farm type the majority of farmers were2194
more likely to belong to. Farmers’ farm type was used to determine their individual2195
state variables as previously discussed.2196
2197
Input data and submodels2198
All input data was derived from the previous chapters and the actual model input data,2199
along with the submodels highlighted in Figure 6.2, are presented in Appendix E.2200
2201
6.2.2 Policy and climate scenarios2202
Three policy scenarios under two climate scenarios were simulated in this study (see2203
Table 6.2). The three policy scenarios related to: the current water allocation system;2204
the proposed basic water allocation system; and the proposed enhanced water alloca-2205
tion system (see Section 1.1.4). The two climate scenarios related to a dry year and a2206
wet year based on total annual IWN of main crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots)2207
combined. Appendix E provides a description of how monthly and annual IWN were2208
calculated from 1973 to 2012. Furthermore, 1983 and 1988 were selected as the dry and2209
wet years respectively, as IWN during these years equalled or exceed 20 % and 80 % of2210
annual IWN from 1973 to 2012. This method is commonly adopted for these types of2211
studies (Knox et al., 1997).2212
2213
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6.2.3 Statistical analysis2214
Statistical analysis in this study was conducted and is presented in two parts: model2215
validation; and policy and climate scenario simulations.2216
2217
Validation procedure2218
In order to validate the model, and to explore the sensitivity of the model to variables2219
which vary during initial model setup, 100 simulations were conducted under the cur-2220
rent water allocation system scenario, for the period 2008 to 2012, in order to examine2221
whether simulated abstractions for all 836 farmers were similar to measured abstrac-2222
tions of the 90 respondents (see section 5.3.4). Two-tailed tests of association were2223
conducted between the simulated abstractions of the 836 farmers and the measured2224
abstractions of the 90 respondents, for both annual and average monthly abstractions.2225
The null hypotheses for these tests were that there was no significant association be-2226
tween simulated and measured abstractions. As in previous analysis, the Shapiro-Wilk2227
tests, in addition to normal probability plots, were used to determine whether variables2228
were normally distributed (see Appendix E). Depending on the results of these tests,2229
the appropriate parametric (Pearson’s correlation) or non-parametric (Spearman’s rank2230
correlation) test of association was used.2231
2232
Therefore, with regards to the tests of association, if the p-value was less than the2233
chosen alpha level, which for these tests were .05, then the null hypothesis was rejected2234
suggesting that the variables were associated. Furthermore, a Pearson’s correlation2235
coefficient (r), or a Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rs), of plus or minus 0.7 or2236
greater was considered a strong correlation; plus or minus 0.5 a moderate correlation;2237
and plus or minus 0.3 a weak correlation.2238
2239
Policy and climate change scenario simulation procedure2240
As with the model validation, 100 simulations were conducted and the average values for2241
each model indicator were reported (see Appendix E). Shapiro-Wilk tests, in addition2242
to normal probability plots, were used to determine whether variables were normally2243
distributed (see Appendix E). Depending on the results of these tests, the appropriate2244
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parametric or non-parametric test was then used to explore the null hypothesis that2245
a statistically significant difference existed between the three policy scenarios, during2246
both the dry and wet year climate scenarios, if the p-value was less than the chosen2247
alpha level, which for these tests was .05, (one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) or2248
Kruskal-Wallis respectively). If such a statistically significant difference existed, then2249
further relevant parametric or non-parametric tests were conducted to test the same null2250
hypothesis but between each pair of farm types (independent t-test or Mann-Whitney2251
U test respectively). However, in regards to Mann-Whitney U tests the difference in2252
median values was reported if the two distributions were similar in shape; otherwise2253
the difference in mean ranks was reported if distributions were not similar.2254
2255
6.3 Results and discussion2256
6.3.1 Model validation2257
Figure 6.4 illustrates there were strong, positive, linear correlations between annual ab-2258
stractions of the 90 respondents and annual abstractions of the 836 simulated farmers2259
with regards to those who preferred LWUO (r= .92), which was statistically significant2260
(p= <.05), thus the null hypothesis could be rejected; and with regards to those who2261
had no preference (r= .95), which was also statistically significant (p= <.05), thus2262
the null hypothesis could also be rejected. However, only a moderate, positive, linear2263
correlation existed with regards to those who preferred HWUO (r= .61), which was2264
not statistically significant (p= >.05), thus the null hypothesis could not be rejected.2265
2266
Similarly, Figure 6.4 also illustrates there were strong, positive, linear correlations2267
between average monthly abstractions of the 90 respondents and average monthly ab-2268
stractions of the 836 simulated farmers with regards to those who preferred LWUO2269
(r= .77), which was statistically significant (p= <.05), thus the null hypothesis could2270
be rejected; and with regards to those who had no preference (r= .91), which was2271
also statistically significant (p= <.05), thus the null hypothesis could also be rejected.2272
Furthermore, only a moderate, positive, linear correlation existed with regards to those2273
who preferred HWUO (r= .58), however this was statistically significant (p= <.05),2274
thus the null hypothesis could be rejected.2275
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Figure 6.4: Scatter plots indicating the strength of association between simulated
annual, and average monthly, abstractions for all 836 farmers and measured annual,
and average monthly, abstractions for the 90 respondents, based on the average of
100 simulations. (Top) Pearson’s correlation coefficients were r= .92, p= <.05, and r= .77,
p= <.05, for annual and average monthly abstractions respectively for those who preferred low
water usage options (LWUO). (Middle) Pearson’s correlation coefficients were r= .95, p= <.05,
and r= .91, p= <.001, for annual and average monthly abstractions respectively for those who
had no preference. (Bottom) Pearson’s correlation coefficients were r= .61, p= >.05, and r=
.58, <.05 for annual and average monthly abstractions respectively for those who preferred high
water usage options (HWUO)
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Overall, although differences between the measured and simulated abstractions oc-2276
curred most likely due to over simplification of the model, particularity as HoF for2277
individual licences were not included, the results indicate that the model, based on2278
farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions, was relatively reliable at simulating abstrac-2279
tions for each farm type under the current water allocation system between 2008 and2280
2012. The model could therefore be used to simulate system level patterns of abstrac-2281
tion behaviour under the proposed basic and enhanced water allocation systems during2282
dry and wet years with relative confidence.2283
2284
6.3.2 Policy and climate change scenario simulations2285
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that statistically significant differences existed between2286
policy scenarios with regards to monthly licence volume abstracted during the dry year2287
climate scenario (X 2= 7.002) as p= <.05, and during the wet year climate scenario2288
(X 2= 18.029) as p= <.05. Furthermore, Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that a statis-2289
tically significant difference existed between policy scenarios with regards to surplus2290
water available during the wet year climate scenario (X 2= 8.979) as p= <.05, but not2291
during the dry year climate scenario (X 2= .295) as p= >.05. In addition, Kruskal-2292
Wallis tests showed that no statistically significant differences existed between policy2293
scenarios with regards to shortage water required during the dry year climate scenario2294
(X 2= .065) as p= >.05, or during the wet year climate scenario (X 2= .278) as p=2295
>.05. Similarly, Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that no statistically significant differences2296
existed between policy scenarios with regards to the percentage of farm IWN satisfied2297
(i.e. main crop potatoes and vegetables combined) during the dry year climate scenario2298
(X 2= .023) as p= >.05, or during the wet year climate scenario (X 2= .357) as p= >.052299
(see Figure 6.5).2300
2301
In particular, statistically significant differences existed with regards to monthly2302
licence volume abstracted between the current and proposed enhanced water allocation2303
systems during the dry year climate scenario (U = 32) as p= <.05, and during the2304
wet year climate scenario (U = 8) as p= <.05. Furthermore, statistically significant2305
differences also existed with regards to monthly licence volume abstracted between the2306
proposed basic and proposed enhanced water allocation systems during the dry year2307
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climate scenario (U = 34) as p= <.05, and during the wet year climate scenario (U =2308
10) as p= <.05. Thus, the null hypothesis for this model indicator could be rejected2309
as farmers abstracted significantly less under the proposed enhanced water allocation2310
system, during both the dry (median 868 Ml and IQR 1,106 Ml) and wet (median 4522311
Ml and IQR 579 Ml) year climate scenarios, compared to the current water allocation2312
system, during both the dry (median 1,684 Ml and IQR 1,854 Ml) and wet (median2313
1,561 Ml and IQR 928 Ml) year climate scenarios, and also compared to the proposed2314
basic water allocation system, during both the dry (median 1,464 Ml and IQR 1,3402315
Ml) and wet (median 1,440 Ml and IQR 1,064 Ml) year climate scenarios.2316
2317
Similarly, statistically significant differences existed during the wet year climate2318
scenario, with regards to surplus water available between the current and proposed2319
enhanced water allocation systems (U = 32) as p= <.05, and between the proposed2320
basic and proposed enhanced water allocation systems (U = 24) as p= <.05. Thus, the2321
null hypothesis for this model indicator could be rejected as farmers during the wet2322
year climate scenario had significantly less surplus water available under the proposed2323
enhanced water allocation system (median 242 Ml and IQR 887 Ml) compared to the2324
current (median 712 Ml and IQR 1,805 Ml) and proposed basic (median 1,437 Ml and2325
IQR 1,064 Ml) water allocation systems.2326
2327
Overall, the system level patterns of abstraction behaviour which emerged from2328
farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions indicate that farmers under the proposed en-2329
hanced water allocation system abstracted less on average each month and therefore2330
had less surplus water available compared to the current or proposed basic water allo-2331
cation systems. This was due to farmers’ monthly licensed water availability varying2332
depending on water availability within AP areas (see Appendix E). Nonetheless, de-2333
spite farmers abstracting less under this system, the percentage of farm IWN satisfied2334
did not significantly vary under any of the policy scenarios. Therefore, the results of2335
the simulations based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions, would indicate that2336
the proposed enhanced water allocation system, at least at the system level, offered the2337
greatest protection for the environment as low flow conditions were enforced, and fewer2338
abstractions occurred overall without significantly effecting the percentage of farm IWN2339
satisfied.2340
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However, perhaps unsurprisingly, the results also indicate that surplus water was2341
generally available outside of the growing season whilst a shortage of water was exhib-2342
ited during the growing season. This would suggest that regardless of policy scenario,2343
few trades are likely to occur between farmers. However, this is partly a model lim-2344
itation as the growing season started at the same time for all farmers, thus increases2345
and decreases in IWN occurred at the same time, whilst in reality it may be staggered.2346
Nonetheless, even if the growing season was staggered, few trades are likely to occur2347
but the results do highlight the potential for water licence trading with other sectors.2348
2349
6.4 Summary2350
Overall, this study has provided a first insight into how the proposed water allocation2351
reforms, both in basic and enhanced catchments, are likely to change water availability2352
for farmers. Furthermore, it has indicated the importance of understanding abstraction2353
behaviour in determining the overall success of these reforms. In doing so, this chapter2354
addressed the third of three research questions set out in the introduction to this thesis,2355
and highlighted again at the start of this chapter. That was, what potential system2356
level patterns of abstraction behaviour emerge from individual farm scale decisions un-2357
der different policy and climate scenarios.2358
2359
The development of an ABM was presented and validated by comparing simulated2360
abstractions for the period 2008 to 2012 with measured abstractions for the same period2361
based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions. The policy and climate scenario2362
simulations indicated that the proposed enhanced water allocation system offered the2363
greatest protection to the environment at the system level, as a result of less water2364
abstracted and low flow conditions being introduced, whilst not significantly reducing2365
the percentage of farm IWN satisfied. Furthermore, despite model limitations, the sim-2366
ulation results indicate few trades are likely to occur between farmers, even if preferred2367
behavioural intentions were to change, as surplus water was generally only available2368
outside of the growing season, whilst a shortage of water was indicated during the2369
growing season. Nonetheless, the proposed enhanced water allocation system appears2370
to offer the greatest potential of increasing efficiency with regards to balancing the2371
needs of licence users, at least farmers, with the environment.2372
Chapter 72373
Discussion and conclusions2374
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, water resource management in England2375
is currently in a long-term transition from large-scale, high-cost, centralised infrastruc-2376
ture projects to low-cost, community-scale, decentralised systems. A major aspect of2377
this transition is the introduction of water markets where water licence trading can2378
occur to improve efficiency. Water licence trading has been in operation in several2379
countries for several decades and has been available in England since 2003 (DEFRA,2380
2011). However, due to several reasons, mainly regarding institutional barriers which2381
deter farmers from trading, very few trades have actually occurred in England. Similar2382
institutional barriers were found to exist in other countries (Thobani, 1998; Zhang,2383
2007). However, the current water allocation system in England is considered by the2384
regulatory authorities as inadequate to provide users with the ability to adapt to climate2385
change whilst providing adequate protection for the environment (EA, 2008; DEFRA,2386
2011).2387
2388
In response, DEFRA proposed the basic and enhanced water allocation systems to2389
address the inadequacies of the current system and encourage water licence trading (see2390
Chapter 1). However, it was argued that the success of the proposed water allocation2391
systems, particularly with regards to water licence trading, very much depended on the2392
preferred behavioural intentions of the users on the ground (Feola et al., 2015). This2393
factor formed the rationale for this research as very little was understood with regards2394
to how the proposed water allocation systems in England would be received by licence2395
users, in particular by farmers, who were the main focus of this study (see Chapter 3).2396
2397
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Therefore, this thesis has presented three studies which have attempted to un-2398
derstand farmers’ behavioural intentions under different climate and proposed water2399
allocation system scenarios, in order to assess whether the proposals will achieve their2400
intended aim. These studies included: an empirical investigation within the Great Ouse2401
catchment in eastern England to understand farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions2402
under different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the proposed2403
water allocation systems; the development of a conceptual typology based on farmers2404
preferred behavioural intentions rather than more traditional attributes such as income2405
or farm size; and the development, and policy and climate scenario simulation results,2406
of an ABM used to understand the system level patterns of abstraction behaviour which2407
emerge from individual farm level decisions. This chapter discusses some of the main2408
limitations of the methods used and attempts to place the results within the context2409
of the wider literature.2410
2411
7.1 Understanding farmer behaviour2412
There is an increasing body of literature which supports the rationale that any individ-2413
uals or group of individuals, who are directly affected by changes in policy, particularly2414
with regards to water and land management, should be a key consideration in the2415
design and implementation of that policy change (Austin et al., 1998; Burton, 2004;2416
Emtage et al., 2006; Guillem et al., 2012). Moreover, several studies have shown that2417
farmers’ behaviour very much influences how and to what success policy proposals are2418
realised on the ground (Bjornlund, 2003; Moon and Cocklin, 2011; Home et al., 2014;2419
Feola et al., 2015). However, several challenges remain in understanding individuals’2420
intentions and associated behaviours, and methods to incorporate these into practical2421
policy applications.2422
2423
The main challenges in understanding individual behaviours’ are associated with the2424
complexity and limitations of the theoretical behavioural models used. In particular, to2425
what extent can current behavioural models accurately measure an individual’s inten-2426
tion, and to what extent is that intention a true measure of an individual’s behaviour.2427
The more reliable the behavioural model, the more likely policy decision-makers are2428
to incorporate them into the design and implementation stages of policy changes. Al-2429
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though each model offers particular advantages and disadvantages, this research was2430
based on one of the most widely used and influential models for predicting human so-2431
cial behaviour, the TPB (Ajzen, 1985). However, as previously discussed one of the2432
main criticisms of this model, in addition to normal survey limitation biases such as2433
respondents answering how they think they should rather than honestly or whether2434
only those responded who were interested in the subject, concerns efficacy (i.e. the2435
predictive ability of the model) (Sniehotta et al., 2014).2436
2437
Meta-analytical reviews found that the TPB explained between 40-49 % of the2438
variance in intention (Sheeran et al., 1999; Armitage and Conner, 2001; Hagger et al.,2439
2002; Trafimow et al., 2002; Schulze and Wittmann, 2003; McEachan et al., 2011). The2440
adapted TPB model used in this study explained between 29-65 % of the variance in2441
intention based on Nagelkerke’s R2. However, as binary logistic regression was used2442
rather than multiple linear regression, there are no direct analogues to the coefficient of2443
determination (i.e. R2) used in ordinary least squares, and therefore the aforementioned2444
pseudo R2 value was used (Bewick et al., 2005). As a result, these different method-2445
ological approaches should be considered when comparing the results of this study with2446
those reported in meta-analytical reviews. Although, the results of this study suggest2447
a comparatively high percentage of variance explained, incorporating associated salient2448
beliefs for each construct would likely improve the results. Therefore, a more robust2449
methodology may consider using farmer focus groups to determine salient beliefs. This2450
would have likely provided a more robust set of behaviours and potentially explained2451
a higher percentage of variance in intention (Ajzen, 2011).2452
2453
Attitude and subjective norm were found to be the main predictors of farmers’ in-2454
tention for three of the four scenarios: strategic (long-term) water shortage and water2455
surplus scenarios; and the in-season (short-term) water shortage scenario. For the latter2456
scenario, perceived behavioural control was also found to be a significant predictor of2457
farmers’ intention. Interestingly, previous studies also found attitude to be a significant2458
predictor of farmers’ behaviour, and not perceived behavioural control, suggesting that2459
farmers tend to have complete volitional control with regards to long-term decision-2460
making at the farm scale (Wauters et al., 2010; Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013).2461
2462
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Although this study has provided a first insight into how farmers’ may respond to2463
the proposed water allocation systems in England, there is clearly a considerable per-2464
centage of variance in intention which was left unexplained and therefore other factors,2465
not measured, could influence farmers’ behavioural intentions. As previously men-2466
tioned, a more robust methodology which measures salient beliefs may highlight some2467
of these other factors. Furthermore, the intention-behaviour gap remains which is likely2468
to exacerbate the longer the time interval between measuring intentions and farmers2469
actually performing the behaviours (Orbell and Sheeran, 1998; Sniehotta et al., 2005).2470
As the proposed water allocation systems are only being introduced in the early 2020s,2471
farmers’ intentions may change again, and therefore, this study should only be used2472
as a preliminary understanding at this current time. Nonetheless, when water trading2473
was first introduced in southeastern Australia in 1989 very few farmers participated in2474
water licence trading for the first ten years. However, an increasing number of farm-2475
ers participated in temporary licence trades as more farmers increasingly understood2476
the operations and the advantages of a secure, reliable, fast, and cheap water transfer2477
(Bjornlund, 2003).2478
2479
7.2 Validity and utility of a behavioural farm typology2480
Although farm typologies clearly offer policy decision-makers a useful tool for cate-2481
gorising farms, and making more informed policy decisions, the main criticism of farm2482
typologies, which this study attempted to address, is that they fail to fully capture true2483
farmer behaviour and are therefore of limited value in supporting policy formulation2484
(Guillem et al., 2012). Although the conceptual approach used in this study iden-2485
tified three farm types, which featured significant differences in farm characteristics,2486
alternative data-driven approaches such as cluster analysis (Barnes et al., 2011), or2487
stratification of farmers based on particular farm characteristics, might have identified2488
different farm types, and thus different preferred behavioural intentions. However, the2489
conceptual approach used was considered more appropriate when using ordinal Likert-2490
item measures of behaviour.2491
2492
Nonetheless, although the validity of the typology is difficult to assess unless used in2493
practice, it certainly offers utility for policy decision-makers who can use the informa-2494
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tion with regards to implementing the proposed water allocation systems in England.2495
In particular, identifying which farmers are more or less likely to engage with particular2496
aspects of the proposals, such as water licence trading, may be used in deciding which2497
catchments should be categorised as basic or enhanced.2498
2499
Within the wider sphere of policy decision-making, behavioural typologies clearly2500
offer greater value in supporting policy formulation compared to more traditional ty-2501
pologies. However, limitations also exist with regards to the added complexity involved2502
in developing a behavioural typology (i.e. measuring individual behavioural intentions),2503
and the effects of the intention-behaviour gap. In this sense, behavioural farm typolo-2504
gies may be more valuable for policy formulation (Guillem et al., 2012) rather than2505
continual monitoring of policy interventions, and policy decision-makers should not2506
rely solely on behavioural intentions but also on more traditional farm characteristics2507
(Schmitzberger et al., 2005; Emtage et al., 2006, 2007; Gorton et al., 2008; Pike, 2008;2508
Barnes et al., 2011; Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013).2509
2510
7.3 Utility of the Agent-Based Model (ABM)2511
This research has highlighted the importance of understanding farmers’ preferred be-2512
havioural intentions with regards to the proposed water allocation systems in England.2513
Furthermore, understanding the system level patterns of abstraction behaviour which2514
could emerge from individual decision-making at the farm scale provides valuable infor-2515
mation for policy decision-makers. However, although the ABM developed highlighted2516
the potential effects of the proposed water allocation systems, several limitations of the2517
model exist.2518
2519
One of the main limitations of this model was its ability to only model in-season2520
(short-term) water shortage and surplus preferred behavioural strategies, during a se-2521
lected dry and wet year climate scenario, rather than model behaviours over a longer2522
time period. With the latter approach, strategic (long-term) water shortage and sur-2523
plus preferred behaviours could have been implemented, despite the added complexity2524
of the model, to highlight the long-term effects of proposed policy changes. If the model2525
had incorporated strategic behavioural strategies, then all farm types, during strategic2526
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(long-term)/water shortage scenarios, would have simply increased their application2527
efficiency which would ultimately reduce abstractions at the system level during the2528
growing season, regardless of policy or climate scenario. However, during strategic2529
(long-term)/water surplus scenarios, more water would be abstracted during the grow-2530
ing season as a result of those who preferred high water usage options (HWUO) growing2531
the same crops but over a larger area. Furthermore, as the strategies for those who2532
preferred low water usage options (LWUO), and those who had no preference, were to2533
change nothing and sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season respec-2534
tively, very little in regards to overall system level patterns of abstraction would have2535
changed, as no trading occurred as buying was not a preferred behavioural strategy of2536
any of the farmers. However, this highlights another limitation of the model.2537
2538
The purpose of the model was to understand the potential system level patterns2539
of abstraction behaviour which were likely to emerge based on farmers’ preferred be-2540
havioural intentions. However, as none of the farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions2541
involved buying more water, either strategically or in-season, no trading occurred in2542
the model. Therefore, only the potential for trading at the system level was simulated2543
based on surplus water available and shortage water indicated. Furthermore, although2544
previous studies, such as that in southeastern Australia, have found that an increas-2545
ing number of farmers participated in temporary water licence trading (i.e. weekly,2546
monthly, or seasonal), very few participated in permanent water licence trading due to:2547
differential tax treatment; policy uncertainty; institutional barriers such as administra-2548
tive complexity and costs; and farmers’ perception that water rights are an inherent2549
part of their property (Bjornlund, 2003). Nonetheless, the results of the simulations2550
highlighted that even if trading was available, very few trades would likely occur, even2551
if farmers growing seasons would be staggered, as very little overlap would exist with2552
regards to when surplus water was available and shortage water was required. There-2553
fore, despite these limitations, the results of the model would suggest that farmers, who2554
do not already have storage available, are best investing in storage to make use of the2555
surplus water available out-of-season.2556
2557
Another limitation of the model concerns the lack of planning and learning to change2558
adaptive strategies. A more sophisticated model would perhaps incorporate the abil-2559
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ity of farmers to better plan their irrigation water needs (IWN) during the year. In2560
the current model, this is simply divided by the number of months their licence was2561
available. However, in reality farmers know, approximately, from previous years when2562
demand is likely to be greatest and when it is likely to be less. Furthermore, if farmers2563
continually experienced particular water shortage or surplus scenarios they may very2564
well change their behavioural strategies, which would certainly alter the system level2565
patterns of abstraction behaviour. Therefore, a model which simulates abstraction be-2566
haviour over consecutive years could incorporate planning and learning from previous2567
seasons. Data regarding how farmers actually plan their abstractions each year could2568
be obtained during focus groups used to measure salient beliefs.2569
2570
Overall, the model presented, as with any, was a simplified representation of reality.2571
Nonetheless, despite the limitations discussed, the scenario simulation results indicated2572
that the proposed enhanced water allocation system was likely to achieve its intended2573
aim of increasing efficiency whilst balancing the needs of licence users and the environ-2574
ment, more than the current or proposed basic water allocation system. Furthermore,2575
incorporating other licence users would likely open up greater opportunities for water2576
licence trading. However, although the proposed enhanced water allocation system was2577
designed to facilitate trading more easily than the proposed basic system, the method2578
used to derive water shares under the enhanced system may result in fewer trades as2579
licences adjust to reflect users needs, and therefore less surplus water would be available2580
compared to the proposed basic system.2581
2582
Previous studies have also used ABM to simulate different policy or climate sce-2583
narios related to individual behavioural strategies and changes in land use or resources2584
(Schlu¨ter and Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Gala´n et al., 2009; Acosta et al., 2014). However, one of2585
the main limitations that each of these studies concluded with regards to ABM concerns2586
the fact that as the models are developed based on behavioural strategies of particular2587
groups of individuals, often within a particular geographic location, then generalising2588
the model for a wider population or different geographic location may be difficult.2589
Therefore, although the simulation results presented in this study are designed based2590
on farmers currently operating within the Great Ouse catchment, the framework of the2591
model, after adapting it to another area, could be generalised to other catchments.2592
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7.4 Overview of conclusions2593
Farmer water abstraction behaviour in response to different policy and climate scenarios2594
was investigated, in an area of eastern England, to assess whether the proposed water2595
allocation systems in England would achieve their intended aim (i.e. to increase effi-2596
ciency whilst balancing the needs of licences users and the environment). Three studies2597
were conducted to understand farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions, explore the2598
utility of a farm typology developed based on farmers’ behavioural intentions, and to2599
examine the potential system level patterns of abstraction behaviour which emerge,2600
under different policy and climate scenarios, based on farmers’ preferred behavioural2601
intentions. The main conclusions of this research are:2602
2603
1. The TPB provides a relatively reliable method of successfully measur-2604
ing farmers’ intentions and underlying predictors. The TPB explained between2605
29-65 % of the variance in intention which was similar to the range found by meta-2606
analytical reviews (i.e. 40-49 %). Furthermore, attitude and subjective norm were2607
found to be the main significant predictors of farmers’ intentions, at least in three of2608
the four water shortage and surplus scenarios including: the strategic (long-term) water2609
shortage and surplus scenarios; and the in-season (short-term)/water shortage scenario.2610
In addition, with regards to the latter scenario, perceived behavioural control was also2611
found to be a significant predictor of intention. Therefore, these results indicate that2612
farmers, at least in regards to these behaviours, believe they have greater volitional2613
control with regards to decision-making in the long-term compared to the short-term.2614
2615
2. Behavioural farm typologies offer greater value in supporting policy2616
formulations compared to traditional farm typologies. Developing a typology2617
based on individual behavioural intentions provides greater utility to policy decision-2618
makers, compared to more traditional typologies, as physical or economic attributes2619
alone may fail to fully capture an individuals’ intention. Depending on the policy for-2620
mulation, this is likely to be of great interest, and very valuable to those involved in2621
the policy formulation. However, the additional insights come at a cost with regards to2622
added complexity in developing the typology (i.e. having to measure individual inten-2623
tions), and inherent limitations with any behavioural approach such as the intention-2624
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behaviour gap (i.e. the utility of a behavioural typology becomes less the longer the2625
period between policy formulation and intervention).2626
2627
3. Significant differences in farm characteristics existed between the2628
farm types derived in this study. Those who preferred Low Water Usage Op-2629
tions (LWUO) were generally representative of farmers who irrigated smaller areas,2630
used predominantly rainguns as their irrigation application mechanism, had less stor-2631
age available, and were older and had a lower level of education compared to farmers2632
who preferred High Water Usage Option (HWUO). In addition, those who preferred2633
LWUO predominantly used rainguns as their main irrigation application mechanism2634
whilst those who preferred HWUO, and those who had no preference, used a mix of2635
different application mechanisms. Furthermore, those who preferred LWUO generally2636
had a mix of both time limited and none-time limited licences whilst those who pre-2637
ferred HWUO predominantly had time limited licences. Interestingly, those who had no2638
preference were generally representative of farmers who had larger annual licence lim-2639
its and past annual abstractions (similar to those who preferred HWUO) compared to2640
farmers who preferred LWUO. However, those who had no preference also had smaller2641
daily licence limits (similar to those who preferred LWUO) compared to those who2642
preferred HWUO. In addition, those who had no preference abstracted more in-season2643
compared to those who preferred LWUO.2644
2645
4. All farm types’ preferred Low Water Usage Option (LWUO) under2646
strategic (long-term) and in-season (short-term) water shortage scenarios.2647
Despite farmers’ overall preferred behaviour in regards to all 18 behaviours assessed,2648
each farm type preferred LWUO during water shortage scenarios. Under a strategic2649
(long-term) scenario this was to increase application efficiency. Under an in-season2650
(short-term) scenario this was to only use their maximum abstraction licence to irri-2651
gate their most valuable crops. Although this is not surprising for those who preferred2652
LWUO, or perhaps even for those who had no preference. The feasibility or perhaps2653
lack of experience under the current water allocation system could have contributed2654
to the preferred behaviour of those who preferred HWUO. However, during water sur-2655
plus scenarios, those who preferred LWUO and those who had no preference preferred2656
LWUO, and those who preferred HWUO preferred HWUO.2657
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5. ABM offer a valuable tool for policy decision-makers involved with2658
policy formulation. In the context of this study, the ABM developed and used to2659
understand what system level patterns of abstraction behaviour emerge based on in-2660
dividual farm level decision-making, indicated the proposed enhanced water allocation2661
system provided the greatest ability to balance the needs of licence users whilst protect-2662
ing the environment. However, this ABM did not incorporate licence users from other2663
sectors in the catchment and therefore generalising ABM results to wider populations2664
or other geographic locations may be difficult. Therefore, although ABM can provide2665
an insight into system level patterns of policy interventions, they are perhaps limited2666
in their utility to the area or population of interest.2667
2668
6. The success of the proposed water allocation systems, with regards2669
to encouraging water licence trading is dependent on both institutional2670
changes and changes in users’ intentions. The importance of institutions being2671
designed to encourage and facilitate water licence trading was discussed in the introduc-2672
tion to this thesis (see Chapter 1). However, as evident in several countries, including2673
the UK, one of the main reasons farmers do not trade was due to high transaction costs2674
and where transaction costs were low reasons included: management, legal, adminis-2675
trative, and fiscal barriers (Zhang, 2007). Therefore, although policy decision-makers2676
can utilise the results of this study to identify which farmers are more or less likely to2677
engage with water licence trading, without changing current institutional barriers, the2678
proposed water allocation systems are not likely to succeed.2679
2680
7. Although water licence trading is likely to increase efficiency at the2681
system level this should be coupled with a long-term strategy to increase2682
storage capacity and application efficiency at the farm level. The results of the2683
policy and climate scenario simulations suggest that very few trades are likely to occur2684
between farmers. However, this is also due to several limitations within the model, but2685
nonetheless very little overlap appears to occur between surplus water being available2686
and shortage water being required. Where overlap does occur, trading would likely2687
provide a viable method of improving efficiency. However, for the majority of farmers,2688
policies focussing on increasing storage capacity and improving application efficiency2689
are more likely to increase efficiency at the system level.2690
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7.5 Further research2691
This research provides a first investigation into understanding farmers’ preferred be-2692
havioural intentions with regards to the proposed water allocation systems in England.2693
In particular, the three studies presented attempted to address the three research gaps2694
identified in Chapter 2. These included: understanding farmers’ preferred behavioural2695
intentions under different scenarios of water shortage and surplus with regards to the2696
proposed water allocation systems; the potential utility of developing a farm typology2697
based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions with regards to the proposed wa-2698
ter allocation systems; and lastly understanding the potential system level patterns of2699
abstraction behaviour which emerge from individual farm level decision-making, under2700
different policy and climate scenario, with regards to the proposed water allocation2701
systems. However, although the methods and results of this research have direct policy2702
application they have also highlighted several limitations and areas for further research.2703
2704
In regards to measuring individual behaviour using the TPB, this research has2705
identified several limitations with the approach used in this study. Further research2706
is required to improve the variance in intention explained by predictor variables by2707
either measuring farmers’ salient beliefs, within the theoretical framework of the TPB2708
(Ajzen, 2011), or adopting an alternative behavioural approach such as the temporal2709
self-regulation theory (Hall and Fong, 2007), which emphasises temporal dynamics and2710
lends itself more readily to experimental tests (Sniehotta et al., 2014). In addition,2711
focus groups may provide a more valuable approach in understanding individual be-2712
haviours (Wauters et al., 2010). However, measuring salient beliefs was considered in2713
the design of the study but a more direct approach was adopted in order to assess a2714
greater number of behaviours. Therefore, further research may consider focussing on2715
fewer behaviours but in more detail.2716
2717
In addition, further research is required to understand the full validity and utility of2718
behavioural farm typologies used for policy formulation, intervention, and monitoring2719
(Barnes et al., 2011). This research only highlighted the potential utility of the typology2720
for policy formulation based on farmers’ preferred behavioural intentions. However, if2721
behavioural typologies are to become more widely used, then further studies are re-2722
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quired to assess their practical applications, and the extent of the usefulness in policy2723
decision-making (i.e. do individuals perform the behaviours they intended).2724
2725
Further research is also required to simulate water trading at the system level un-2726
der the different policy and climate scenarios. Although this study highlighted the2727
potential for water trading by measuring surplus water available and shortage water2728
required, a more sophisticated model could incorporate an economic element to indi-2729
vidual farmers’ strategies. Zhang et al. (2014) concluded a similar observation, arguing2730
that further research with regards to water trading between farmers is required, and2731
should preferably use a dataset with sufficient observations on water transactions in2732
order to test the assumptions we draw regarding factors which drive developing water2733
markets. In addition, more work is required to understand how the proposed water al-2734
location systems in England would operate when other licence users are included from2735
other sectors, such as public water supply companies and electricity supply industries.2736
2737
References
Abraham, C. and Sheeran, P. (2003). Acting on intentions: The role of anticipated
regret. British Journal of Social Psychology, 42(4):495–512.
Acosta, L. A., Rounsevell, M. D., Bakker, M., Van Doorn, A., Go´mez-Delgado, M., and
Delgado, M. (2014). An agent-based assessment of land use and ecosystem changes in
traditional agricultural landscape of Portugal. Intelligent Information Management,
6(2):55–80.
Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A Theory of Planned Behaviour. In Kuhl,
J. and Beckmann, J., editors, Action control, pages 11–39. Springer, Berlin.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 50(2):179–211.
Ajzen, I. (2011). The Theory of Planned Behaviour: Reactions and reflections. Psy-
chology & Health, 26(9):1113–1127.
Albarracin, D., Johnson, B. T., Fishbein, M., and Muellerleile, P. A. (2001). Theories of
Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 127(1):142.
Allen, R. G., Pereira, L. S., Raes, D., Smith, M., et al. (1998). Crop evapotranspiration:
Guidelines for computing crop water requirements. Irrigation and drainage paper 56.
Food and Agricultural Organisation, Rome, 300(9).
Allison, P. D. (2008). Convergence failures in logistic regression. In SAS Global Forum,
volume 360, pages 1–11.
Andersen, E., Elbersen, B., Godeschalk, F., and Verhoog, D. (2007). Farm manage-
ment indicators and farm typologies as a basis for assessments in a changing policy
environment. Journal of Environmental Management, 82(3):353–362.
Andreoli, M. and Tellarini, V. (2000). Farm sustainability evaluation: Methodology
and practice. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 77(1):43–52.
Armitage, C. J. and Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behaviour:
A meta-analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40(4):471–499.
Arndt, D. S., Baringer, M. O., and Johnson, M. R. (2010). State of the climate in 2009.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 91(7):1–222.
Austin, E., Willock, J., Deary, I., Gibson, G., Dent, J., Edwards-Jones, G., Morgan, O.,
Grieve, R., and Sutherland, A. (1998). Empirical models of farmer behaviour using
psychological, social and economic variables. Part I: Linear modelling. Agricultural
Systems, 58(2):203–224.
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science,
211(4489):1390–1396.
119
120 References
Barnes, A. P., Willock, J., Hall, C., and Toma, L. (2009). Farmer perspectives and
practices regarding water pollution control programmes in Scotland. Agricultural
Water Management, 96(12):1715–1722.
Barnes, A. P., Willock, J., Toma, L., and Hall, C. (2011). Utilising a farmer typology to
understand farmer behaviour towards water quality management: Nitrate Vulnerable
Zones in Scotland. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 54(4):477–
494.
Barreteau, O., Bousquet, F., and Attonaty, J.-M. (2001). Role-playing games for open-
ing the black box of multi-agent systems: Method and lessons of its application
to Senegal river valley irrigated systems. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation, 4(2):5.
Bates, B., Kundzewicz, Z., Wu, S., and Palutikof, J. (2008). Climate change and wa-
ter. Technical Paper VI, IPCC Secretariat, Genevea, Switzerland, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change.
Becu, N., Perez, P., Walker, A., Barreteau, O., and Le Page, C. (2003). Agent based
simulation of a small catchment water management in northern Thailand: Descrip-
tion of the CATCHSCAPE model. Ecological Modelling, 170(2):319–331.
Beedell, J. and Rehman, T. (2000). Using social-psychology models to understand
farmers conservation behaviour. Journal of Rural Studies, 16(1):117–127.
Berger, T. (2001). Agent-based spatial models applied to agriculture: A simulation
tool for technology diffusion, resource use changes and policy analysis. Agricultural
Economics, 25(2):245–260.
Bewick, V., Cheek, L., and Ball, J. (2005). Statistics review 14: Logistic regression.
Critical Care, 9(1):1.
Billari, F. C. and Prskawetz, A. (2012). Agent-based computational demography: Using
simulation to improve our understanding of demographic behaviour. Springer Science
& Business Media, Berlin.
Bjornlund, H. (2003). Farmer participation in markets for temporary and permanent
water in southeastern Australia. Agricultural Water Management, 63(1):57–76.
Bjornlund, H. and McKay, J. (2002). Aspects of water markets for developing coun-
tries: Experiences from Australia, Chile, and the US. Environment and Development
Economics, 7(4):769–795.
Bousquet, F., Barreteau, O., Le Page, C., Mullon, C., and Weber, J. (1999). An
environmental modelling approach: The use of multi-agent simulations. Advances in
Environmental and Ecological Modelling, 113:122.
Brotherton, I. (1991). What limits participation in ESAs? Journal of Environmental
Management, 32(3):241–249.
Brouwer, C. and Heibloem, M. (1986). Irrigation water management: Irrigation water
needs. Training manual number 3 . Food and Agricultural Organisation, Rome, 3.
Brown, D. G., Page, S., Riolo, R., Zellner, M., and Rand, W. (2005). Path dependence
and the validation of agent-based spatial models of land use. International Journal
of Geographical Information Science, 19(2):153–174.
Burton, R. J. (2004). Reconceptualising the behavioural approach in agricultural stud-
ies: A socio-psychological perspective. Journal of Rural studies, 20(3):359–371.
Carraro, N. and Gaudreau, P. (2013). Spontaneous and experimentally induced action
planning and coping planning for physical activity: A meta-analysis. Psychology of
Sport and Exercise, 14(2):228–248.
References 121
CEH (2016). Centre for Ecology and Hydrology: National River Flow Archive. Accessed
on 29/04/17: http://nrfa.ceh.ac.uk/data/search.
Chambers, J. M., Cleveland, W., Tukey, P., and Kleiner, B. (1983). Graphical methods
for data analysis. Wadsworth International Group, Michigan.
Chatzisarantis, N. L., Hagger, M. S., et al. (2005). Effects of a brief intervention based
on the Theory of Planned Behavior on leisure-time physical activity participation.
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 27(4):470.
Cheung, S. F. and Chan, D. K. (2000). The role of perceived behavioral control in
predicting human behavior: A meta-analytic review of studies on the Theory of
Planned Behavior. Unpublished manuscript, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Cisneros, B. B., Oki, T., Arnell, N., Benito, G., Cogley, J., Do¨ll, P., Jiang, T., and
Mwakalila, S. (2014). Freshwater Resources. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [Field, CB and Barros, DJ and Dokken, DJ and Mach, KJ and
Mastrandrea, MD and Bilir, TE and Chatterjee, M and Ebi, KL and Estrada, YO
and Genova, RC and Girma, B and Kissel, ES and Levy, AN and MacCracken, S and
Mastrandrea, PR and White, LL (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 229-269.
Cochran, W. G. (1952). The χ2 test of goodness of fit. The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, pages 315–345.
Conner, M. and Armitage, C. J. (1998). Extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour:
A review and avenues for further research. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
28:1429–1464.
Conner, M., Godin, G., Sheeran, P., and Germain, M. (2013). Some feelings are more
important: Cognitive attitudes, affective attitudes, anticipated affect, and blood
donation. Health Psychology, 32(3):264.
Conner, M., Sheeran, P., Norman, P., and Armitage, C. J. (2000). Temporal stability
as a moderator of relationships in the Theory of Planned Behaviour. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 39(4):469–493.
Cox, D. R. and Snell, E. J. (1989). Analysis of binary data. Chapman & Hall, London.
dAquino, P., August, P., Balmann, A., Berger, T., Bousquet, F., Brond´ızio, E., Brown,
D. G., Couclelis, H., Deadman, P., Goodchild, M. F., et al. (2002). Agent-based mod-
els of land-use and land-cover change. In Proceedings of an International Workshop,
pages 4–7.
Darnhofer, I., Bellon, S., Dedieu, B., and Milestad, R. (2011). Adaptiveness to enhance
the sustainability of farming systems. In Sustainable Agriculture Volume 2, pages 45–
58. Springer, Berlin.
Daskalopoulou, I. and Petrou, A. (2002). Utilising a farm typology to identify potential
adopters of alternative farming activities in Greek agriculture. Journal of Rural
Studies, 18(1):95–103.
DeAngelis, D., Gross, L. J., and Boston, M. (1992). Individual-based models and ap-
proaches in ecology. Springer, New York.
DeAngelis, D. L. and Mooij, W. M. (2005). Individual-based modeling of ecological
and evolutionary processes. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics,
pages 147–168.
DEFRA (2011). Water for Life: Market reform proposals. Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA.
122 References
DEFRA (2013). Farm structure survey 2013: Focus on agricultural labour in England
and the United Kingdom. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
DEFRA.
DEFRA (2014a). Farm business survey 2013/14: East of England region commentary
2010/11 . Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA.
DEFRA (2014b). Making the most of every drop consultation on reforming the wa-
ter abstraction management system. Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs, DEFRA.
DEFRA (2016a). Abstraction licences in England and Wales by sector 2014. Ac-
cessed on 29/04/17: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/env15-
water-abstraction-tables.
DEFRA (2016b). UK Goverment response to consultation on reforming the water ab-
straction management system. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
DEFRA.
DEFRA (2016c). Water abstraction management reform in England . Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA.
Dixon, W. J. and Mood, A. M. (1946). The statistical sign test. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 41(236):557–566.
EA (2008). Water resources in England and Wales: Current state and future pressures.
Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2010). Managing water abstraction. Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2011). Great Ouse catchment flood management plan: Summary report January
2011 . Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2013a). The Cam and Ely Ouse Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy .
Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2013b). The North West Norfolk Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy .
Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2013c). The Old Bedford including Middle Level Catchment Abstraction Manage-
ment Strategy . Environment Agency, EA.
EA (2013d). The Upper Ouse and Bedford Ouse Catchment Abstraction Management
Strategy . Environment Agency, EA.
Edwards-Jones, G. (2006). Modelling farmer decision-making: Concepts, progress and
challenges. Animal Science, 82(06):783–790.
Emtage, N., Herbohn, J., and Harrison, S. (2006). Landholder typologies used in
the development of natural resource management programs in Australia: A review.
Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, 13(2):79–94.
Emtage, N., Herbohn, J., and Harrison, S. (2007). Landholder profiling and typolo-
gies for natural resource–management policy and program support: Potential and
constraints. Environmental Management, 40(3):481–492.
Epstein, J. M. (2006). Generative social science: Studies in agent-based computational
modeling. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Epstein, J. M. and Axtell, R. (1996). Growing artificial societies: Social science from
the bottom up. Brookings Institution Press, Washington.
References 123
Erfani, T., Binions, O., and Harou, J. (2015). Protecting environmental flows through
enhanced water licensing and water markets. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences,
19(2):675–689.
Evans, T. P. and Kelley, H. (2004). Multi-scale analysis of a household level agent-based
model of landcover change. Journal of Environmental Management, 72(1):57–72.
Fagiolo, G., Moneta, A., and Windrum, P. (2007). A critical guide to empirical val-
idation of agent-based models in economics: Methodologies, procedures, and open
problems. Computational Economics, 30(3):195–226.
Falkenmark, M. and Rockstro¨m, J. (2004). Balancing water for humans and nature:
The new approach in ecohydrology. Earthscan, New York.
Feola, G., Lerner, A. M., Jain, M., Montefrio, M. J. F., and Nicholas, K. A. (2015). Re-
searching farmer behaviour in climate change adaptation and sustainable agriculture:
Lessons learned from five case studies. Journal of Rural Studies, 39:74–84.
Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An intro-
duction to theory and research. Addison-Wesley, Boston.
Fu, G., Charles, S. P., and Yu, J. (2009). A critical overview of pan evaporation trends
over the last 50 years. Climatic Change, 97(1-2):193–214.
Gala´n, J. M., Lo´pez-Paredes, A., and Del Olmo, R. (2009). An agent-based model
for domestic water management in Valladolid metropolitan area. Water Resources
Research, 45(5).
Gardner, B., de Bruijn, G. J., and Lally, P. (2011). A systematic review and meta-
analysis of applications of the self-report habit index to nutrition and physical activity
behaviours. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 42(2):174–187.
Gardner, G. and Stern, P. (1996). Environmental problems and human behavior. Allyn
and Bacon, Boston.
Gardner, M. (1970). The Fantastic Combinations of John Conways New Solitaire
Games. Mathematical Games, 223(4):120–123.
Garforth, C. and Rehman, T. (2006). Research to understand and model the behaviour
and motivations of farmers in responding to policy changes (England). Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA.
Garrick, D., Whitten, S. M., and Coggan, A. (2013). Understanding the evolution and
performance of water markets and allocation policy: A transaction costs analysis
framework. Ecological Economics, 88:195–205.
Gasson, R. (1973). Goals and values of farmers. Journal of Agricultural Economics,
24(3):521–542.
Geraerts, E. and McNally, R. J. (2008). Forgetting unwanted memories: Directed
forgetting and thought suppression methods. Acta Psychologica, 127(3):614–622.
Gianfagna, C. C., Johnson, C. E., Chandler, D. G., and Hofmann, C. (2015). Watershed
area ratio accurately predicts daily streamflow in nested catchments in the Catskills,
New York. Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies, 4:583–594.
Gibbons, J. and Ramsden, S. (2008). Integrated modelling of farm adaptation to
climate change in East Anglia, UK: Scaling and farmer decision making. Agriculture,
Ecosystems & Environment, 127(1):126–134.
Gilbert, N. (2007). Agent-based models: Quantitative applications in the social sciences.
Sage, London.
124 References
Gilbert, N. and Troitzsch, K. (2005). Simulation for the social scientist. McGraw-Hill
Education, London.
Gimblett, H. R. (2002). Integrating geographic information systems and agent-based
modeling techniques for simulating social and ecological processes. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Gleick, P. H. (2003). Global freshwater resources: Soft-path solutions for the 21st
century. Science, 302(5650):1524–1528.
Gorton, M., Douarin, E., Davidova, S., and Latruffe, L. (2008). Attitudes to agricultural
policy and farming futures in the context of the 2003 CAP reform: A comparison of
farmers in selected established and new Member States. Journal of Rural Studies,
24(3):322–336.
Gosling, S., Taylor, R., Arnell, N., and Todd, M. (2011). A comparative analysis of
projected impacts of climate change on river runoff from global and catchment-scale
hydrological models. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 15(1):279–294.
Gowing, J. and Ejieji, C. (2001). Real-time scheduling of supplemental irrigation for
potatoes using a decision model and short-term weather forecasts. Agricultural Water
Management, 47(2):137–153.
Grimm, V. (1999). Ten years of individual-based modelling in ecology: What have we
learned and what could we learn in the future? Ecological Modelling, 115(2):129–148.
Grimm, V., Berger, U., Bastiansen, F., Eliassen, S., Ginot, V., Giske, J., Goss-Custard,
J., Grand, T., Heinz, S. K., Huse, G., et al. (2006). A standard protocol for describing
individual-based and agent-based models. Ecological Modelling, 198(1):115–126.
Grimm, V., Berger, U., DeAngelis, D. L., Polhill, J. G., Giske, J., and Railsback,
S. F. (2010). The ODD protocol: A review and first update. Ecological Modelling,
221(23):2760–2768.
Grimm, V. and Railsback, S. F. (2005). Individual-based Modeling and Ecology: Prince-
ton Series in Theoretical and Computational Biology . Princeton University Press,
New Jersey.
Grimm, V. and Railsback, S. F. (2013). Individual-based modeling and ecology. Prince-
ton university press, New Jersey.
Guerrin, F. (2001). MAGMA: A simulation model to help manage animal wastes at
the farm level. Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, 33(1):35–54.
Guillem, E., Barnes, A., Rounsevell, M., and Renwick, A. (2012). Refining perception-
based farmer typologies with the analysis of past census data. Journal of Environ-
mental Management, 110:226–235.
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L., and Biddle, S. J. (2002). A meta-analytic review of
the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior in physical activity: Predictive
validity and the contribution of additional variables. Journal of Sport & Exercise
Psychology, 24(1):3–32.
Hales, D., Rouchier, J., and Edmonds, B. (2003). Model-to-model analysis. Journal of
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 6(4).
Hall, P. A. and Fong, G. T. (2007). Temporal Self-Regulation Theory: A model for
individual health behavior. Health Psychology Review, 1(1):6–52.
Hankins, M., French, D., and Horne, R. (2000). Statistical guidelines for studies of
the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour. Psychology and
Health, 15(2):151–161.
References 125
Hardeman, W., Johnston, M., Johnston, D., Bonetti, D., Wareham, N., and Kinmonth,
A. L. (2002). Application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in behaviour change
interventions: A systematic review. Psychology and Health, 17(2):123–158.
Hare, M. and Deadman, P. (2004). Further towards a taxonomy of agent-based simu-
lation models in environmental management. Mathematics and Computers in Simu-
lation, 64(1):25–40.
Hargreaves, G. H. and Allen, R. G. (2003). History and evaluation of hargreaves evap-
otranspiration equation. Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Engineering, 129(1):53–
63.
Hargreaves, G. H. and Samani, Z. A. (1985). Reference crop evapotranspiration from
temperature. Applied Engineering in Agriculture, 1(2):96–99.
Hassandra, M., Vlachopoulos, S. P., Kosmidou, E., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Goudas, M.,
and Theodorakis, Y. (2011). Predicting students intention to smoke by Theory of
Planned Behaviour variables and parental influences across school grade levels. Psy-
chology & Health, 26(9):1241–1258.
Henriques, C., Holman, I. P., Audsley, E., and Pearn, K. (2008). An interactive multi-
scale integrated assessment of future regional water availability for agricultural irri-
gation in East Anglia and North West England. Climatic Change, 90(1-2):89–111.
Hess, T. M. (1996). Evapotranspiration estimates for water balance scheduling in the
UK. Irrigation News, 25:31–36.
Hodge, C. A. H., Burton, R., Corbett, W., Evans, R., and Seale, R. (1984). Soils and
their use in Eastern England. Soil Survey of England and Wales, Harpenden.
Home, R., Balmer, O., Jahrl, I., Stolze, M., and Pfiffner, L. (2014). Motivations for
implementation of ecological compensation areas on Swiss lowland farms. Journal of
Rural Studies, 34:26–36.
Hosmer, D. W. and Lemesbow, S. (1980). Goodness of fit tests for the multiple logistic
regression model. Communications in Statistics: Theory and Methods, 9(10):1043–
1069.
Huse, G., Giske, J., and Salvanes, A. G. V. (2002). Individual–based models. In Hart,
P.J.B and Reynolds, J.D., editors, Handbook of Fish Biology and Fisheries, Volume
2: Fisheries, pages 228–248. Blackwell Science, Oxford.
Janssen, M. (2002). Complexity and ecosystem management: The theory and practice
of multi-agent systems. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
Janssen, M. A. and Ostrom, E. (2006). Empirically based, agent-based models. Ecology
and Society, 11(2):37.
Jo¨reskog, K. G. and So¨rbom, D. (1989). LISREL 7: A guide to the program and
applications. SPSS, Chicago.
Keating, B. A., Carberry, P. S., Hammer, G. L., Probert, M. E., Robertson, M. J.,
Holzworth, D., Huth, N. I., Hargreaves, J. N., Meinke, H., Hochman, Z., McLean,
G., Verburg, K., Snow, V., Dimes, J., Silburn, M., Wang, E., Brown, S., Bristow,
K., Asseng, S., Chapman, S., McCown, R., Freebairn, D., and Smith, C. (2003).
An overview of APSIM, a model designed for farming systems simulation. European
Journal of Agronomy, 18(3):267–288.
Knox, J., Kay, M., and Weatherhead, E. (2012). Water regulation, crop production,
and agricultural water management: Understanding farmer perspectives on irrigation
efficiency. Agricultural Water Management, 108:3–8.
126 References
Knox, J., Morris, J., Weatherhead, E., and Turner, A. (2000). Mapping the financial
benefits of sprinkler irrigation and potential financial impact of restrictions on ab-
straction: A case-study in Anglian Region. Journal of Environmental Management,
58(1):45–59.
Knox, J., Rodriguez-Diaz, J., Weatherhead, E., and Kay, M. (2010). Development of a
water-use strategy for horticulture in England and Wales: A case study. The Journal
of Horticultural Science and Biotechnology, 85(2):89–93.
Knox, J., Weatherhead, E., and Bradley, R. (1997). Mapping the total volumetric irri-
gation water requirements in England and Wales. Agricultural Water Management,
33(1):1–18.
Knox, J., Weatherhead, K., Dı´az, J. R., and Kay, M. (2009). Developing a strategy
to improve irrigation efficiency in a temperate climate: A case study in England.
Outlook on Agriculture, 38(4):303–309.
Ko¨brich, C., Rehman, T., and Khan, M. (2003). Typification of farming systems
for constructing representative farm models: Two illustrations of the application of
multi-variate analyses in Chile and Pakistan. Agricultural Systems, 76(1):141–157.
Konzmann, M., Gerten, D., and Heinke, J. (2013). Climate impacts on global irriga-
tion requirements under 19 gcms, simulated with a vegetation and hydrology model.
Hydrological Sciences Journal, 58(1):88–105.
Kor, K. and Mullan, B. A. (2011). Sleep hygiene behaviours: An application of the
Theory of Planned Behaviour and the investigation of perceived autonomy support,
past behaviour and response inhibition. Psychology & Health, 26(9):1208–1224.
Kostrowicki, J. (1977). Agricultural typology concept and method. Agricultural Sys-
tems, 2(1):33–45.
Lambert, F. H., Stott, P. A., Allen, M. R., and Palmer, M. A. (2004). Detection
and attribution of changes in 20th century land precipitation. Geophysical Research
Letters, 31(10).
Landais, E. (1998). Modelling farm diversity: New approaches to typology building in
France. Agricultural Systems, 58(4):505–527.
Leathes, W., Knox, J., Kay, M., Trawick, P., and Rodriguez-Dı¨az, J. (2008). Developing
UK farmers’ institutional capacity to defend their water rights and effectively manage
limited water resources. Irrigation and Drainage, 57(3):322–331.
Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology,
22(140):55.
Luo, Y., Chang, X., Peng, S., Khan, S., Wang, W., Zheng, Q., and Cai, X. (2014).
Short-term forecasting of daily reference evapotranspiration using the hargreaves–
samani model and temperature forecasts. Agricultural Water Management, 136:42–
51.
Manstead, A. S. and Eekelen, S. A. (1998). Distinguishing between perceived behav-
ioral control and self-efficacy in the domain of academic achievement intentions and
behaviors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28(15):1375–1392.
Matthews, R. B., Gilbert, N. G., Roach, A., Polhill, J. G., and Gotts, N. M.
(2007). Agent-based land-use models: A review of applications. Landscape Ecol-
ogy, 22(10):1447–1459.
McCarty, D. (1981). Changing contraceptive usage intentions: A test of the fishbein
model of intention. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 11(3):192–211.
References 127
McEachan, R. R. C., Conner, M., Taylor, N. J., and Lawton, R. J. (2011). Prospective
prediction of health-related behaviours with the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A
meta-analysis. Health Psychology Review, 5(2):97–144.
McVicar, T. R., Van Niel, T. G., Roderick, M. L., Li, L. T., Mo, X. G., Zimmermann,
N. E., and Schmatz, D. R. (2010). Observational evidence from two mountainous
regions that near-surface wind speeds are declining more rapidly at higher elevations
than lower elevations: 1960–2006. Geophysical Research Letters, 37(6).
MetOffice (2016). Regional climate values: East Anglia. Accessed on 29/04/17:
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/summaries/datasets.
Midi, H., Sarkar, S. K., and Rana, S. (2010). Collinearity diagnostics of binary logistic
regression model. Journal of Interdisciplinary Mathematics, 13(3):253–267.
Miralles, D., Holmes, T., De Jeu, R., Gash, J., Meesters, A., and Dolman, A. (2011).
Global land-surface evaporation estimated from satellite-based observations. Hydrol-
ogy and Earth System Sciences, 15(2):453–469.
Moon, K. and Cocklin, C. (2011). Participation in biodiversity conservation: Motiva-
tions and barriers of Australian landholders. Journal of Rural Studies, 27(3):331–342.
Morris, C. and Potter, C. (1995). Recruiting the new conservationists: Farmers’ adop-
tion of agri-environmental schemes in the UK. Journal of Rural Studies, 11(1):51–63.
Nagelkerke, N. J. (1991). A note on a general definition of the coefficient of determi-
nation. Biometrika, 78(3):691–692.
Neumann, J. and Burks, A. (1966). Theory of self-reproduction automata. University
of Illinois Press: Urbana.
Norman, P. and Cooper, Y. (2011). The Theory of Planned Behaviour and breast self-
examination: Assessing the impact of past behaviour, context stability and habit
strength. Psychology & Health, 26(9):1156–1172.
Orbell, S. and Sheeran, P. (1998). Inclined abstainers: A problem for predicting health-
related behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37(2):151–165.
Parker, D. C., Manson, S. M., Janssen, M. A., Hoffmann, M. J., and Deadman, P.
(2003). Multi-agent systems for the simulation of land-use and land-cover change: A
review. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93(2):314–337.
Peng, C. Y. J., Lee, K. L., and Ingersoll, G. M. (2002). An introduction to logistic
regression analysis and reporting. The Journal of Educational Research, 96(1):3–14.
Pennings, J. M., Irwin, S. H., and Good, D. L. (2002). Surveying farmers: A case
study. Review of Agricultural Economics, 24(1):266–277.
Phillip, S., Hunter, C., and Blackstock, K. (2010). A typology for defining agritourism.
Tourism Management, 31(6):754–758.
Pike, T. (2008). Understanding behaviours in a farming context: Bringing theoretical
and applied evidence together from across DEFRA and highlighting policy relevance
and implications for future research. DEFRA Agricultural Change and Environment
Observatory Discussion Paper. Defra, London.
Poppenborg, P. and Koellner, T. (2013). Do attitudes toward ecosystem services de-
termine agricultural land use practices? An analysis of farmers decision-making in a
South Korean watershed. Land Use Policy, 31:422–429.
Railsback, S. F. (2001). Concepts from complex adaptive systems as a framework for
individual-based modelling. Ecological Modelling, 139(1):47–62.
128 References
Rapaport, P. and Orbell, S. (2000). Augmenting the Theory of Planned Behaviour: Mo-
tivation to provide practical assistance and emotional support to parents. Psychology
and Health, 15(3):309–324.
Ricciardi, A. and Rasmussen, J. B. (1999). Extinction rates of North American fresh-
water fauna. Conservation Biology, 13(5):1220–1222.
Richard, R., Vries, N. K., and Pligt, J. (1998). Anticipated regret and precautionary
sexual behaviour. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28(15):1411–1428.
Rise, J., Sheeran, P., and Hukkelberg, S. (2010). The role of self-identity in the The-
ory of Planned Behavior: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
40(5):1085–1105.
Rivis, A., Sheeran, P., and Armitage, C. J. (2011). Intention versus identification as
determinants of adolescents health behaviours: Evidence and correlates. Psychology
& Health, 26(9):1128–1142.
Roozenbeek, B., Lingsma, H. F., Perel, P., Edwards, P., Roberts, I., Murray, G. D.,
Maas, A. I., and Steyerberg, E. W. (2011). The added value of ordinal analysis in
clinical trials: An example in traumatic brain injury. Critical Care, 15(3):1.
Rosegrant, M. W. and Binswanger, H. P. (1994). Markets in tradable water rights:
Potential for efficiency gains in developing country water resource allocation. World
Development, 22(11):1613–1625.
Rost, S., Gerten, D., Bondeau, A., Lucht, W., Rohwer, J., and Schaphoff, S. (2008).
Agricultural green and blue water consumption and its influence on the global water
system. Water Resources Research, 44(9).
Russell, S. and Fielding, K. (2010). Water demand management research: A psycho-
logical perspective. Water Resources Research, 46(5).
Sandberg, T. and Conner, M. (2008). Anticipated regret as an additional predictor
in the Theory of Planned Behaviour: A meta-analysis. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 47(4):589–606.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical
Sociology, 1(2):143–186.
Schlu¨ter, M. and Pahl-Wostl, C. (2007). Mechanisms of resilience in common-pool
resource management systems: An agent-based model of water use in a river basin.
Ecology and Society, 12(2):4.
Schmitzberger, I., Wrbka, T., Steurer, B., Aschenbrenner, G., Peterseil, J., and Zech-
meister, H. (2005). How farming styles influence biodiversity maintenance in Austrian
agricultural landscapes. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 108(3):274–290.
Schreinemachers, P. and Berger, T. (2011). An agent-based simulation model of human–
environment interactions in agricultural systems. Environmental Modelling & Soft-
ware, 26(7):845–859.
Schulze, R. and Wittmann, W. W. (2003). A meta-analysis of the Theory of Rea-
soned Action and the Theory of PlannedBbehavior: The principle of compatibility
and multidimensionality of beliefs as moderators. Meta-analysis: New Developments
and Applications in Medical and Social Sciences, pages 219–250. Hogrefe & Huber,
Boston.
Searcy, J. K. (1959). Flow-duration curves. United States Geological Survey, US
Government Printing Office.
Shapiro, S. S. and Wilk, M. (1972). An analysis of variance test for the exponential
distribution (complete samples). Technometrics, 14(2):355–370.
References 129
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intentionbehavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review.
European Review of Social Psychology, 12(1):1–36.
Sheeran, P., Gollwitzer, P. M., and Bargh, J. A. (2013). Nonconscious processes and
health. Health Psychology, 32(5):460.
Sheeran, P., Orbell, S., and Trafimow, D. (1999). Does the temporal stability of be-
havioral intentions moderate intention-behavior and past behavior-future behavior
relations? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(6):724–734.
Shiklomanov, I. A., Rodda, J. C., et al. (2003). World water resources at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Shugart, H., Smith, T., and Post, W. (1992). The potential for application of individual-
based simulation models for assessing the effects of global change. Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, 23:15–38.
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational. Wiley, New York.
Sniehotta, F. F., Gellert, P., Witham, M. D., Donnan, P. T., Crombie, I. K., and Mc-
Murdo, M. E. (2013). Psychological theory in an interdisciplinary context: psycho-
logical, demographic, health-related, social, and environmental correlates of physical
activity in a representative cohort of community-dwelling older adults. International
Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity, 10(1):106.
Sniehotta, F. F., Presseau, J., and Arau´jo-Soares, V. (2014). Time to retire the Theory
of Planned Behaviour. Health Psychology Review, 8(1):1–7.
Sniehotta, F. F., Scholz, U., and Schwarzer, R. (2005). Bridging the intention–
behaviour gap: Planning, self-efficacy, and action control in the adoption and main-
tenance of physical exercise. Psychology & Health, 20(2):143–160.
Sokhansanj, S., Kumar, A., and Turhollow, A. F. (2006). Development and implemen-
tation of integrated biomass supply analysis and logistics model (IBSAL). Biomass
and Bioenergy, 30(10):838–847.
Stott, P. A., Gillett, N. P., Hegerl, G. C., Karoly, D. J., Stone, D. A., Zhang, X.,
and Zwiers, F. (2010). Detection and attribution of climate change: A regional
perspective. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(2):192–211.
Strand, E., Huse, G., and Giske, J. (2002). Artificial evolution of life history and
behavior. The American Naturalist, 159(6):624–644.
Sutherland, L.-A., Barnes, A., McCrum, G., Blackstock, K., and Toma, L. (2011).
Towards a cross-sectoral analysis of land use decision-making in Scotland. Landscape
and Urban Planning, 100(1):1–10.
Sutton, S. (1994). The past predicts the future: Interpreting behaviour–behaviour
relationships in social psychological models of health behaviour. In Rutter, D.R and
Quine, L., editors, Social psychology and health: European perspectives, pages 71-88.
Avebury and Ashgate Publishing, Brookfield.
Tavernier, E. M. and Tolomeo, V. (2004). Farm typology and sustainable agriculture:
Does size matter? Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 24(2):33–46.
Tesfatsion, L. (2002). Agent-based computational economics: Growing economies from
the bottom up. Artificial Life, 8(1):55–82.
Thobani, M. (1998). Meeting water needs in developing countries: Resolving issues in
establishing tradable water rights. In Markets for Water, pages 35–50. Springer, US.
Trafimow, D., Sheeran, P., Conner, M., and Finlay, K. A. (2002). Evidence that
perceived behavioural control is a multidimensional construct: Perceived control and
perceived difficulty. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41(1):101–121.
130 References
Triandis, H. C. (1979). Values, attitudes, and interpersonal behavior. In Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation. University of Nebraska Press, US.
UKIA (2007). A fair share of water for agriculture: A strategy for irrigation in eastern
England . UK Irrigation Association, UKIA.
Van Winkle, W., Rose, K. A., and Chambers, R. C. (1993). Individual-based approach
to fish population dynamics: An overview. Transactions of the American Fisheries
Society, 122(3):397–403.
Vo¨ro¨smarty, C. J., McIntyre, P. B., Gessner, M. O., Dudgeon, D., Prusevich, A.,
Green, P., Glidden, S., Bunn, S. E., Sullivan, C. A., Liermann, C. R., and Davies,
P. (2010). Global threats to human water security and river biodiversity. Nature,
467(7315):555–561.
Wada, Y., Wisser, D., Eisner, S., Flo¨rke, M., Gerten, D., Haddeland, I., Hanasaki,
N., Masaki, Y., Portmann, F. T., Stacke, T., Tessler, Z., and Schewe, J. (2013).
Multimodel projections and uncertainties of irrigation water demand under climate
change. Geophysical Research Letters, 40(17):4626–4632.
Wang, A., Lettenmaier, D. P., and Sheffield, J. (2011). Soil moisture drought in China,
1950-2006. Journal of Climate, 24(13):3257–3271.
Wauters, E., Bielders, C., Poesen, J., Govers, G., and Mathijs, E. (2010). Adoption
of soil conservation practices in Belgium: An examination of the Theory of Planned
Behaviour in the agri-environmental domain. Land Use Policy, 27(1):86–94.
Weatherhead, E. and Rivas Casado, M. (2007). Survey of irrigation of outdoor crops
in 2005: England and Wales. Cranfield University, UK.
Webb, M. C., Wilson, J. R., and Chong, J. (2004). An analysis of quasi-complete
binary data with logistic models: Applications to alcohol abuse data. Journal of
Data Science, 2(2004):273–285.
Whatmore, S., Munton, R., Little, J., and Marsden, T. (1987). Towards a typology of
farm businesses in contemporary british agriculture. Journal of the European Society
for Rural Sociology, 27(1):21–37.
Wheeler, S., Garrick, D., Loch, A., and Bjornlund, H. (2013). Evaluating water mar-
ket products to acquire water for the environment in Australia. Land Use Policy,
30(1):427–436.
Wilensky, U. (1999). NetLogo: Center for connected learning and computer-based
modeling. Accessed on 29/04/17: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/.
Willock, J., Deary, I. J., Edwards-Jones, G., Gibson, G. J., McGregor, M. J., Suther-
land, A., Dent, J. B., Morgan, O., and Grieve, R. (1999). The role of attitudes
and objectives in farmer decision making: Business and environmentally-oriented
behaviour in Scotland. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50(2):286–303.
Wilson, G. A. (1996). Farmer environmental attitudes and ESA participation. Geofo-
rum, 27(2):115–131.
Winter, M. (2000). Strong policy or weak policy? The environmental impact of the
1992 reforms to the CAP arable regime in Great Britain. Journal of Rural Studies,
16(1):47–59.
Wolff, K., Nordin, K., Brun, W., Berglund, G., and Kvale, G. (2011). Affective and
cognitive attitudes, uncertainty avoidance and intention to obtain genetic testing:
An extension of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Psychology & Health, 26(9):1143–
1155.
References 131
Wolpert, J. (1964). The decision process in spatial context. Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, 54(4):537–558.
World Commission on Dams (2000). Dams and Development: A new framework for
decision-making. The Report of the World Commission on Dams. Earthscan, London.
Xu, C.-Y. and Singh, V. (2002). Cross comparison of empirical equations for calcu-
lating potential evapotranspiration with data from Switzerland. Water Resources
Management, 16(3):197–219.
Yammarino, F. J., Skinner, S. J., and Childers, T. L. (1991). Understanding mail survey
response behavior: A meta-analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly, 55(4):613–639.
Young, M. D. (2014). Designing water abstraction regimes for an ever-changing and
ever-varying future. Agricultural Water Management, 145:32–38.
Zhang, J. (2007). Barriers to water markets in the Heihe River basin in northwest
China. Agricultural Water Management, 87(1):32–40.
Zhang, J., Zhang, F., Zhang, L., and Wang, W. (2009). Transaction costs in water
markets in the Heihe River Basin in Northwest China. Water Resources Development,
25(1):95–105.
Zhang, L., Zhu, X., Heerink, N., and Shi, X. (2014). Does output market development
affect irrigation water institutions? Insights from a case study in northern China.
Agricultural Water Management, 131:70–78.
Zhang, X., Zwiers, F. W., Hegerl, G. C., Lambert, F. H., Gillett, N. P., Solomon, S.,
Stott, P. A., and Nozawa, T. (2007). Detection of human influence on twentieth-
century precipitation trends. Nature, 448(7152):461–465.

133
134 Chapter A: Questionnaire
Appendix A
Questionnaire
Section A: This section is about your general irrigation practice 
What are the three main crops you usually 
irrigate (e.g. early potatoes, main crop 
potatoes, sugar beet, orchard fruit, small 
fruit, vegetables, grass, cereals)? 
   
How large an irrigated area do these main 
crops usually cover (ha or acres)? 
ha 
acres 
ha 
acres 
ha 
acres 
What is the predominant soil type these 
crops usually grow on? 
Sand 
Loam 
Peat 
Sand 
Loam 
Peat 
Sand 
Loam 
Peat 
What type of irrigation application 
infrastructure do you usually use? 
Rainguns 
Booms 
Sprinklers 
Trickle 
Rainguns 
Booms 
Sprinklers 
Trickle 
Rainguns 
Booms 
Sprinklers 
Trickle 
If applicable, what is the approximate size of your water 
storage capacity? (Please indicate unit of measurement such as 
mega litres, cubic metres, millions of gallons, acre-inches) 
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Section B: This section is about strategic decision making 
Part 1: Water Shortage 
If (HYPOTHETICALLY) you repeatedly, during the last 10 years, didn’t have enough water to meet 
crop water requirements... 
...What would you, as key decision maker in your farm 
business, intend to do next season? 
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Grow the same crops but over a smaller area 
Grow less water intensive crops 
Increase storage capacity 
Increase application efficiency 
Buy more water for the duration of the growing season 
Apply for a larger abstraction licence  
Change nothing 
 
...How advantageous or disadvantageous would each of 
the following actions be for your farm business? 
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Growing the same crops but over a smaller area would 
be...  
Growing less water intensive crops would be... 
Increasing storage capacity would be... 
Increasing application efficiency would be... 
Buying more water for the duration of the growing 
season would be... 
Applying for a larger abstraction licence would be... 
Changing nothing would be... 
 
 
...Which of the following social groups would most 
influence your strategic decision making? 
 
Please rank numerically,  
1 being most influential 
Groups interested in water saving and efficiency 
 (e.g. Water abstraction group(s), National Farmers Union 
(NFU), Environmental Agency (EA), Defra, UK Irrigation 
Association (UKIA)) 
 
Groups interested in crop type and quality 
 (e.g. main buyer(s), agronomist, business advisor(s)) 
 
 
Family, friends and neighbours 
 
 
...The social group you ranked as 1 would think that you 
(definitely shouldn’t to definitely should)… 
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...Grow the same crops but over a smaller area 
...Grow less water intensive crops 
...Increase storage capacity 
...Increase application efficiency 
...Buy more water for the duration of the growing 
season 
...Apply for a larger abstraction licence 
...Change nothing 
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...How much do you disagree or agree with the following 
statements? 
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Growing the same crops but over a smaller area or not 
is entirely up to you 
Growing less water intensive crops or not is entirely up 
to you 
Increasing storage capacity or not is entirely up to you 
Increasing application efficiency or not is entirely up to 
you 
Buying more water for the duration of the growing 
season or not is entirely up to you 
Applying for a larger abstraction licence or not is 
entirely up to you 
Changing nothing or not is entirely up to you 
 
Have you repeatedly, during the last 10 years, not had 
enough water to meet crop water requirements? If NO 
please skip to PART 2 
   Yes                              No 
If YES (IN REALITY) you repeatedly didn’t have enough 
water to meet crop water requirements, what did you do? 
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Grew the same crops but over a smaller area 
Grew less water intensive crops 
Increased storage capacity 
Increased application efficiency 
Bought more water for the duration of the growing 
season 
Applied for a larger abstraction licence  
Changed nothing 
 
Part 2: Water Surplus 
If (HYPOTHETICALLY) you repeatedly, during the last 10 years, had a surplus of water after you 
met crop water requirements... 
...What would you, as key decision maker in your farm 
business, intend to do next season? 
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Grow the same crops but over a larger area 
Grow more water intensive crops 
Sell surplus water for the duration of the growing 
season  
Change nothing 
 
...How advantageous or disadvantageous would each of 
the following actions be for your farm business? 
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Growing the same crops but over a larger area would 
be... 
Growing more water intensive crops would be... 
Selling surplus water for the duration of the growing 
season would be... 
Changing nothing would be... 
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...Which of the following social groups would most 
influence your strategic decision making? 
 
Please rank numerically, 
1 being most influential 
Groups interested in water saving and efficiency 
 (e.g. Water abstraction group(s), National Farmers Union 
(NFU), Environmental Agency (EA), Defra, UK Irrigation 
Association (UKIA)) 
 
Groups interested in crop type and quality 
 (e.g. main buyer(s), agronomist, business advisor(s)) 
 
 
Family, friends and neighbours 
 
 
...The social group you ranked as 1 would think that you 
(definitely shouldn’t to definitely should)… 
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...Grow the same crops but over a larger area 
...Grow more water intensive crops 
...Sell surplus water for the duration of the growing 
season  
...Change nothing 
 
...How much do you disagree or agree with the 
following statements? 
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Growing the same crops but over a larger area or not is 
entirely up to you 
Growing more water intensive crops or not is entirely 
up to you 
Selling surplus water for the duration of the growing 
season or not is entirely up to you 
Changing nothing or not is entirely up to you 
 
Have you repeatedly, during the last 10 years, had a 
surplus of water after you met crop water 
requirements? If NO please skip to  
SECTION C 
   Yes                              No 
If YES (IN REALITY) you repeatedly had a surplus of 
water after you met crop water requirements, what did 
you do? 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
d
is
ag
re
e 
 V
er
y
 m
u
ch
 
d
is
ag
re
e 
 D
is
ag
re
e 
 N
o
t 
su
re
 
 A
g
re
e 
 V
er
y
 m
u
ch
 
ag
re
e 
 S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
ag
re
e 
Grew the same crops but over a larger area 
Grew more water intensive crops 
Sold surplus water for the duration of the growing 
season  
Changed nothing 
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Section C: This section is about decision making during the growing season 
Part 1: Water Shortage 
If (HYPOTHETICALLY) you repeatedly didn’t have enough water to meet crop water requirements 
during a growing season... 
...What would you, as key decision maker in your farm 
business, intend to do? 
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Only use your maximum abstraction licence to spread 
water evenly between all crops 
Only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate 
your most valuable crops 
Restrict application (i.e. deficit irrigation) 
Buy more water to meet crop water requirements 
 
...How advantageous or disadvantageous would each of 
the following actions be for your farm business? 
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Only using your maximum abstraction licence to spread 
water evenly between all crops would be... 
Only using your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate 
your most valuable crops would be... 
Restricting application (i.e. deficit irrigation) would be... 
Buying more water to meet crop water requirements 
would be... 
 
 
...Which of the following social groups would most 
influence your decision making during the growing 
season? 
 
Please rank numerically, 
1 being most influential 
Groups interested in water saving and efficiency 
(e.g. Water abstraction group(s), National Farmers Union 
(NFU), Environmental Agency (EA), Defra, UK Irrigation 
Association (UKIA)) 
 
Groups interested in crop type and quality 
(e.g. main buyer(s), agronomist, business advisor(s)) 
 
 
Family, friends and neighbours 
 
 
...The social group you ranked as 1 would think that you 
(definitely shouldn’t to definitely should)… 
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...Only use your maximum abstraction licence to spread 
water evenly between all crops 
...Only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate 
your most valuable crops 
...Restrict application (i.e. deficit irrigation) 
...Buy more water to meet crop water requirements 
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...How much do you disagree or agree with the following 
statements? 
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Only using your maximum abstraction licence to spread 
water evenly between all crops or not is entirely up to you 
Only using your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate 
your most valuable crops or not is entirely up to you 
Restricting application (i.e. deficit irrigation) or not is 
entirely up to you 
Buying more water to meet crop water requirements or not 
is entirely up to you 
 
Have you repeatedly not had enough water to meet crop 
water requirements during a growing season? If NO 
please skip to PART 2 
   Yes                              No 
If YES (IN REALITY) you repeatedly didn’t have enough 
water to meet crop water requirements during a growing 
season, what did you do? 
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Only used your maximum abstraction licence to spread 
water evenly between all crops 
Only used your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate 
your most valuable crops 
Restricted application (i.e. deficit irrigation) 
Bought more water to meet crop water requirements 
 
Part 2: Water Surplus 
If (HYPOTHETICALLY) you repeatedly had a surplus of water after you met crop water 
requirements during the growing season... 
...What would you, as key decision maker in your farm 
business, intend to do? 
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Sell surplus water to maximise profits 
Just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water 
requirements and leave the remainder of your licence 
unused 
Abstract surplus water for storage 
 
...How advantageous or disadvantageous would each of 
the following actions be for your farm business? 
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Selling surplus water to maximise profits would be... 
Just using your abstraction licence to meet crop water 
requirements and leaving the remainder of your licence 
unused would be... 
Abstracting surplus water for storage would be... 
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...Which of the following social groups would most 
influence your decision making during the growing 
season? 
 
Please rank numerically,  
1 being most influential 
Groups interested in water saving and efficiency 
 (e.g. Water abstraction group(s), National Farmers Union 
(NFU), Environmental Agency (EA), Defra, UK Irrigation 
Association (UKIA)) 
 
Groups interested in crop type and quality 
(e.g. main buyer(s), agronomist, business advisor(s)) 
 
 
Family, friends and neighbours 
 
 
...The social group you ranked as 1 would think that you 
(definitely shouldn’t to definitely should)… 
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...Sell surplus water to maximise profits 
...Just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water 
requirements and leave the remainder of your licence 
unused 
...Abstract surplus water for storage 
 
...How much do you disagree or agree with the following 
statements? 
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Selling surplus water to maximise profits or not is entirely 
up to you 
Just using your abstraction licence to meet crop water 
requirements and leaving the remainder of your licence 
unused or not is entirely up to you 
Abstracting surplus water for storage or not is entirely up 
to you 
 
Have you repeatedly had a surplus of water after you met 
crop water requirements during a growing season? If NO 
please skip to  
SECTION D 
   Yes                              No 
If (IN REALITY) you repeatedly had a surplus of water 
after you met crop water requirements during the growing 
season, what did you do? 
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Sold surplus water to maximise profits 
Just used your abstraction licence to meet crop water 
requirements and left the remainder of your licence 
unused 
Abstracted surplus water for storage 
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Section D: Demographic Questions 
What is your gender? 
Male  Female  
 
What is your age? 
18-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70 + 
 
What is your highest level of education completed? 
NQF Level Example Qualification 
Entry Level: Entry level certificate/ Foundation diploma/ BTEC Level 1 
Level 1-2: O-Levels (A*-G)/ Higher Dip 
Level 3-5: A-Levels (A*-E)/ Advance Dip/ Foundation Deg/ HND/ Dip FE  
Level 6: Bachelors (Honours) Degree/ Graduate Dip/ Professional CE 
Level 7: Masters Degree/ PGDip/ PGCert/ Postgraduate CE 
Level 8: Doctoral Degree (Doctorates and Higher Doctorates) 
 
On average, what is your total gross annual farm business income? 
 £0-4,999 £5-9,999 £10-£14,999 £15-£19,999 £20-£29,999  
 
£30-£39,999 £40-£49,999 £50-74,999 £75-£99,999 £100,000+ 
 
Have you used your licence at all in the last 10 years?    Yes   No 
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Table B.1: Farm attributes (section A of survey)
Crop category Irrigated Area Soil type (%) Irrigation method (%)
(%) (ha) Sa Lo Pe M R B S T M
Main crop 1 (n=90)
- Early pot. 10 503 56 33 11 0 67 11 0 0 22
- Main crop pot. 72 4,819 28 40 20 12 65 11 2 0 23
- Sugar beet 2 110 50 0 50 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Orchard fruit 1 3 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
- Small fruit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Vegetables 13 1,243 50 25 8 17 50 17 8 0 25
- Grass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Cereals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Other 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
- Missing 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Total 100 6,699 34 37 18 11 62 11 2 1 23
Main crop 2 (n=54)
- Early pot. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Main crop pot. 10 930 11 33 33 22 44 11 0 0 44
- Sugar beet 12 191 20 50 10 20 70 30 0 0 0
- Orchard fruit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Small fruit 1 1 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
- Vegetables 32 1,634 57 18 14 11 62 24 0 0 14
- Grass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Cereals 3 200 0 67 0 33 67 0 0 0 33
- Other 1 4 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Missing 40 - - - - - - - - - -
Total 100 2,959 38 31 15 15 60 21 0 2 17
Main crop 3 (n=39)
- Early pot. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Main crop pot. 1 16 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Sugar beet 9 504 43 14 0 43 63 13 0 0 25
- Orchard fruit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Small fruit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Vegetables 21 1,540 37 37 16 11 42 37 5 0 16
- Grass 1 12 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Cereals 10 925 22 44 11 22 67 33 0 0 0
- Other 1 4 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Missing 57 - - - - - - - - - -
Total 100 3,001 37 34 11 18 56 28 3 0 13
Total (amalgamation of main crops 1, 2 and 3 excluding missing data)
- Early pot. 5 503 56 33 11 0 67 11 0 0 22
- Main crop pot. 41 5,765 27 39 21 13 63 11 1 0 25
- Sugar beet 11 805 32 32 11 26 70 20 0 0 10
- Orchard fruit 1 3 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
- Small fruit 1 1 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
- Vegetables 33 4,417 49 25 14 12 53 27 3 0 17
- Grass 1 12 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
- Cereals 7 1,125 17 50 8 25 67 25 0 0 8
- Other 2 28 100 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 33
Total 100 12,659 36 35 16 14 60 18 2 1 19
Summing errors due to rounding. Potatoes (pot.); Sand (Sa); Loam (Lo); Peat (Pe);
Mixed (M); Raingun (R); Boom (B); Sprinkler (S); Trickle (T)
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Figure B.1: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to irrigated area and storage ca-
pacity. (Top) A normal probability plot illustrating that neither variables were normally
distributed which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for
both variables. (Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the strength of association between ranked
irrigated area and ranked storage capacity (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient rs= .76, p=
<.001)
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Table B.2: Social demographics (section D of survey) (n = 90)
Measure Respondents
(%)
Gender
- Male 93
- Female 2
- Missing 4
Age
- 18-29 7
- 30-39 8
- 40-49 21
- 50-59 28
- 60-69 23
- ≥ 70 11
- Missing 2
aEducation (NQF level)
- <1 3
- 1-2 29
- 3-5 22
- 6 28
- 7 6
- 8 0
- Missing 12
bIncome (£)
- 0-4,999 0
- 5-9,999 0
- 10-14,999 0
- 15-19,999 1
- 20-29,999 3
- 30-39,999 0
- 40-49,999 0
- 50-74,999 8
- 75-99,999 8
- ≥ 100,000 66
- Missing 14
Licence use (last 10 years)
- Yes 96
- No 2
- Missing 2
aNational Qualification Framework
(NQF) levels for England, Wales
and Northern Ireland
bTotal gross annual farm
business income
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Figure B.2: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to annual and daily licence limits.
(Top) A normal probability plot illustrating that neither variables were normally distributed
which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for both variables.
(Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the strength of association between ranked annual licence
limit and ranked daily licence limit (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient rs= .70, p= <.001)
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Table B.3: Past abstractions between 2008 and 2012 (’000 m3 or Ml)
Month 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average S.D.
Jan 107 96 232 324 67 165 108.89
Feb 46 33 208 285 57 126 113.81
Mar 35 4 13 149 151 70 73.36
Apr 26 35 50 216 162 98 85.87
May 152 274 348 661 269 341 192.10
Jun 289 646 561 509 172 435 197.82
Jul 428 334 883 388 120 431 279.61
Aug 176 271 172 289 193 220 55.21
Sep 61 237 35 104 112 110 77.71
Oct 4 72 6 78 32 39 35.27
Nov 201 79 237 148 199 173 61.17
Dec 191 169 284 242 58 189 85.64
Annual 1,715 2,249 3,028 3,393 1,591 2,395 794.71
Summing errors due to rounding
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Figure B.3: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to annual abstractions and pre-
cipitation. (Top) A normal probability plot illustrating that both variables were normally
distributed which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05 for
both variables. (Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the strength of association between annual
abstractions and annual precipitation (Pearson’s correlation coefficient r= -.91, p= <.05)
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Figure B.4: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to average monthly abstractions
and precipitation. (Top) A normal probability plot illustrating that both variables were
approximately normally distributed which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of
normality as p = >.05 for both variables. (Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the strength of
association between average monthly abstractions and average monthly precipitation (Pearson’s
correlation coefficient r= .36, p= >.05)
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Figure B.5: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to average monthly abstractions and
precipitation in-season (Apr-Oct). (Top) A normal probability plot illustrating that both
variables were approximately normally distributed which supports the results of the Shapiro-
Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05 for both variables. (Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the
strength of association between average monthly abstractions and average monthly precipitation
in-season (Apr-Oct) (Pearson’s correlation coefficient r= .36, p= >.05)
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Figure B.6: A normal probability plot illustrating distribution, and a scatter plot
indicating strength of association, with regards to average monthly abstractions
and precipitation out-of-season (Nov-Mar). (Top) A normal probability plot illustrating
that both variables were approximately normally distributed which supports the results of the
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05 for both variables. (Bottom) A scatter plot indi-
cating the strength of association between average monthly abstractions and average monthly
precipitation out-of-season (Nov-Mar) (Pearson’s correlation coefficient r= .87, p= >.05)
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Table C.1: Strategic (long-term)/water shortage behavioural intentions (section B of survey)
Behaviour bLikert item responses (%) (n=90) Median IQR
-aConstruct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing
Grow the same crops but over a smaller area
- I 16 7 16 14 32 6 7 3 4 2
- A 17 28 41 4 6 0 0 4 3 1
- SN 7 10 18 23 28 7 0 8 4 2
- PBC 7 9 12 3 32 10 22 4 5 3
- PB 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 93 3 2
Grow less water intensive crops
- I 17 9 22 12 26 9 0 6 3 3
- A 11 17 38 16 13 0 0 6 3 2
- SN 9 10 21 16 30 4 0 10 4 2
- PBC 8 2 20 2 24 16 22 6 5 3
- PB 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 93 4 2
Increase storage capacity
- I 8 4 9 10 23 13 23 9 5 3
- A 4 2 6 6 32 19 19 12 5 1
- SN 2 1 2 13 37 12 20 12 5 1
- PBC 10 4 23 2 22 14 16 8 5 3
- PB 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 93 4 3
Increase application efficiency
- I 1 2 2 10 36 24 18 7 5 1
- A 1 0 0 2 46 29 17 6 5 1
- SN 1 0 0 8 38 24 20 9 5 1
- PBC 11 1 20 4 26 17 14 7 5 3
- PB 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 94 5 2
Buy more water for the duration of the growing season
- I 10 4 13 22 31 7 7 6 4 2
- A 2 7 10 22 27 19 7 7 5 2
- SN 2 0 4 32 32 12 4 12 5 1
- PBC 6 6 19 4 32 13 13 7 5 3
- PB 0 0 2 1 2 2 0 92 5 3
Apply for a larger abstraction licence
- I 7 8 14 13 36 3 11 8 5 2
- A 2 3 7 21 30 14 13 9 5 2
- SN 4 1 11 23 26 14 9 11 5 2
- PBC 9 8 20 4 19 12 20 8 5 3
- PB 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 94 5 3
Change nothing
- I 33 8 22 13 9 2 7 6 3 3
- A 17 11 36 21 7 1 1 7 3 2
- SN 17 10 30 23 8 1 0 11 3 2
- PBC 12 0 12 3 30 13 22 7 5 3
- PB 1 1 3 1 0 0 1 92 3 2
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A);
Subjective Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past
Behaviour (PB)
b(I), (PBC), and (PB) = strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7);
(A) = extremely disadvantageous (1) to extremely advantageous (7);
and (SN) = definitely shouldn’t (1) to definitely should (7) (4 = not
sure for all constructs)
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Table C.2: Preferred strategic (long-term)/water shortage behavioural intentions
Behaviour bRescaled Likert item responses
∑
Totals cSign test
-aConstruct -3 -2 -1 (n=) 1 2 3 Total (-,+,=)
Increase application efficiency 425
- I -3 -4 -2 (84) 32 44 48 115 29,15,37*
- A -3 0 0 (85) 41 52 45 135
- SN -3 0 0 (82) 34 44 54 129
- PBC -30 -2 -18 (84) 23 30 39 42
- PB 0 0 -1 ( 5) 2 0 3 4
Increase storage capacity 294
- I -21 -8 -8 (82) 21 24 63 71 33,15,32*
- A -12 -4 -5 (79) 29 34 51 93
- SN -6 -2 -2 (79) 33 22 54 99
- PBC -27 -8 -21 (83) 20 26 42 32
- PB -3 0 -2 ( 6) 1 0 3 -1
Apply for a larger abstraction licence 182
- I -18 -14 -13 (83) 32 6 30 23 26,19,38
- A -6 -6 -6 (82) 27 26 36 71
- SN -12 -2 -10 (80) 23 26 24 49
- PBC -24 -14 -18 (83) 17 22 54 37
- PB 0 -2 0 ( 5) 2 2 0 2
Buy more water for the duration of the growing season 164
- I -27 -8 -12 (85) 28 12 18 11 42,21,21*
- A -6 -12 -9 (84) 24 34 18 49
- SN -6 0 -4 (79) 29 22 12 53
- PBC -15 -10 -17 (84) 29 24 36 47
- PB 0 0 -2 ( 7) 2 4 0 4
Grow less water intensive crops -85
- I -45 -16 -20 (85) 23 16 0 -42 15,32,38*
- A -30 -30 -34 (85) 12 0 0 -82
- SN -24 -18 -19 (81) 27 8 0 -26
- PBC -21 -4 -18 (85) 22 28 60 67
- PB 0 -2 -2 ( 6) 2 0 0 -2
Grow the same crops but over a smaller area -95
- I -42 -12 -14 (87) 29 10 18 -11 52,17,14*
- A -45 -50 -37 (86) 5 0 0 -127
- SN -18 -18 -16 (83) 25 12 0 -15
- PBC -18 -16 -11 (86) 29 18 60 62
- PB 0 -2 -3 ( 6) 1 0 0 -4
Change nothing -199
- I -90 -14 -20 (85) 8 4 18 -94
- A -45 -20 -32 (84) 6 2 3 -86
- SN -45 -18 -27 (80) 7 2 0 -81
- PBC -33 0 -11 (84) 27 24 60 67
- PB -3 -2 -3 ( 7) 0 0 3 -5
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A); Subjective
Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past Behaviour (PB)
bLikert item scores rescaled from -3 to 3 and multiplied by number of responses
cPositive difference (+); negative difference (-); and ties (=). (*) = p<.05.
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Table C.3: Tests for multi-collinearity, and recommended number of cases, in re-
lation to respondents’ preferred strategic (long-term)/water shortage behavioural
intention. Tests for multi-collinearity of the predictor variables (i.e. attitude, subjective norm
(SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC)) in relation to the binary response variable (i.e.
intention) where 0 = strongly disagree to agree and 1 = very much agree to strongly agree with
the intention to increase application efficiency (n = 79)
Measure Attitude SN PBC VIF Frequency
0 1
- Intention .388 .467 .135
- Attitude .416 .044 1.210 42 37
- SN .134 1.230 41 38
- PBC 1.019 53 26
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
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Table C.4: Strategic (long-term)/water surplus behavioural intentions (section B of survey)
Behaviour bLikert item responses (%) (n=90) Median IQR
-aConstruct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing
Grow the same crops but over a larger area
- I 3 2 41 17 21 3 3 9 3 2
- A 4 7 24 19 32 6 3 4 4 2
- SN 3 4 19 28 24 6 1 14 4 2
- PBC 4 2 17 2 39 6 23 7 5 4
- PB 7 2 21 2 9 1 1 57 3 2
Grow more water intensive crops
- I 4 4 52 14 12 3 0 9 3 1
- A 4 6 32 26 23 4 0 4 4 2
- SN 7 3 31 27 17 2 0 13 4 1
- PBC 4 2 22 2 34 7 21 7 5 3
- PB 9 1 24 1 6 2 0 57 3 0
Sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season
- I 7 7 21 14 34 4 6 7 4 2
- A 7 2 6 20 48 8 6 4 5 1
- SN 3 2 9 32 31 7 2 13 4 1
- PBC 11 2 21 8 28 8 16 7 5 3
- PB 8 1 17 4 7 4 1 58 3 2
Change nothing
- I 8 3 18 19 30 8 8 7 4 2
- A 7 4 26 34 18 1 6 4 4 2
- SN 6 7 23 30 16 4 0 14 4 1
- PBC 9 2 20 9 26 4 24 6 5 4
- PB 4 1 12 4 17 1 10 50 5 2
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A);
Subjective Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past
Behaviour (PB)
b(I), (PBC), and (PB) = strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7);
(A) = extremely disadvantageous (1) to extremely advantageous (7);
and (SN) = definitely shouldn’t (1) to definitely should (7) (4 = not
sure for all constructs)
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Table C.5: Preferred strategic (long-term)/water surplus behavioural intentions
Behaviour bRescaled Likert item responses
∑
Totals cSign test
-aConstruct -3 -2 -1 (n=) 1 2 3 Total (-,+,=)
Sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season 82
- I -18 -12 -19 (84) 31 8 15 5 29,29,21
- A -18 -4 -5 (86) 43 14 15 45
- SN -9 -4 -8 (78) 28 12 6 25
- PBC -30 -4 -19 (84) 25 14 42 28
- PB -21 -2 -15 (38) 6 8 3 -21
Change nothing 47
- I -21 -6 -16 (84) 27 14 21 19 41,21,17*
- A -18 -8 -23 (86) 16 2 15 -16
- SN -15 -12 -21 (77) 14 8 0 -26
- PBC -24 -4 -18 (85) 23 8 66 51
- PB -12 -2 -11 (45) 15 2 27 19
Grow the same crops but over a larger area 36
- I -9 -4 -37 (82) 19 6 9 -16 25, 6,51*
- A -12 -12 -22 (86) 29 10 9 2
- SN -9 -8 -17 (77) 22 10 3 1
- PBC -12 -4 -15 (84) 35 10 63 77
- PB -18 -4 -19 (39) 8 2 3 -28
Grow more water intensive crops -80
- I -12 -8 -47 (82) 11 6 0 -50
- A -12 -10 -29 (86) 21 8 0 -22
- SN -18 -6 -28 (78) 15 4 0 -33
- PBC -12 -4 -20 (84) 31 12 57 64
- PB -24 -2 -22 (39) 5 4 0 -39
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A); Subjective
Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past Behaviour (PB)
bLikert item scores rescaled from -3 to 3 and multiplied by number of responses
cPositive difference (+); negative difference (-); and ties (=). (*) = p<.05.
Table C.6: Tests for multi-collinearity, and recommended number of cases, in re-
lation to respondents’ preferred strategic (long-term)/water surplus behavioural
intention. Tests for multi-collinearity of the predictor variables (i.e. attitude, subjective norm
(SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC)) in relation to the binary response variable (i.e.
intention) where 0 = strongly disagree to not sure and 1 = agree to strongly agree with the
intention to sell surplus water for the duration of the growing season (n = 75)
Measure Attitude SN PBC VIF Frequency
0 1
- Intention .356 .332 .181
- Attitude .141 .136 1.033 64 11
- SN .196 1.054 40 35
- PBC 1.053 58 17
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
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Table C.7: In-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural intentions (section C of survey)
Behaviour bLikert item responses (%) (n=90) Median IQR
-aConstruct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing
Only use your maximum abstraction licence to spread water
evenly between all crops
- I 16 6 32 7 16 9 10 6 3 2
- A 7 17 42 10 11 4 2 7 3 2
- SN 10 2 20 22 24 6 4 11 4 2
- PBC 10 6 17 3 27 13 17 8 5 3
- PB 2 1 3 1 3 1 0 88 3 3
Only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate your
most valuable crops
- I 7 0 6 1 33 23 24 6 6 2
- A 3 4 19 11 40 8 8 7 5 2
- SN 3 1 4 12 31 24 12 11 5 1
- PBC 9 4 14 6 29 13 17 8 5 3
- PB 0 1 1 2 4 1 2 88 5 2
Restrict irrigation (i.e. deficit irrigation)
- I 7 3 22 18 33 4 2 10 4 2
- A 10 18 40 16 7 0 2 8 3 2
- SN 8 4 20 28 17 8 3 12 4 2
- PBC 9 8 17 4 29 11 13 9 5 3
- PB 1 1 2 2 6 0 0 88 4 2
Buy more water to meet crop water requirements
- I 9 3 8 14 33 14 7 11 5 1
- A 4 2 11 17 36 12 8 10 5 1
- SN 3 0 4 26 36 9 9 13 5 1
- PBC 9 6 13 10 31 7 13 11 5 2
- PB 2 0 1 1 6 0 2 88 5 2
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A);
Subjective Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past
Behaviour (PB)
b(I), (PBC), and (PB) = strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7);
(A) = extremely disadvantageous (1) to extremely advantageous (7);
and (SN) = definitely shouldn’t (1) to definitely should (7) (4 = not
sure for all constructs)
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Table C.8: Preferred in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural intentions
Behaviour bRescaled Likert item responses
∑
Totals cSign test
-aConstruct -3 -2 -1 (n=) 1 2 3 Total (-,+,=)
Only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate your
most valuable crops 301
- I -18 0 -5 (85) 30 42 66 115 42,13,25*
- A -9 -8 -17 (84) 36 14 21 37
- SN -9 -2 -4 (80) 28 44 33 90
- PBC -24 -8 -13 (83) 26 24 45 50
- PB 0 -2 -1 (11) 4 2 6 9
Buy more water to meet crop water requirements 179
- I -24 -6 -7 (80) 30 26 18 37 43,19,18*
- A -12 -4 -10 (81) 32 22 21 49
- SN -9 0 -4 (78) 32 16 24 59
- PBC -24 -10 -12 (80) 28 12 36 30
- PB -6 0 -1 (11) 5 0 6 4
Only use your maximum abstraction licence to spread water
evenly between all crops -56
- I -42 -10 -29 (85) 14 16 27 -24 21,29,31
- A -18 -30 -38 (84) 10 8 6 -62
- SN -27 -4 -18 (80) 22 10 12 -5
- PBC -27 -10 -15 (83) 24 24 45 41
- PB -6 -2 -3 (11) 3 2 0 -6
Restrict irrigation (i.e. deficit irrigation) -65
- I -18 -6 -20 (81) 30 8 6 0
- A -27 -32 -36 (83) 6 0 6 -83
- SN -21 -8 -18 (79) 15 14 9 -9
- PBC -24 -14 -15 (82) 26 20 36 29
- PB -3 -2 -2 (11) 5 0 0 -2
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A); Subjective
Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past Behaviour (PB)
bLikert item scores rescaled from -3 to 3 and multiplied by number of responses
cPositive difference (+); negative difference (-); and ties (=). (*) = p<.05.
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Table C.9: Tests for multi-collinearity, and recommended number of cases, in rela-
tion to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural
intention. Tests for multi-collinearity of the predictor variables (i.e. attitude, subjective norm
(SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC)) in relation to the binary response variable (i.e.
intention) where 0 = strongly disagree to very much agree and 1 = strongly agree with the
intention to only use your maximum abstraction licence to irrigate your most valuable crops (n
= 78)
Measure Attitude SN PBC VIF Frequency
0 1
- Intention .446 .483 .313
- Attitude .410 .181 1.219 65 13
- SN .180 1.219 47 31
- PBC 1.048 51 27
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Table C.10: Tests for multi-collinearity, and recommended number of cases, in re-
lation to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-term)/water shortage behavioural
intention after removing an outlier. Tests for multi-collinearity of the predictor variables
(i.e. attitude, subjective norm (SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC)) in relation to
the binary response variable (i.e. intention) where 0 = strongly disagree to very much agree
and 1 = strongly agree with the intention to only use your maximum abstraction licence to
irrigate your most valuable crops (n = 77)
Measure Attitude SN PBC VIF Frequency
0 1
- Intention .466 .513 .337
- Attitude .408 .177 1.216 64 13
- SN .174 1.215 46 31
- PBC 1.046 50 27
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
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Table C.11: In-season (short-term)/water surplus behavioural intentions (section C of survey)
Behaviour bLikert item responses (%) (n=90) Median IQR
-aConstruct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing
Sell surplus water to maximise profits
- I 8 0 14 27 14 16 9 12 4 3
- A 3 0 3 16 40 18 9 11 5 2
- SN 6 1 10 27 26 7 7 18 4 1
- PBC 9 1 18 4 32 7 18 11 5 3
- PB 9 1 19 2 9 1 1 58 3 2
Just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water
requirements and leave the remainder of your licence unused
- I 3 2 16 12 37 11 10 9 5 1
- A 2 2 23 28 28 1 3 12 4 2
- SN 2 4 13 22 30 1 9 18 4 1
- PBC 10 6 13 8 28 6 19 11 5 3
- PB 0 1 1 3 30 3 11 50 5 1
Abstract surplus water for storage
- I 6 6 23 18 18 6 6 19 4 2
- A 6 2 10 18 36 8 4 17 5 1
- SN 6 1 10 26 26 3 8 21 4 1
- PBC 10 1 17 11 24 4 18 14 5 3
- PB 7 2 19 4 10 1 1 56 3 2
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A);
Subjective Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past
Behaviour (PB)
b(I), (PBC), and (PB) = strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7);
(A) = extremely disadvantageous (1) to extremely advantageous (7);
and (SN) = definitely shouldn’t (1) to definitely should (7) (4 = not
sure for all constructs)
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Table C.12: Preferred in-season (short-term)/water surplus behavioural intentions
Behaviour bRescaled Likert item responses
∑
Totals cSign test
-aConstruct -3 -2 -1 (n=) 1 2 3 Total (-,+,=)
Just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water
requirements and leave the remainder of your licence unused 182
- I -9 -4 -14 (82) 33 20 27 53 37,29,11
- A -6 -4 -21 (79) 25 2 9 5
- SN -6 -8 -12 (74) 27 2 24 27
- PBC -27 -10 -12 (80) 25 10 51 37
- PB 0 -2 -1 (45) 27 6 30 60
Sell surplus water to maximise profits 155
- I -21 0 -13 (79) 13 28 24 31 33,16,23*
- A -9 0 -3 (80) 36 32 24 80
- SN -15 -2 -9 (74) 23 12 18 27
- PBC -24 -2 -16 (80) 29 12 48 47
- PB -24 -2 -17 (38) 8 2 3 -30
Abstract surplus water for storage 58
- I -15 -10 -21 (73) 16 10 15 -5
- A -15 -4 -9 (75) 32 14 12 30
- SN -15 -2 -9 (71) 23 6 21 24
- PBC -27 -2 -15 (77) 22 8 48 34
- PB -18 -4 -17 (40) 9 2 3 -25
aTheory of Planned Behaviour constructs: Intention (I); Attitude (A); Subjective
Norm (SN); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); and Past Behaviour (PB)
bLikert item scores rescaled from -3 to 3 and multiplied by number of responses
cPositive difference (+); negative difference (-); and ties (=). (*) = p<.05.
Table C.13: Tests for multi-collinearity, and recommended number of cases, in re-
lation to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-term)/water surplus behavioural
intention. Tests for multi-collinearity of the predictor variables (i.e. attitude, subjective norm
(SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC)) in relation to the binary response variable (i.e.
intention) where 0 = strongly disagree to agree and 1 = very much agree to strongly agree with
the intention to just use your abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leave
the remainder of your licence unused (n = 72)
Measure Attitude SN PBC VIF Frequency
0 1
- Intention .467 .129 .483
- Attitude .158 .003 1.026 46 26
- SN .097 1.035 38 34
- PBC 1.010 50 22
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
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Table C.14: Iteration history with regards to respondents’ preferred in-season (short-
term)/water surplus behavioural intention (n = 72)
Iteration -2log Coefficients
likelihood Constant Attitude SN PBC
1 50.304 -2.205 1.641 .032 1.773
2 42.001 -3.492 2.771 -.102 2.849
3 39.176 -4.677 3.912 -.297 3.941
4 38.243 -5.779 5.006 -.406 5.013
5 37.925 -6.809 6.035 -.429 6.038
6 37.811 -7.816 7.041 -.430 7.044
7 37.769 -8.818 8.043 -.431 8.046
8 37.753 -9.818 9.044 -.431 9.047
9 37.747 -10.819 10.044 -.431 10.047
10 37.745 -11.819 11.044 -.431 11.047
11 37.745 -12.819 12.044 -.431 12.047
12 37.744 -13.819 13.044 -.431 13.047
13 37.744 -14.819 14.044 -.431 14.047
14 37.744 -15.819 15.044 -.431 15.047
15 37.744 -16.819 16.044 -.431 16.047
16 37.744 -17.819 17.044 -.431 17.047
17 37.744 -18.819 18.044 -.431 18.047
18 37.744 -19.819 19.044 -.431 19.047
19 37.744 -20.819 20.044 -.431 20.047
20 37.744 -21.819 21.044 -.431 21.047
Estimation terminated at iteration 20 because maximum
iterations had been reached. Final solution was not found
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Table C.15: Influential social group (section B and C of survey)
Scenario bRanking (%) (n=90)
-aSocial group 1 2 3 Missing
Strategic (long-term)/water shortage
- A 27 49 18 7
- B 58 30 3 9
- C 10 12 66 12
Strategic (long-term)/water surplus
- A 27 53 13 7
- B 60 29 4 7
- C 10 10 69 11
In-season (short-term)/water shortage
- A 29 48 13 10
- B 52 31 6 11
- C 11 10 64 14
In-season (short-term)/water surplus
- A 23 47 14 16
- B 53 23 7 17
- C 9 13 58 20
aGroups interested in water saving and
efficiency (A); Groups interested in crop
type and quality (B); and family, friends
and neighbours (C)
bMost influential (1) to least influential (3)
Table C.16: Actual experience of scenario (section B and C of survey)
Scenario Experienced (%) (n=90)
Yes No Missing
Strategic (long-term)/water shortage
9 90 1
Strategic (long-term)/water surplus
51 47 2
In-season (short-term)/water shortage
12 80 8
In-season (short-term)/water surplus
53 36 11
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Figure D.1: Normal probability plots illustrating distribution with regards to irri-
gated area and storage capacity for each farm type. (Top) A normal probability plot
illustrating that neither variables were normally distributed for those who preferred LWUO
which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for both vari-
ables. (Middle) A normal probability plot illustrating that neither variables were normally
distributed for those who had no preference which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk
tests of normality as p = <.05 for both variables. (Bottom) A normal probability plot illus-
trating that neither variables were normally distributed for those who preferred HWUO which
supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for both variables
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Figure D.2: Normal probability plots illustrating distribution with regards to an-
nual and daily licence limits for each farm type. (Top) A normal probability plot illus-
trating that neither variables were normally distributed for those who preferred LWUO which
supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for both variables. (Mid-
dle) A normal probability plot illustrating that neither variables were normally distributed for
those who had no preference which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality
as p = <.05 for both variables. (Bottom) A normal probability plot illustrating that neither
variables were normally distributed for those who preferred HWUO which supports the results
of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for both variables
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Figure D.3: Normal probability plots illustrating distribution with regards to an-
nual, in-season, and out-of-season abstractions for each farm type. (Top) A normal
probability plot illustrating that none of the variables were normally distributed for those who
preferred LWUO which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05
for all variables. (Middle) A normal probability plot illustrating that none of the variables
were normally distributed for those who had no preference which supports the results of the
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for all variables. (Bottom) A normal probability
plot illustrating that none of the variables were normally distributed for those who preferred
HWUO which supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = <.05 for all
variables
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Appendix E
Model description
E.1 Irrigation Water Need (IWN)
E.1.1 Calculating irrigation water need (IWN)
In addition to soil, air, and sunlight crops need water to grow. Where precipitation is
not enough to meet crop water needs alone irrigation is required and in this form is
usually referred to as supplemental irrigation. IWN in this study was calculated using
the method proposed by Brouwer and Heibloem (1986) as:
IWN = ETc − Pe (E.1)
where ETc equals crop evapotranspiration (i.e. crop water need); and Pe equals effec-
tive precipitation (i.e. precipitation which is retained within the root zone).
E.1.2 Calculating crop evapotranspiration (ETc)
Crop evapotranspiration (ETc), under optimal conditions, can be affected by: climate
(i.e. radiation; air temperature; humidity; and wind speed); crop type (i.e. as different
crops, and even varieties of the same crop, have different daily and seasonal crop water
demands); and the growth stage of the crop (i.e. as a fully grown crop will require more
water than the same crop which has just been planted) (Brouwer and Heibloem, 1986).
ETc in this study was calculated using the method proposed by Allen et al. (1998) as:
ETc = EToKc (E.2)
where ETo equals reference evapotranspiration; and Kc equals a crop coefficient.
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E.1.3 Calculating reference evapotranspiration (ETo)
There are multiple methods for calculating reference evapotranspiration (ETo) which
can broadly be categorised into: water-budget; mass-transfer; combination; radiation;
and temperature-based methods (Xu and Singh, 2002). The Food and Agricultural Or-
ganisation of the United Nations (FAO) recommend the use of the Penman-Monteith
method, a combination-based method, as it has shown to provide relatively accurate
results in a variety of locations and climates using a hypothetical grass reference crop
with an assumed crop height of 0.12 m, a fixed surface resistance of 70 s m−1, and
an albedo of 0.23 (Allen et al., 1998). However, despite the accuracy of this method
the main criticism concerns the large data requirements, which for many areas are not
recorded, and include: radiation; air temperature; air humidity; and wind speed data.
As an alternative method, when data is limited, the FAO propose the use of the
1985 Hargreaves method, a temperature-based method, which has shown reasonable
results with global validity and only requires minimum and maximum air temperature
(Allen et al., 1998). In addition, the 1985 Hargreaves method has commonly been
used for providing ETo predictions for weekly or longer periods for use in irrigation
scheduling at the farm and regional level (Hargreaves and Allen, 2003). Eight years of
measured lysimeter evapotranspiration of a cool season grass (Alta fescue), with a crop
height of between 0.08 and 0.15 m, at Davis, California, was used as the reference crop
(Hargreaves and Samani, 1985). ETo in this study was calculated using the method
proposed by Hargreaves and Samani (1985) as:
ETo = CRa(
Tmax+ Tmin
2
+ 17.8)(Tmax− Tmin)E (E.3)
where C and E are parameters of the equation with suggested values of 0.0023 and
0.50 respectively although several studies have indicated that local calibration of these
parameters is necessary in order to improve precision (Luo et al., 2014); Ra equals
extraterrestrial radiation; and Tmax and Tmin equal maximum and minimum tem-
perature (0C) respectively.
E.1.4 Calculating extraterrestrial radiation (Ra)
The solar radiation received at the top of the earth’s atmosphere on a horizontal surface
is called the extraterrestrial (solar) radiation (Ra). If the sun is directly overhead, the
angle of incidence is zero and Ra equals 0.0820 MJ m
−2 min−1. Therefore, as seasons
change the position of the sun and length of day also change thus Ra is a function of
latitude, date, and time (Allen et al., 1998). Ra in this study was calculated using the
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method proposed by Allen et al. (1998) as:
Ra =
24(60)
pi
Gscdr(ωs sin(ϕ) sin(δ) + cos(ϕ) cos(δ) sin(ωs)) (E.4)
dr = 1 + 0.033 cos(
2pi
365
J) (E.5)
ωs = arccos(− tan(j) tan(d)) (E.6)
j =
pi
180
(degree+
minute
60
) (E.7)
d = 0.409 sin(
2pi
365
J − 1.39) (E.8)
where Gsc equals the solar constant 0.0820 MJ m
−2 min−1; dr equals the inverse rel-
ative distance between the earth and sun (see equation E.5); J equals the day of the
year (between 1 and 365 or 366 in a leap year); ωs equals the sunset hour angle (see
equation E.6); j equals latitude in radians (see equation E.7); and d equals solar dec-
imation (see equation E.8). Furthermore, to convert Ra into equivalent mm day
−1 it
can be multiplied by 0.408 (a conversion factor equal to the inverse of the latent heat
of vaporisation).
Therefore, monthly and annual ETo values were calculated for the study area from
1973 to 2012 using: regional average minimum and maximum temperature data ob-
tained from the UK Met Office (MetOffice, 2016); the central point of the study area
to determine latitude (i.e. 52021’ N); and the 15th day of each month to determine
day of the year. Furthermore, Figure E.1 (top) illustrates the minimum, average, and
maximum ETo values from 1962 to 1996 presented by Hess (1996) for the months April
to September at Silsoe College, Bedfordshire (located within the study area) which
were used to calibrate the model. Initial results of the uncalibrated model using the
suggested values of 0.0023 and 0.50 for parameters C and E, and temperature data
for the same period, resulted in an overestimation of ETo values. Therefore the pa-
rameters were reduced systematically until ETo values were similar to those presented
by Hess (1996) using values 0.0020 and 0.30 for parameters C and E respectively. In
addition, Figure E.1 (bottom) illustrates a strong, positive, linear correlation between
the average ETo values presented by Hess (1996) and those calibrated for this study
for the period 1962 to 1996 (r= .99) which was also statistically significant (p= <.001).
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Figure E.1: A line graph and scatter plot indicating the strength of association
between monthly reference evapotranspiration calibrated in this study and those
presented by Hess (1996) (1962 to 1996). (Top) A line graph indicating calibrated
and uncalibrated monthly reference evapotranspiration (ETo) in relation to those presented
by Hess (1996) (1962 to 1996). (Bottom) A scatter plot indicating the strength of association
between average ETo presented by Hess (1996) and calibrated ETo for this study (1962 to 1996)
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient r= .99, p= <.001)
E.1.5 Calculating crop coefficients (Kc)
The relationship between ETc and ETo is given by the crop coefficient (Kc). To de-
termine Kc values it is necessary to know: the total growing period for each crop; the
various growth stages of each crop; and the Kc values for each crop for each of the
growing stages (Brouwer and Heibloem, 1986). Two crops were selected which repre-
sented the two most irrigated crop categories in the study area: main crop potatoes
(Solanum tuberosum) which accounted for 41 % of irrigated crops and vegetables (car-
rots) (Daucus carota) which represented 33 % of irrigated crops. Carrots were selected
to represent vegetables similar to the study presented by Knox et al. (1997) which
examined IWN at Silsoe College, Bedforshire. The total growing period, in days, for
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Table E.1: Input data for deriving crop coefficient (Kc) values
Measure Main crop Vegetables
potatoes (i.e. carrots)
Planting date 1st Apr. 1st May
Harvest date 15th Sep. 20th Sep.
Total growing days 168 143
- Initial stage 40 31
- Crop development stage 61 76
- Mid-season stage 31 18
- Late-season stage 36 18
Kc values
- Initial stage 0.45 0.45
- Crop development stage 0.75 0.75
- Mid-season stage 1.10 1.00
- Late-season stage 0.85 1.00
each crop is from planting, or transplanting, to harvest. Once the total growing pe-
riod is known the total number of days is divided into four growing stages: the initial
stage (i.e. from planting, or transplanting until the crop covers approximately 10 to
20 % of the ground); the crop development stage (i.e. from the initial stage until full
ground cover); the mid-season stage (i.e. from the crop development stage until the
crop reaches maturity); and the late-season stage (i.e. from mid-season until harvest).
Although Kc values provided by Brouwer and Heibloem (1986) were used in this study
local data regarding: planting and harvest dates; length of crop growth stages and Kc
values at full cover (i.e. mid-season stage) were derived from Knox et al. (1997) and
are presented in Table E.1.
However, the number of days for each crop growing stage does not always equate
to the number of days in each month. Therefore, when this occurred Kc in this study
was calculated using the method proposed by Brouwer and Heibloem (1986) as:
Kc = (
nstage1
nmonth
∗Kcstage1) + (n
stage2
nmonth
∗Kcstage2) (E.9)
where nmonth equals the number of days in a given month; nstage1 and nstage2 equal
the number of growing days in the given month associated with each growing stage;
and Kc
stage1 and Kc
stage2 equal the corresponding Kc values for relevant growing stages.
E.1.6 Calculating effective precipitation (Pe)
Only precipitation water which is retained within the root zone can be utilised by
crops (i.e. commonly referred to as effective precipitation (Pe)) whilst the remainder
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is lost through: evaporation; deep percolation; or surface run-off. The main factors
which determine the amount of precipitation which is retained in the root zone include:
climate; soil texture; soil structure; and depth of the root zone. Although more complex
methods can be used to calculate Pe the method used in this study was that proposed
by Brouwer and Heibloem (1986) as:
Pe = 0.8P − 25 if P > 75 (E.10)
Pe = 0.6P − 10 if P < 75 (E.11)
where P equals precipitation (mm month−1).
Therefore, monthly and annual IWN were calculated for main crop potatoes and
vegetables (i.e. carrots) from 1973 to 2012. Furthermore, 1983 and 1988 were selected
as the dry and wet years used as the climate scenarios for this study based on total
annual IWN (i.e. combined IWN of the two crops) which was equalled or exceeded 20
% and 80 % of years respectively which is a method commonly adopted for these types
of studies (Knox et al., 1997) (see Figure E.2).
Moreover, Table E.2 presents IWN for each crop, and the total, during both the dry
and wet years. Interestingly, although total IWN for both crops is greatest during the
dry year (i.e. 138 Ml and 119 Ml respectively) compared to the wet year (i.e. 64 Ml and
48 Ml respectively) irrigation is still required for a longer period of time during the wet
year for both crops. In particular, main crop potatoes required supplemental irrigation
from June to August during the dry year but from April to September, excluding July,
during the wet year. Vegetables (i.e. carrots) also required supplemental irrigation
from June to August during the dry year but from June to September, excluding July,
during the wet year.
In addition, Knox et al. (1997) reported IWN of 235 mm and 164 mm for main crop
potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots) respectively, during a design dry year based on
data obtained between 1973 and 1992, on medium available water capacity soil whilst
the method presented in this study calculated IWN of 251 mm and 195 mm, on average,
using temperature and precipitation data for the same period. However, the estimates
presented by Knox et al. (1997) were based on an irrigation water requirement model
using: different climate data; a two layer soil water balance model to estimate soil water
storage; and the Penman-Monteith method to calculate ETo. Therefore, the dry and
wet years used as the two climate scenarios for this study represent reasonable IWN
estimates.
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Figure E.2: Bar charts illustrating total annual irrigation water need (IWN) of
main crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots) for the study area from 1973 to
2012 highlighting dry and wet years (i.e. 1983 and 1988 respectively). (Top) A bar
chart illustrating total annual irrigation water need (IWN) of main crop potatoes and vegetables
(i.e. carrots) for the study area from 1973 to 2012 highlighting dry and wet years (i.e. 1983 and
1988 respectively). (Bottom) A bar chart illustrating the percentage of years which exceeded
particular levels of total annual IWN of main crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. carrots) for
the study area, for the period 1973 to 2012, highlighting dry and wet years (i.e. 1983 and 1988
respectively)
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Table E.2: Irrigation water needs (IWN) during dry and wet years (i.e. 1983 and 1988
respectively)
Month Pot−dry Veg−dry Total−dry Pot−wet Veg−wet Total−wet
(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
- Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Apr 0 0 0 3 0 3
- May 0 0 0 9 0 9
- Jun 33 33 66 18 18 37
- Jul 60 43 103 0 0 0
- Aug 45 42 87 28 25 53
- Sep 0 0 0 7 4 11
- Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Annual 138 119 256 64 48 113
E.2 Input data
Table E.3: Model input data with regards to farm type parameters
Variable aLWUO No bHWUO
preferred preference preferred
Farm type 1 2 3
Number of farmers 192 226 418
Median irrigated area (m2) 380,000 490,000 760,000
- 75th percentile (m2) 510,000 1,760,000 1,650,000
- 25th percentile (m2) 180,000 210,000 350,000
Main crop potato cover (%) .63 .49 .57
Vegetable cover (%) .37 .51 .43
Storage availability (%) .24 .5 .6
Storage only licence (%) .0 .16 .22
Median storage capacity (m3) 100,000 68,000 136,000
- 75th percentile (m3) 114,000 165,000 307,000
- 25th percentile (m3) 50,000 38,000 61,000
Median annual licence limit (m3) 17,727 48,595 54,500
- 75th percentile (m3) 33,773 87,730 100,000
- 25th percentile (m3) 8,190 19,884 25,846
a Low water usage options (LWUO)
b High water usage options (HWUO)
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Table E.4: Model input data with regards to Assessment Point (AP) names, and low (Q95)
and high (Q30) flow conditions (m3/s)
Assessment Point Low flow condition High flow condition
(AP) name (Q95) (m3/s) (Q30) (m3/s)
C1AP01 0.24 0.89
C1AP02 0.09 0.32
C1AP04 0.25 0.94
C1AP06 0.14 0.54
C1AP07 0.14 0.53
C1AP08 0.35 1.33
C1AP09 0.56 2.11
C1AP10 0.26 0.99
C1AP00 0.16 1.27
C2AP00 0.68 5.43
C3AP02 0.01 0.32
C3AP03 0.25 1.05
C3AP04 0.26 1.31
C3AP07 0.11 0.36
C3AP08 0.02 0.33
C3AP09 0.44 1.47
C3AP11 0.10 0.82
C3AP12 0.09 0.54
C3AP13 0.50 2.31
C3AP17 2.38 19.06
C4AP01 2.90 20.54
C4AP03 2.45 17.37
C4AP05 2.37 14.59
C4AP06 1.09 3.33
C4AP12 0.46 5.53
C4AP14 0.55 2.59
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E.3 Submodels
Submodels presented below relate to those briefly described in Figure 6.2.
E.3.1 run-monthly-parameters
The first submodel is an observer procedure which sets the global environment state
variables including: IWN of main crop potatoes; IWN of vegetables (i.e. carrots); and
AP river discharges. However, these variables vary depending on the climate scenario
being simulated (i.e. a dry or wet year). Nonetheless, the input data are converted to
m3 per month, and therefore the global environment state variables were set as:
IWNpot(m
3) = IWNpot(mm)/1000 (E.12)
IWNveg(m
3) = IWNveg(mm)/1000 (E.13)
APdischarge(m
3) = APdischarge(m
3/s) ∗ 60 ∗ 60 ∗ 24 ∗ 30 (E.14)
where IWNpot and IWNveg equal IWN of main crop potatoes and vegetables (i.e. car-
rots) respectively; and APdiscahrge equals the river discharge of an AP area.
E.3.2 calculate-farm-water-requirements
The second submodel is a farmer procedure which sets IWN of main crop potatoes,
vegetables (i.e. carrots), and the total IWN of the two combined for each farmer (i.e.
farm water requirements). These were calculated as:
FarmIWNpot(m
3) = IWNpot(m
3) ∗ (IA(m2) ∗ CCpot(%)) (E.15)
FarmIWNveg(m
3) = IWNveg(m
3) ∗ (IA(m2) ∗ CCveg(%)) (E.16)
FarmIWNtotal(m
3) = FarmIWNpot(m
3) + FarmIWNveg(m
3) (E.17)
where FarmIWNpot and FarmIWNveg equal farm IWN of main crop potatoes and veg-
etables (i.e. carrots) respectively; IA equals irrigated area of the farm; CCpot and CCveg
equal the percentage crop cover of main crop potatoes and vegetables respectively; and
FarmIWNtotal equals the total IWN of the farm.
186 Chapter E: Model description
E.3.3 calculate-ap-water-availability
The third submodel involves both grid and farmer procedures. First, water availability,
and low (Q95) and high (Q30) flow conditions converted to m3, were set for each AP
area (i.e. landscape state variables) as:
APwater−available(m3) = APdischarge(m3) (E.18)
APlow−flow(m3) = APlow−flow(m3/s) ∗ 60 ∗ 60 ∗ 24 ∗ 30 (E.19)
APhigh−flow(m3) = APhigh−flow(m3/s) ∗ 60 ∗ 60 ∗ 24 ∗ 30 (E.20)
where APwater−available equals water availability in an AP area; APlow−flow and APhigh−flow
equal the low and high flow conditions of an AP area respectively.
Secondly, each farmer then calculates how much water is available in the AP in
which they are located. Under the current water allocation system, water availability
was set as equation E.18, as no low flow conditions are enforced by the regulatory
authority, and therefore all water was available. In reality, some licences have HoF
conditions attached to them but as this data was unavailable, HoF were not included in
the model. However, under the proposed water allocation systems, low flow conditions
are enforced and therefore water availability was set as:
APwater−available(m3) = APwater−available(m3)−APlow−flow(m3) (E.21)
E.3.4 calculate-farm-water-availability
The fourth submodel is a farmer procedure which calculates farmers’ monthly licensed
water available, and storage water available (i.e. their two sources of water). However,
monthly licensed water available depends on the policy scenario being simulated as
seasonal restrictions on licences are only enforced under the current system. Therefore,
monthly licensed water available for each licence type was set as:
Licencedirect(m
3) = Licenceannual(m
3)/7 (E.22)
Licencestorage(m
3) = Licenceannual(m
3)/5 (E.23)
Licencedirectandstorage(m
3) = Licenceannual(m
3)/12 (E.24)
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where Licencedirect equals monthly licensed water available for farmers with direct li-
cences (i.e. 7 months of the year during in-season); Licenceannual equals farmers annual
licence limit derived during model initialisation; Licencestorage equals monthly licensed
water available for farmers with storage only licences (i.e. 5 months of the year during
out-of-season); and Licencedirectandstorage equals monthly licensed water available for
farmers with direct and storage licences (i.e. 12 months of the year).
Therefore, under the current water allocation system, if water was available within
an AP area, farmers’ monthly licensed water availability was set depending on their
licence type. If water was unavailable in the AP area, then no farmers’ would have
monthly licensed water available. However, under the basic and enhanced water al-
location systems, seasonal restrictions on licences are removed, and therefore, in the
model, all licences became direct and storage, as farmers could abstract for 12 months
of the year, as long as water was available within the AP area. Furthermore, under the
enhanced water allocation system, monthly licensed water availability was based on a
share of available water within an AP area. Therefore, during the first month of the
year a percentage was calculated for each farmer as:
Licenceshare(%) = Licencedirectandstorage(m
3)/APwater−available−proposed(m3) (E.25)
where Licenceshare(%) equals the percentage used in subsequent months to derive
monthly licensed water availability. Therefore, in subsequent months, monthly licensed
water availability was set as:
Licenceshare(m
3) = Licenceshare(%) ∗APwater−available−proposed(m3) (E.26)
where Licenceshare equals monthly water available for farmers under the proposed en-
hanced water allocation system.
Overall, licensed water available depended on the policy scenario being simulated
but was set as one of the above for each farmer and is referred to simply as Licenceavailable
for the remainder of the submodels. Furthermore, storage water available was set as:
Storageavailable(m
3) = Storageannual(m
3) (E.27)
where Storageavailable equals farmers’ storage water available; and Storageannual equals
farmers storage capacity derived during model initialisation.
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E.3.5 calculate-farm-water-abstractions
The fifth submodel is a more complex farmer procedure which calculates farmers’
monthly licensed abstractions, and storage water balance (i.e. how much they abstract
to refill and how much they abstract to satisfy IWN) (see Figure 6.3). Furthermore,
the procedures involved have been discussed in Section 6.2.1 and are not repeated
here. Nonetheless, this section provides the main calculations involved. If a farmer
had monthly licensed water available, and it was greater than their IWN, then licence
abstracted for IWN was set as:
LicenceabstractedforIWN (m
3) = FarmIWNtotal(m
3) (E.28)
however, if a farmer had monthly licensed water available, and it was less than their
IWN, then licence abstracted for IWN was set as:
LicenceabstractedforIWN (m
3) = Licenceavailable(m
3) (E.29)
where LicenceabstractedforIWN equals the volume of monthly licensed water available ab-
stracted to satisfy IWN.
After licensed water available has been abstracted for farm IWN, farmers calculate
whether they have surplus water available for storage. This is set as:
Licenceavailableforstorage(m
3) = Licenceavailable(m
3)− LicenceabstractedforIWN (m3)
(E.30)
where Licenceavailableforstorage equals the remainder of the monthly licensed volume avail-
able which was not used to satisfy IWN. Farmers also calculate whether they require
to use their storage to satisfy farm IWN, if their monthly licensed volume available
was not enough. If a farmer has storage water available, and it was greater than the
shortage required to satisfy farm IWN, then:
StorageabstractedforIWN (m
3) = FarmIWNtotal(m
3)− LicenceabstractedforIWN (m3)
(E.31)
however, if a farmer has storage water available, and it was less than the shortage
required to satisfy farm IWN, then:
StorageabstractedforIWN (m
3) = Storageavailable(m
3) (E.32)
where StorageabstractedforIWN equals the volume of storage water available abstracted to
satisfy IWN.
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Farmers then record how much of their storage water they have remaining, and the
how much they require to replenish to full capacity. These are set as:
Storagelimitnextmonth(m
3) = Storagelimitnextmonth(m
3)− StorageabstractedforIWN (m3)
(E.33)
and;
Storagedeficitnextmonth(m
3) = Storageannual(m
3)− Storagelimitnextmonth(m3) (E.34)
where Storagelimitnextmonth equals how much storage water a farmer has remaining; and
Storagedeficitnextmonth equals how much water a farmer requires to replenish their farm
storage reservoir. Therefore, if a storage water deficit exists, and licence available for
storage was less than the deficit, then:
Licenceabstractedforstorage(m
3) = Licenceavailableforstorage(m
3) (E.35)
or where licence available for storage was greater than the deficit, then:
Licenceabstractedforstorage(m
3) = Storagedeficitnextmonth(m
3) (E.36)
where Licenceabstractedforstorage equals the volume of monthly licensed water available
which was abstracted to replenish a farm storage reservoir. In addition, if licensed water
is abstracted for storage then the storage limit next month is updated accordingly:
Storagelimitnextmonth(m
3) = Storagelimitnextmonth(m
3) + Licenceabstractedforstorage(m
3)
(E.37)
Furthermore, farmers’ also record how much of their annual and monthly licensed
water they have available for the following month. These are set as:
Licenceannuallimitnextmonth(m
3) = Licenceannuallimitnextmonth(m
3)−
LicenceabstractedforIWN (m
3)− Licenceabstractedforstorage(m3)
(E.38)
and if licence annual limit next month is greater than their licence monthly limit
next month, then:
Licencemonthlylimitnextmonth(m
3) = Licenceannuallimitnextmonth(m
3) (E.39)
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however, if it less, then:
Licencemonthlylimitnextmonth(m
3) = Licencemonthlylimitnextmonth(m
3) (E.40)
where Licenceannuallimitnextmonth equals annual licensed volume remaining which was set
to annual licence limit during model initialisation; and Licenceannuallimitnextmonth equals
the monthly licensed volume remaining depending on the volume of their annual licence
remaining. Lastly, farmers calculate the total volume of licensed water they abstracted:
Licenceabstractedtotal(m
3) = LicenceabstractedforIWN (m
3)+Licenceabstractedforstorage(m
3)
(E.41)
E.3.6 perform-preferred-behavioural-strategies
This final submodel is another farmer procedure where farmers’ perform, if required,
their in-season (short-term) water shortage and surplus behaviours as discussed in
Section 6.2.1. These are dependent on farm type and whether behaviours are triggered
in the model. However, first, farmers calculate how much water they have in total to
satisfy their farm IWN:
FarmIWNtotalavailable(m
3) = LicenceabstractedforIWN (m
3)+StorageabstractedforIWN (m
3)
(E.42)
where FarmIWNtotalavailable equals the total water that the farmer has at their disposal.
This is then divided equally between the two crops, if they require it:
PotIWNtotalavailable(m
3) = (100/FarmIWNtotal(m
3)) ∗ FarmIWNpot(m3) (E.43)
PotIWNavailable(m
3) = (PotIWNtotalavailable(m
3)/100) ∗ FarmIWNtotalavailable(m3)
(E.44)
V egIWNtotalavailable(m
3) = (100/FarmIWNtotal(m
3)) ∗ FarmIWNveg(m3) (E.45)
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V egIWNavailable(m
3) = (V egIWNtotalavailable(m
3)/100) ∗ FarmIWNtotalavailable(m3)
(E.46)
where PotIWNtotalavailable and VegIWNtotalavailable are temporary variables which equal
the volume of farm IWN available which is required by each crop; PotIWNavailable and
VegIWNavailable equal the actual volume of water which is available for each crop.
Farmers then determine whether they have a shortage or surplus of water. If the
total volume of water a farmer has at their disposal is less than their farm IWN, then
they have a shortage:
Shortage(m3) = FarmIWNtotal(m
3)− FarmIWNtotalavailable(m3) (E.47)
If, however, the total volume of licensed water abstracted was less than their total
licensed water available, then they have a surplus:
Surplus(m3) = Licenceavailable(m
3)− Licenceabstractedtotal(m3) (E.48)
As all farmers preferred to only use their maximum abstraction licence to irrigate
their most valuable crops, then they all perform the same strategy. In this model, their
most valuable crop was considered the crop which covered the largest percentage of
their irrigated area. Therefore, if a shortage existed, and main crop potatoes were the
predominant crop, and their IWN was greater than the farm IWN available, then:
PotIWNapplied(m
3) = FarmIWNtotalavailable(m
3 (E.49)
and;
V egIWNapplied(m
3) = 0 (E.50)
where PotIWNapplied equals the total volume of water available to satisfy IWN of main
crop potatoes; and VegIWNapplied equals the total volume of water available to satisfy
IWN of vegetables (i.e. carrots). However, if main crop potatoes IWN was less than
the farm IWN available, then:
PotIWNapplied(m
3) = FarmIWNpot(m
3) (E.51)
and;
V egIWNapplied(m
3) = FarmIWNtotalavailable(m
3 − PotIWNapplied(m3) (E.52)
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Conversely, when vegetables (i.e. carrots) were the predominant crop, the same cal-
culations were performed, and not repeated here, except the role of main crop potatoes
and vegetables (i.e. carrots) were switched. Furthermore, if a water shortage did not
occur then farmers divided their total water available equally between the two crops
based on the percentage of their crop cover as previously discussed.
If a water surplus existed, then those who preferred LWUO preferred to just use
their abstraction licence to meet crop water requirements and leave the remainder of
their licence unused. Those who had no preference preferred to sell surplus water to
maximise profits. Whilst those who preferred HWUO preferred to abstract surplus
water for storage. However, as the latter strategy was performed automatically by all
farm types, if farmers had storage available, those who preferred HWUO reverted to
their second preference, to sell surplus water to maximise profits. Therefore, although
nothing was to be reported for those who preferred LWUO, the quantity of water
available for sale was recorded for those who had no preference and those who preferred
HWUO:
Surplusavailableforsale(m
3) = Surplus(m3) (E.53)
E.4 Results
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Figure E.3: Normal probability plots illustrating distribution with regards to an-
nual, in-season, and out-of-season abstractions for each simulated farm type. (Top)
A normal probability plot illustrating that annual, and out-of-season, abstractions were nor-
mally distributed, whilst in-season abstractions were not for those who preferred LWUO. This
supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05 for both annual and
out-of-season abstractions, whilst p = <.05 for in-season abstractions. (Middle) A normal prob-
ability plot illustrating that all of the variables were normally distributed for those who had
no preference. This supports the results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05
for all of variables. (Bottom) A normal probability plot illustrating that all of the variables
were normally distributed for those who preferred HWUO. This supports the results of the
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality as p = >.05 for all of variables
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,
sh
o
rt
a
g
e
w
a
te
r
re
q
u
ir
e
d
,
a
n
d
fa
rm
ir
ri
g
a
ti
o
n
w
a
te
r
n
e
e
d
sa
ti
sfi
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
e
a
ch
p
o
li
c
y
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
fo
r
b
o
th
d
ry
a
n
d
w
e
t
y
e
a
r
c
li
m
a
te
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
s.
(T
op
le
ft
)
A
n
or
m
al
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p
lo
t
il
lu
st
ra
ti
n
g
th
a
t
li
ce
n
ce
vo
lu
m
e
a
b
st
ra
ct
ed
w
a
s
n
o
t
n
o
rm
a
ll
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
a
n
y
o
f
th
e
p
ol
ic
y
or
cl
im
at
e
sc
en
ar
io
s.
T
h
is
su
p
p
or
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
f
th
e
S
h
a
p
ir
o
-W
il
k
te
st
s
o
f
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
a
s
p
=
<
.0
5
u
n
d
er
th
e
cu
rr
en
t
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
se
d
b
a
si
c
w
a
te
r
al
lo
ca
ti
on
sy
st
em
s
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
d
ry
y
ea
r
cl
im
at
e
sc
en
ar
io
,
w
h
il
st
p
=
>
.0
5
,
b
u
t
o
n
ly
m
a
rg
in
a
ll
y,
u
n
d
er
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
p
o
li
cy
a
n
d
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
s.
(T
o
p
ri
gh
t)
A
n
or
m
al
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p
lo
t
il
lu
st
ra
ti
n
g
th
at
su
rp
lu
s
w
a
te
r
av
a
il
a
b
le
w
a
s
n
o
t
n
o
rm
a
ll
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
a
n
y
o
f
th
e
p
o
li
cy
o
r
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
s.
T
h
is
su
p
p
or
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
S
h
ap
ir
o-
W
il
k
te
st
s
of
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
a
s
p
=
<
.0
5
u
n
d
er
a
ll
p
o
li
cy
sc
en
a
ri
o
s
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
d
ry
ye
a
r
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
a
n
d
u
n
d
er
th
e
p
ro
p
os
ed
en
h
an
ce
d
w
at
er
al
lo
ca
ti
on
sy
st
em
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
w
et
ye
a
r
cl
im
a
te
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en
a
ri
o
,
w
h
il
st
p
=
>
.0
5
,
b
u
t
o
n
ly
m
a
rg
in
a
ll
y,
u
n
d
er
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
p
o
li
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sc
en
ar
io
s.
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ot
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m
le
ft
)
A
n
or
m
al
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p
lo
t
il
lu
st
ra
ti
n
g
th
a
t
sh
o
rt
a
g
e
w
a
te
r
re
q
u
ir
ed
w
a
s
n
o
t
n
o
rm
a
ll
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
a
n
y
o
f
th
e
p
o
li
cy
o
r
cl
im
at
e
sc
en
ar
io
s.
T
h
is
su
p
p
or
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
S
h
a
p
ir
o
-W
il
k
te
st
s
o
f
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
a
s
p
=
<
.0
5
fo
r
a
ll
p
o
li
cy
a
n
d
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
s.
(B
o
tt
o
m
ri
g
h
t)
A
n
or
m
al
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
p
lo
t
il
lu
st
ra
ti
n
g
th
at
fa
rm
ir
ri
ga
ti
o
n
w
a
te
r
n
ee
d
sa
ti
sfi
ed
w
a
s
n
o
t
n
o
rm
a
ll
y
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
a
n
y
o
f
th
e
p
o
li
cy
o
r
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
s.
T
h
is
su
p
p
or
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
S
h
ap
ir
o-
W
il
k
te
st
s
of
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
a
s
p
=
<
.0
5
fo
r
a
ll
p
o
li
cy
a
n
d
cl
im
a
te
sc
en
a
ri
o
s

